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Manpower programs for the disadvantaged have been
operated in the United States for approximately fifteen
years.

The programs - introduced under the authority of the

Manpower Development and Training Act of 1961, the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964, the 1967 amendments to the Social
Security Act, and the Comprehensive Training and Employment
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Act of 1973 - were all concerned with the employment and
earning of certain groups.

This body of legislation was

intended to intervene in particular sectors of the labor
market having a differentially high unemployment rate, not
offset by higher wages and other benefits.

The intent was

to reduce labor market immobility due to geographical location, lack of skills, and age, sex or color discrimination.
The ultimate objective of the manpower programs was to
improve the employment and earnings experience of the disadvantaged target population.

Little is presently known

about the impact of the programs on the earnings and employment of participants after they leave the program.
This retrospective study attempts to determine the
impact of the Portland Concentrated Employment Program
(PCEP) on the post-training incomes of 1985 peEP participants and a control group of 1150 individuals applying to or
enrolled in the peEP between 1968 and 1972.

The control

group is a group of persons who are statistically equivalent
to the participants as far as demographic variables and
their application to and eligibility for the peEP; but, who
for some

unknr~n

reason, did not enter the program.

Follow-

up income information was purchased from the U.S. Social
Security Administration in coded cells containing five or
more individuals.

The five digit numeric code classified

individuals by participation or nonparticipation in the
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peEP, sex, race, age, and education.

The Analysis of Vari-

ance statistical technique was utilized in analyzing the
1973 mean earnings of the code groups included in the study.
The analysis of the data resulted in the following
major findings.

Of the five independent variables - par-

ticipation, sex, race, age, and education - there were
significant interactions between participation, race, and
age; participation and race; and sex and age.

The first

interaction is a result of Black participants and the White
control group earning their highest incomes between the ages
of 21-25 years.

White participants and the Black control

group had generally rising incomes as age increased up to 45
years.

All groups 45 years and over earned low incomes

relative to other groups in the study.

The interaction

between participation and race resulted from the Black
control group in most cases earning more than all other
groups in the study.

Black participants earned slightly

more than White participants.

But, the White participant

group appears to have benefitted more from participation in
the peEP, in comparison with the White control group, than
did Black participants.

Enrollment in the peEP in most

cases did not raise the incomes of participants significantly higher than the incomes of the control group.

Sex

and age demonstrated a significant interaction which was
primarily due to the poor performance of males ages 45 and
over.

In all other age groups males earned significantly
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more than females.

The groups with a high school degree and

under 45 years of age earned significantly more than those
without a high school degree.

The education group benefit-

ting most from participation in the PCEP included persons
with 1-9 years of education.
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this
study in both the participant and the control groups earned
incomes below the official 1973 poverty level.

Participa-

tion in the PCEP did not raise the mean earnings of groups
studied above the poverty level.

Considering income alone,

approximately thirteen percent of the participants in comparison with their control groups are considered to have
benefitted significantly from the PCEP.

Six percent of

the participants may have gained more benefit from continued
labor market participation than from enrollment in the
PCEP.

The findings 'of this study indicate that the benefits

to participants in the PCEP were not as substantial as
expected.

PREFACE
This dissertation was funded by

u.s.

Department of

Labor Doctorial Dissertation Grant Number 91-41-75-16.
Certain data used in this dissertation were derived
from statistics furnished by the U.S. Social Security
Administration.

The author did not at any time have access

to any information relating to specific individuals or
reporting units.

The author assumes the full responsibility

for the analysis and interpretation of the data.
The information concerning the functioning of the
Comprehensive Employment & Training Act of 1973 (CETA) in
the Portland metropolitan area was obtained through taped
interviews with city officials and manpower staff personnel
in the metropolitan area, and the Executive Secretary of the
CETA Balance of State Prime Sponsor for the State of Oregon.
The interviews took place during February and March 1975.
Each subject taped was asked for permission to record the
interview and all consented.
ded.

One interview was not recor-

At the time of the interviews CETA VI was in the

beginning stages of implementation.

Consequently, the

concentration of Chapters III & IV is on the implications
and effects of CETA Title I which authorized a decentralized, decategorized manpower system.

Detailed observations
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on the operation of only two of the five prime sponsors in
the Portland area are included.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The major purpose of this dissertation is to evaluate
the impact of the Portland Concentrated Employment Program
(CEP) on participants in tr2 manpower program.

Income

information on CEP participants between 1968 through 1972
and a control group was obtained from the
ity Administration.

u.s.

Social Secur-

The analysis and the findings are

covered in Chapters V and VI of the dissertation.
The Concentrated Employment Program is one of many
programs which are subsumed under the general category of
manpower policy.

To relate the Concentrated Employment

Program to the body of manpower policy, the first chapters
of the dissertation present a historical review of the evolution of manpower policy in the United States during the
last fifty years.

This review reveals three major periods

in which the focus or organization of manpower policies
underwent significant changes.

The first period, which

spans the years from 1930 until the late 1950's, marked the
beginning of a national concern legitimized through legislation about unemployment levels.

The New Deal and the

Employment Act of 1946 are the major legislative milestones
during this period.

The second stage occurred during the
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decade from approximately 1960 to 1970.

High and seemingly

stable unemployment rates among the disadvantaged were combined with the optimistic belief at the federal governmental
level, that centrally administered programs providing training, education, and placement would provide the desired
impact on the problems of structural unemployment.

The

programs were expected to raise the incomes and employment
rates of participants.

The Manpower Development and Train-

ing Act of 1961 was the major piece of legislation passed
during this decade.

Gradual disillusionment with the feder-

al programs occurred during the second half of the decade.
Various attempts to consolidate and coordinate the manpower
programs while maintaining federal control were unsuccessful
in significantly reducing the problems.

The creation of the

Concentrated Employment Program was an example of the federal
attempt to reduce the confusion, fragmentation, and duplication which characterized the manpower delivery system in the
late 1960's.

But, for various reasons discussed in the body

of the dissertation, a workable efficient federally administered manpower system appeared doomed to failure.

The

continuing problems led federal policymakers to search for
alternative methods of service delivery.

After lengthy

consideration national elected officials chose to decentralize and decategorize manpower programs.

The resulting

third stage which reaches up to the present time, is characterized by the shift in control of manpower programs from
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the federal to the state and local levels.

The major legis-

lation empowering the shift in the delivery system was the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA).
Chapters III and IV discuss the expectations of CETA's
sponsors and the functioning of the new CETA programs operating in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area.
This dissertation attempts to examine the manpower
policy area from the framework of policy analysis.

The

emphasis is placed on the identification of the manpower
problem, the formulation of a course of action, the legitimation of the policy, the application of the policy, evaluation, and feedback into the policy process.

The evaluation

of the impact of the Portland CEP program is considered a
necessary and important part of the policy-making process.
Although the method of delivering manpower services has
shifted, the basic assumption that manpower programs providing a group of services can have a positive impact on the
long-term incomes and employment of the disadvantaged participant has not been adequately examined.

The analysis of

the impact of CEP on its participants provides new information which may be of use to decision makers when considering changes in future manpower programs.

The evaluation of

the Portland CEP should have particular relevance to planners for Portland CETA programs which are currently based on
the CEP model and include participants from the same geographic area.

4
~~NPOWER

POLICY

The word "manpower" is a fairly recent addition to the
vocabulary, but in the largest sense we have always had
manpower policies - policies affecting the size, skills,
and disposition of the working force.

Immigration, slavery,

land laws, and universal education were all at their heart
I

manpower policies.

A clear definition of manpower policy

is made difficult by its overlap with many other policy
areas, particularly

economic and education policies.

It is

possible to separate, in concept at least, education and
economic policy from manpower policy by examining the
emphases and primary goals which have emerged in these areas
over time.
Education policy in the United States has been concerned primarily with general education and literacy levels.
The primary goal of education is to teach people to think,
not to prepare them for employment.

Little emphasis in

education has been placed on developing skills training for
specific occupations.
General economic policy, using the federal governmentis fiscal and monetary tools, has concentrated on monitoring and influencing the aggregate levels of demand and
supply in the general economy, as well as aggregate unem2
ployment levels.
Fiscal and monetary tools, which include
regulation of the quantity of money circulating in the
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economy and the manipulation of federal government expenditures and revenues, have been perceived by policy-makers as
affecting both aggregate unemployment levels and inflation.
The development of manpower policy in the early 1960's was
an outcome of national political leaders' reluctance to
employ an aggressive fiscal policy to lower high aggregate
unemployment levels.

The primary reason for the hesitation

was the fear that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies
would lead to price increases and spiralling inflation.
Alternatively, national leaders pursued a policy
intended to intervene in the more narrowly defined problems
of structural unemployment.

This legislation became the

foundation of present manpower policy.

"Structural unem-

ployment exists in particular sectors of the labor market
having differentially high unemployment rates when these
differentials are not offset by relatively high wages or
other advantages, and workers find it difficult or impos3
sible to move to sectors with lower unemployment rates."
Immobility which may be due to geographical location; lack
of skills; or age, sex, and color barriers is an essential
feature of structural unemployment.

Consequently, manpower

policies intended to reduce structural unemployment are
aimed more at specific sectors of the labor force and are
concerned more with the employment and employability of particular individuals and groups, than aggregate levels of
employment.

The goals of manpower policy, which may include

6
increasing clients' literacy levels or reducing unemployment
within target areas, are more specific than the goals of
economic policy.

Nevertheless, economic policy is inextri-

cably tied to manpower policy in that economic policies
invariably affect the number and availability of jobs.
Aggregate unemployment levels determine the number and
quality of applicants for job openings.

Thus, different

manpower intervention strategies are more likely to benefit
the victims of structural unemployment during favorable
economic cycles than during recessions and vice versa. The
development of mechanisms to integrate economic, education,
and manpower policies is an administrative function within
the Executive Branch of the government.
Very broadly the goals of manpower policy are to
develop employment opportunities for all who want them, to
improve the skills of the labor force, and to match the

4
labor supply to the demand for labor.

~ore

specifically,

manpower policy in the last decade has been primarily concerned with increasing the skills, incomes, job opportunities, and length of employment among the disadvantaged
population.

Manpower programs have attempted to provide

education, occupational skills, counselling, and job placement for that portion of the labor force which has historically been at the end of the labor queue.

In attempting to

open the door for the disadvantaged workers in the private
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sector or in creating new jobs in the public sector, manpower policy is directed at the demand side of the economic
equation.

In providing education and marketable skills

which lead to gainful employment, it focuses on the supply
side.

By improving the imperfect functioning of the labor

market through providing information to employers and applicants and by matching men with jobs, it bridges the gap between supply and demand.

In brief, manpower policy attempts

to assure individual access to available and expanding
opportunities.
For the most part in the United States since the
1930's, public manpower policies work at the margin of the
labor market.

For the majority of citizens, the labor mar-

ket works fairly well without government intervention.

~10st

of the population manages to obtain education and skills
with which they successfully compete in the labor market,
without enrolling or participating in a government manpower
program.

"Manpower decisions are made by individuals,

families, schools, employers and unions, in that order, with
5
public manpower programs playing a minor role."
In reality,
the decisions to increase or decrease government spending in
such areas as defense, research and technology, agricultural
subsidies, and public works, although outside of the boundaries of manpower legislation, have a much greater impact
on both the structure and the level of demand in the labor
market than do all the manpower training programs.

8

There is no federal manpower policy in a strict, dictionary sense.

Policy implies more than the existence of

programs which have some impact on a problem.

A policy

requires identification of a significant public problem;
explicit recognition of goals; the formulation of a definite
plan of action selected from among alternatives to realize
those articulated goals; and an evaluation of the policy
with feedback into the decision-making process.
In the

u.s.

manpower policy, insofar as it exists, has

evolved incrementally over time.

Programs have been insti-

tuted more or less one at a time in response to a particular
6

crisis or a newly identified problem.

Elected officials

have tended to look for specific solutions to particular
problems rather than developing a comprehensive and integrated manpower policy.

Consequently, rather than a coherent

federal manpower policy, there are a large number of programs and policies that have been instituted and from which
7

general manpower policy emphases can be extracted.
Several assumptions appear to underlie federal manpower legislation.

The basic assumption is the belief in

the "work ethic", i.e. that it is better to provide jobs or
income for work performed than to provide unearned income.
Furthermore, the manpower legislation passed since 1960 has
the following general theme:

"People who can work should

work; jobs are available if workers are adequately prepared;
training and education can provide the needed preparation,
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for those with severe problems; and employment, increased
income and greater self-esteem - which are the expected
benefits gained from participation in the program - will be
worth far more in the long run than the cost of remedial
8
attention."
The underlying theory assumes that generally training
and economic incentives will be sufficient to overcome
historical labor market discrimination against certain
groups, as well as possible innate or environmentally determined individual differences which resulted in the clients'
need for manpower services in the first place.

Manpower

programs would presumably effect the necessary changes to
allow participants to enjoy the benefits accruing to those
in the mainstream of the American labor force.
The favorable economy and low unemployment rate between 1965 and 1969 reinforced these assumptions.

During

this period a large majority of manpower clients found jobs
in private sector employment.

But, as unemployment rose in

1970, private sector placements for the disadvantaged became
increasingly difficult.

Participants placed in better times
9

were laid off or fired.

Passage of the Emergency Employ-

ment Act of 1971 and Title VI of CETA in 1974, both of which
created public service jobs for the unemployed, held an
implied recognition that perhaps the expectations of the
private labor market were unrealistic.

publicly funded jobs

were considered necessary to reduce the unemployment rates.

10
But, the continued belief in work for income received, was
present in both pieces of legislation.
The postulates which provide the foundation for present manpower policy have evolved in the approximately forty
year period in which unemployment has been perceived as a
legitimate concern for public policy.

Chapter II attempts

to trace the evolution of manpower programs through the
policy-making process in the United States.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MANPOWER POLICY
In 1921 President Harding presumably expressed the
attitude of the federal government in his welcoming speech
to the President's Conference on Unemployment.

He stated,

"There has been vast unemployment before and there will be
again.

There will be depression and inflation just as

surely as the tides ebb and flow.

I could have little

enthusiasm for any proposed remedy which seeks either palli10
ation or tonic from the Public Treasury."
The general
level of employment and the functioning of the economy were
considered outside the bounds of appropriate government
business.

Unemployment was considered a private problem,

and individuals faced with the loss of their jobs, turned to
families, friends, or private charities for aid.
Official policy remained unchanged until 1933.

But,

basic social and economic changes were altering the public
and political opinions concerning the appropriate role of
the government in economic decisions.

Between 1929 and 1931

unemployment in the U.S. rose spectacularly - from between
three and four percent of the labor force to approximately
sixteen percent.

During the depth of the Depression in

13
1933, approximately one quarter of the labor force waG
11
Industrialization and urbanization had caused
unemployed.
economic and social changes in the structure of society.

A

constantly increasing portion of the labor force had become
dependent upon wage and salary income.

The decline of the

extended family and increased geographic mobility, left
unemployed individuals increasingly isolated from traditional
means of support during periods of personal or national
economic crisis.

Private charities were unable to cope with

the large numbers of unemployed people in need of services.
Gradually many different individuals and groups began
to perceive unemployment, not as a private problem affecting
only individuals directly engaged in the transaction, but as
a public problem which affects others not immediately
12
Unemployment was newly perceived as a public
concerned.
problem requiring government attention and intervention.
The Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt responded
and placed the issue of federal responsibility for employment levels on the national political agenda for the first
time.

This was a highly significant step in the development

of manpower policy.

The great majority of the concerns of

the political policymaking process are previously defined
and accepted issue areas.

The Roosevelt Administration's

formulation of unemployment as a public issue requiring
federal intervention was an example of what Charles Lindblom
describes as a "giant step" infrequent in the policy process

14
13
which only rarely considers "new problems".
Franklin D. Roosevelt after a brief commitment to the
traditional balanced budget, developed a course of action
which included unprecedented programs for both relief and
public works - at the same time that other measures were
taken to stimulate economic recovery.

In retrospect, the

revolutionary New Deal consisted of few basic reforms.

Only

two pieces of permanent legislation in the manpower area
emerged from the Depression.

The Wagner-Peyser Act estab-

lished the United States Employment Service as a joint
federal-state system operated with federal matching grants
and aimed at linking unemployed men with jobs.

The Social

Security Act of 1935 established a federal-state system of
unemployment insurance for jobless workers.

Other legis-

lative and administrative efforts under the New Deal were
temporary in nature - such as the Civilian Conservation
Corps, the Public Works Administration, and the Works
Progress Administration.

The measures were inadequate con-

sidering the magnitude of the problem.

The national unem-

ployment rate in 1940 was still in the range of fifteen
14
percent.
But, the importance of the New Deal is not measured
only by the immediate effectiveness of its programs.

The

New Deal legitimized government intervention in the economy
and established unemployment as a rightful area of government concern.

Machinery was set up to administer, evaluate

15
and reformulate employment policy.

The first great hurdle

in the policy process had been passed.

Problems introducing

new legislation in this area were greatly reduced.
The New Deal marked the end of the notion that the
federal government should not interfere in the economy.

The

theoretical rationale for the government assuming active
responsibility for economic policy was provided by John
Maynard Keynes' The General Theory of Employment, Interest,
and Money.

Keynes argued that government should pursue an

active fiscal policy, effecting total spending by tax changes or government expenditures.

Employment depends on the

level of aggregate demand, and government, through its
economic policies, can influence aggregate demand to gener15
ate jobs for all who want to work.
The experience of
World War II demonstrated the responsiveness of employment
levels to federal expenditures.

Federal expenditures in
16
1943 nearly equaled the total spent between 1929-1941.

Unemployment dropped from fifteen percent in 1940 to 1.2
percent in 1944.
As the war came to an end, there was widespread fear,
reinforced by memories of the recent Depression, that conversion to a peacetime economy would create considerable
unemployment.

Prompted by such fears and recognizing the

effectiveness of government activity in eliminating unemployment during the war, Senator James E. Murray and others
introduced legislation to ensure a public commitment to full

16
17
employment.

As it finally emerged from Congress in 1946,

the Employment Act did not guarantee jobs as its liberal
sponsors had hoped.

It did, however, declare a federal pol-

icy of promoting maximum employment, production, and purchasing power, and legitimized continued federal government
concern over employment levels.

It placed on public record

a broad federal responsibility for this area.

The legisla-

tion was also important in establishing the Council of
Economic Advisors (CEA) who were to prepare an annual report
on the economic state of the nation to be delivered by the
President and were to advise the President whenever unemployment or inflation were becoming serious problems.

The

Employment Act also created the permanent ,Joint Economic
18
Committee of Congress.
The existence of the CEA insured
continuing expert analysis of the economy.

The Joint Com-

mittee in Congress, investigating reports and evolving new
legislation, guaranteed continued Congressional interest in
unemployment levels and its continuing place on the federal
political agenda.
SUSPENSION OF EMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER POLICIES
The Employment Act of 1946 was the last major piece of
legislation dealing with employment to be passed by Congress
until 1961.

Gradually, as the country returned to peacetime

without the feared economic relapse, the concern for full
employment slipped down on the level of priorities.

The

17
antiunemployment consensus dissolved as Congressmen turned
their attention to other areas.
Unemployment was not at a satisfactory level during
the postwar decade.

The Council of Economic Advisors in

1947 suggested a moderate goal of four percent unemployment
as a satisfactory level.

This figure was reiterated as a

target goal by both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations.

Table I indicates that the

u.s.

failed, and often

by a wide margin to achieve the goal of four percent total
unemployment.
Given levels of unemployment above four percent and the
philosophy expressed in the Employment Act of 1946,

why was

no legislation passed during this period to alleviate unemployment?

The following factors were important in dis-

couraging the necessary majority building which precedes the
passage of legislation through Congress:
- Throughout his eight years in office from 1952-1960,
President Eisenhower was predominantly concerned with
inflation and strongly opposed federal spending for
employment programs.

Congressional majority building

is a very difficult task in the face of a threatened
Presidential veto.
- The climate of political opinion in the early 1950's
was strongly influenced by the rhetoric surrounding the
McCarthy Hearings, the Cold War with the USSR, and the
Korean War.

A free economy and the free enterprise
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TABLE I
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION
16 YEARS AND OVER, BOTH SEXES:
ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1947-73
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

Source:

Percent of Civilian
Labor Force Unemployed
3.9
3.8
5.9
5.3
3.3
3.0
2.9
5.5
4.4
4.1
4.3
6.8
5.5
5.5
6.7
5.5
5.7
5.2
4.5
3.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9

1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p.
271 and 272.
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system were idealized.

Support for government inter-

vention in the economy temporarily declined.
- Politicians are generally more responsive to registered voters than to other sectors of their constituency.

The distribution of unemployment in the period

between 1947-1957 was uneven.

Those hardest hit by

unemployment were also an ineffectual portion of the
electorate during that period.

As demonstrated in

Table II the unemployment rate for Blacks and teenagers was consistently much higher than that of
the general population.
Individual Congressmen, particularly those representing
areas with higher than normal unemployment rates, continued
a high priority interest in unemployment intervention legislation.

But, the majority coalition necessary to formulate

and pass such legislation could not be obtained.
In 1958 the country was in its third postwar recession,
and by April the unemployment level had reached 7.4 percent.
Unemployment among white males, an important voting group,
rose to 6.1 percent.
Republicans, facing elections in Fall 1958, as well as
Democrats in the Congress, were increasingly concerned in
the high levels of unemployment and the recurring recessions.
An antiunemployment consensus was slowly being rebuilt.

No

fully conceived economic or manpower programs were offered

TABLE II-A
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND COLOR
FOR PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER:
Annual Averages, 1948-65
Male

Female

Total

White
Male

Female

3.6
5.9
5.1
2.8
2.8
2.8
5.3
4.2
3.8
4.1
6.8
5.3
5.4
6.4
5.2
5.2
4.6
4.0

4.1
6.0
5.7
4.4
3.6
3.3
6.0
4.9
4.8
4.7
6.8
5.9
5.9
7.2
6.2
6.5
6.2
5.5

3.5
5.6
4.9
3.1
2.8
2.7
5.0
3.9
3.6
3.8
6.1
4.8
4.9
6.0
4.9
5.0
4.6
4.1

3.4
5.6
4.7
2.6
2.5
2.5
4.8
3.7
3.4
3.6
6.1
4.6
4.8
5.7
4.6
4.7
4.1
3.6

3.8
5.7
5.3
4.2
3.3
3.1
5.6
4.3
4.2
4.3
6.2
5.3
5.3
6.5
5.5
5.8
5.5
5.0

Total
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

3.8
5.9
5.3
3.3
3.0
2.9
5.5
4.4
4.1
4.3
6.8
5.5
5.5
6.7
5.5
5.7
5.2
4.5

Source:

1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 271 and 272.

Negro and Other Races
Hale
Female
Total
5.9
8.9
9.0
5.3
5.4
4.5
9.9
8.7
8.3
7.9
12.6
10.7
10.2
12.4
10.9
10.8
9.6
8.1

5.8
9.6
9.4
4.9
5.2
4.8
10.3
8.8
7.9
8.3
13.8
11.5
10.7
12.8
10.9
10.5
8.9
7.4

6.1
7.9
8.4
6.1
5.7
4.1
9.3
8.4
8.9
7.3
10.8
9.4
9.4
11. 8
11.0
11.2
10.6
9.2

U.S.

N

o

TABLE II-B
UNEr1PLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE:
Annual Averages, 1947-65
Total
& Over

16 & 17
Yrs

18 & 19
Yrs

20-24
Yrs

25-34
Yrs

35-44
Yrs

45-54
Yrs

55-64
Yrs

67 Yrs
& Over

MALE

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

4.0
3.6
5.9
5.1
2.8
2.8
2.B
5.3
4.2
3.B
4.1
6.8
5.3
5.4
6.4
5.2
5.2
4.6
4.0

10.3
10.1
13.7
13.3
9.4
10.5
B.B
13.9
12.5
11.7
12.4
16.3
15.8
15.5
18.3
15.9
18.8
17.1
16.1

11. 3
9.6
14.6
12.3
7.0
7.4
7.2
13.2
10.8
10.4
12.3
17.8
14.9
15.0
16.3
13.B
15.9
14.6
12.4

8.5
6.9
10.4
8.1
3.9
4.6
5.0
10.7
7.7
6.9
7.8
12.7
8.7
B.9
10.7
B.9
8.8
B.l
6.3

3.4
2.8
5.2
4.4
2.3
2.2
2.2
4.B
3.3
3.3
3.3
6.5
4.7
4.B
5.7
4.5
4.5
3.5
3.0

2.6
2.4
4.3
3.6
2.0
1.9
2.0
4.1
3.1
2.6
2.8
5.1
3.7
3.8
4.6
3.6
3.5
2.9
2.6

2.6
2.5
4.3
4.0
2.4
2.2
2.3
4.3
3.2
3.0
3.3
5.3
4.1
4.1
4.9
3.9
3.6
3.2
2.5

2.9
3.1
5.4
4.9
2.8
2.4
2.8
4.5
4.3
3.5
3.5
5.5
4.5
4.6
5.7
4.6
4.3
3.9
3.3

2.8
3.4
5.1
4.8
3.5
3.0
2.4
4.4
4.0
3.5
3.4
5.2
4.8
4.2
5.5
4.6
4.5
4.0
3.5

3.7
4.1
6.0
5.7
4.4
3.6

9.B
9.B
14.4
14.2
10.0
9.1

6.B
7.4
11. 2
9.8
7.2
7.3

4.6
4.9
7.3
6.9
4.4
4.5

3.6
4.3
5.9
5.7
4.5
3.6

2.7
3.0
4.7
4.4
3.8
3.0

2.6
3.0
4.0
4.5
3.5
2.5

2.6
3.1
4.4
4.5
4.0
2.5

2.2
2.3
3.8
3.4
2.9
2.2

FEMALE

1947
194B
1949
1950
1951
1952

N

I-'

TABLE II-B (Continued)
Total
& Over

16 & 17
Yrs

18 & 19
Yrs

20-24
Yrs

25-34
Yrs

35-44
Yrs

45-54
Yrs

55-64
Yrs

4.3
7.3
6.1
6.3
6.0
8.9
8.1
8.3
9.8
9.1
8.9
8.6
7.3

3.4
6.6
5.3
4.8
5.3
7.3
5.9
6.3
7.3
6.5
6.9
6.3
5.5

2.5
5.3
4.0
3.9
3.8
6.2
5.1
4.8
6.3
5.2
5.1
5.0
4.6

2.3
4.6
3.6
3.6
3.2
4.9
4.2
4.2
5.1
4.1
4.2
3.9
3.2

2.5
4.6
3.8
3.6
3.0
4.5
4.1
3.4
4.5
3.5
3.6
3.5
2.8

67 Yrs
& Over

F'EMALE
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965

Source:

3.3
6.0
4.9
4.8
4.7
6.8
5.9
5.9
7.2
6.2
6.5
6.2
5.5

8.5
12.7
12.0
13.2
12.6
16.6
14.4
15.4
18.3
16.8
20.3
18.8
17.2

6.4
10.5
9.1
9.9
9.4
12.9
12.9
13.0
15.1
13.5
15.2
15.1
14.8

1974 Manpower Report of the President, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 271 and 272.

1.4
3.0
2.3
2.3
3.4
3.8
2.8
2.8
3.9
4.1
3.2
3.4
2.8

U.S.

IV
IV
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by either Party, but a number of specific measures were considered.

The Democrats were spectacularly successful in the

1958 election, gaining a total of thirteen seats in the
Senate and forty-seven in the House.

All analyses of the

1958 election, including Eisenhower's own, rate unemployment
19
and the recession as the major factors.
After a twelveyear hiatus, the issue of unemployment again became a high
priority on the federal government agenda.
A Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems
was appointed in 1959, and its hearings and report were
important in rebuilding the consensus against unemployment
among both Republicans and Democrats.

The hearings revealed

that full recovery from the 1957-58 recession was slow in
coming.

Production did rise in the last half of 1959, but

employment did not rise correspondingly.
aged 5.5 percent throughout 1959.

Unemployment aver-

It was particularly high

in certain geographical areas and among older workers.

Al-

though the economy in the 1950's had recovered after each
recession, after each recovery a larger residue of unemploy20
ment remained.
New terms such as automation, structural
unemployment, and mechanization crept into the vocabulary,
and gradually were perceived as public issues.

The Senate

Special Committee's recommendations, which included an area
redevelopment program, retraining programs, and a Youth
Conservation Corps,

were to become the agenda for manpower

legislation in the early 1960's.

24

THE EMERGENCE OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS
Positive Manpower Policy Support Cycle
By 1960 manpower policy, which is a subcategory of
employment policy, had entered into a positive policy support cycle which has continued up to the present time.

The

beginning of the cycle occurred in the late 1950's with the
identification of structural unemployment as a public problem requiring government intervention.

The supporters of a

depressed areas bill, which was vetoed by President Eisenhower in 1958 and again in 1959, had attracted public attention to the problems of depressed geographical areas and had
formulated a plan for intervention which had received the
support of the Congressional majority.

The Senate Special

Committee on Unemployment Problems identified additional
problems caused by structural unemployment.

By 1961 high

priority was given to these problems by both the Congress
and the Administration.
Charles

o.

Jones in Introduction to the Study of

Public Policy presents a policy-making model which approximates the policy cycle in manpower policy from 1961 to the
present.

(See Figure 1)
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The policy-making cycle

The public policy-making process at the national level
is very complex, and the manpower policy-making process is
not an exception.

A simple process by which a clearly

defined problem was solved through a single legislative act
cannot be identified.

The pluralistic multinucleated struc-

ture of policy making involves vast networks of specialized
groups linked together in intertwining "decision chains".
To anact a policy or change a program requires mUltiple con21
sent and the need for coalition building.
Compromises
necessary to avoid political deadlock may shift the focus of
the legislation, fragment its administration through different agencies, or change the legislation to such an extent
that the connection between the original conception of the
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bill and its operation in the field is difficult to trace.
The national public policy-making process is inexact, incremental, and difficult to chronicle in an easily understood
way.
In the area of manpower policy-making many different
actors were involved in the complex process from the initial
stage of problem identification through evaluation and
reformulation.

Initial legislation in 1961 was intended to

benefit primarily the adult, experienced worker who had been
displaced by advancing technology or residence in a depressed geographical area.

The legislation was intended to

intervene in narrowly defined problems of structural unemployment.

As the policy advanced through several cycles,

the Congressional definition of the problem widened.

The

new perceptions and definitions of the manpower "problem"
emerged from the experience gained in previous policy
cycles.

Manpower policy was then reformulated or amended to

increase its effectiveness in intervening in the newly
identified problem areas.
The input into the Congressional policy process came
from the Administration, agencies administering the legislated programs, testimony from experts in the involved
areas, officials from other governmental levels, and the
beneficiaries of the program.

Each participant in the

process attempted to lobby Congress and receive majority
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support for their position.

Lobbying by agencies adminis-

tering or desirous of administering the programs was particularly intense and often influenced final legislation.
Passage of related legislation, changes in fiscal policy,
and all public and private actions affecting employment had
an impact on manpower policy.

New legislation was con-

stantly being introduced and old legislation amended in an
attempt to meet the needs of a constantly changing political
and economic environment.

But, throughout the period from

1960 to 1974, there existed continuing support for the
manpower policy goals of training the unemployed and placing
them in jobs.

Evaluations and feedback indicated that at

least in the short run the policy was realizing these goals.
Economic Policy
The Kennedy slogan of "Get America Moving Again" indicated the return to the political forefront of economic and
unemployment issues.

In the winter of 1961 the unemployment

rate had reached a postwar peak of 8.1 percent (unadjusted
for seasonality).

But the political consensus was divided

on the question of appropriate fiscal policy.

The slack

economy received high priority attention, but radical innovations in fiscal policy were not politically feasible in
1961.

As Charles E. Lindblom postulated in The Policy

Making Process, the more different an alternative is from
past policy, in this case an unprecedented tax cut in a
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sluggish economy, the more unpredictable the outcome and the
more difficult it is to recruit support.

Policy-makers

acted as predicted in Lindblom's "Incremental Change Hodel",
and neither the Administration nor the Congress were willing
in 1961 to adopt innovative policy.

Instead, the search for

alternatives covered only alternatives incrementally different from past policies and formulation of new legislation in
1961 was developed from those alternatives.

The programs

aimed at structural unemployment had precedents and were
politically acceptable.
The passage of the Tax Cut of 1964 should chronologically be located later in this chapter.

I include it here

so as not to intrude the discussion of fiscal policy into
the material on social legislation.

For ten years following

the Korean War, the economic policies of fiscal orthodoxy
had been tested.

The results had been three recessions, a

slow rate of economic growth and chronic unemployment.
President Kennedy, sensitive to Republican charges of fiscal
irresponsibility, attempted to maintain a balanced budget
for his first two years in office.

But, in 1962 with unem-

ployment still averaging 5.5 percent in a slack economy,
Kennedy launched a public education campaign on the "New
Keynesian Economics" primarily aimed at Congress.

The key

actors in the campaign for the tax cut were Keynesian economists, the leaders of the nation's business community -
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including the
tion.

u.s.

Chamber of Commerce - and the Administra-

The support of Wilbur Hills, Congressional Represen-

tative from Arkansas and the Chairman of the powerful House
Ways and Means Committee, was crucial to its passage.

After

months of sharp debate the tax cut became law in February
1964.

The deliberate tax cut to increase aggregate demand

and expand the economy was successful and marked the beginning of a new era in fiscal policy.

The economy experienced

rapid growth and unemployment dropped from 5.2 percent in
1964 to 4.5 percent in 1965, despite the accelerating rate
of labor market growth.
The tax cut had an important impact on related manpower and social welfare programs.

The sharp debate had

focused public and Congressional attention on the high
unemployment rates among the disadvantaged.

The success of

the tax cut supported a theoretical rationale for increased
government spending to spur the economy which led to a
favorable Congressional climate for new legislation.
STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANPOWER POLICY
In 1961 the first piece of legislation aimed at the
problems of structural unemployment was signed into law.
The Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) did not fulfill the hopes
which accompanied its passage.

It failed to make a signifi22
cant impact on unemployment nationally or in target areas.
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New industries operating in a sluggish economy were not
attracted to depressed communities by low interest loans,
small scale training programs, and new public facilities.
However, the lessons learned under the ARA were applied in
the Economic Development Administration created in 1965.
The Manpower Development and Training Act
The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 was
the major piece of manpower legislation passed during the
1960's.

Its passage and subsequent amendments provide a

good example of the operation of the Congressional manpower
policy making system during the 1960's.
By 1961 bipartisan support for a broad training program on a national level had developed.

General agreement

existed between the Administration and Congress that national
intervention was necessary to combat structural unemployment
among adult, experienced workers.

The proposed training

program was not a radical innovation, and it attracted
support from fiscal conservatives as well as expansionists.
The conservatives' support stemmed from their position that
nothing was basically wrong with the economy and stimulation
was not necessary.

High unemployment rates were due to

technological change which had displaced large numbers of
workers.

The upgrading of skills would reduce the unemploy-

ment rate as the workers filled available jobs.

For fiscal

expansionists training was viewed as a necessary supplement
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to increasing aggregate demand through monetary and fiscal
policy.

Thus, the program gained support for different

theoretical reasons.

On the more political level both

Senators and Representatives recognized that retraining
programs offered direct aid to constituents.

A Gallup poll

showed 67 percent of the people "willing to sacrifice" to
23
Retraining was enpay for retraining the unemployed.
dorsed by a national consensus, the necessary majority was
assured, and Congress began debate on the nature of the
program.
The central issue in the ensuing debate was which federal agency should have control over the new program.

A

large scale training program would mean funds and power for
the administrating agency.

The question of who should

administer a new program invariably brings new actors into
the Congressional policy making process, each lobbying for
his own interests and attempting to persuade key Congressmen
to include their agency in the legislation.

In this case

the battle for control was between the existing federal-state
vocational education program under the Department of Health
Education and Welfare (HEW) and the Department of Labor
(DOL).

Critics of the vocational education program charged

that the program, which at that time was predominantly
oriented to training in home economics and agriculture, was
too far out of touch with the modern labor market to be
useful.

The Bureau of the Budget strongly supported this
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opinion and attempted to have the program placed in the DOL
and run as a direct federally funded and controlled program
using the facilities that the DOL selected.

Due to the

lobbying pressure of the powerful American vocational Association, the responsibilities were ultimately divided
between HEW and DOL.

The uneasy compromise officially

resolved the issue of control.

But, the interagency con-

flict continued and had a long term impact on the manpower
delivery system.
The basic features of this important manpower legislation were:

.. (1)

Full federal financing for the first two

years, followed by continued federal support for on-the-job
training but providing only fifty percent matching funds for
institutional training of the unemployed in occupations with
reasonable expectations of employment;

(2) Heads of families

with at least three years of working experience could qualify
for up to fifty-two weeks of training allowances at levels
equal to average unemployment compensation benefit in the
state;

(3) Limited number of youths aged nineteen to twenty-

one years could receive training allowances of twenty
dollars a week;

(4) Title I required an annual Manpower

Report by the President and the DOL was authorized manpower
24
research and development funds."
The legislation was
aimed almost exclusively at the adult, displaced, experienced worker.
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When the first debates over the MDT A began in 1961, the
unemployment rate among married men averaged 4.6 percent and
the rate for white males from ages 25 through 65 was approx25
imately 4.7 percent.
The assumption of many of the
sponsors of MDTA was that many of these and other experienced workers had been displaced by advancing technology,
Government sponsored retraining was necessary to assist
these workers in finding new positions.

But, as the economy

recovered, those workers who theoretically had been displaced by automation found employment without government
assistance.

By 1963 the unemployment rate for married men

had fallen to 3.4 percent and the figure for white males
26
between the ages of 25-65 was approximately 3.6 percent.
Once the MDTA was in operation it became apparent that
the enrollees were not the target group envisioned by the
policy-makers.

The enrollees were increasingly what has

since been termed the "hard core" unemployed - youth, minorities, illiterates, and aged workers.

The enrollees did not

meet the assumed basic literacy levels expected by the program designers.

The clients, in the opinion of those

administering and monitoring the program, required much
longer training programs including basic education to prepare them for employment.

The youth allowances, which were

limited under the Act to five percent of expenditures were
inadequate when 25 percent of the MDTA enrollees were
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youths.

Agencies involved in the program returned to Con-

gress to ohtain amendments which were necessary to meet the
demands of the disadvantaged client population.

Neither the

Congress nor the involved agencies appeared to seriously
consider alternative program models which might serve this
newly identified target population more effectively.

The

MDTA program had attained momentum and had developed constituent agencies and groups concerned with its continuation.
MDTA amendments to accommodate the needs of the disadvantaged clientele were passed almost unanimously by Congress
in 1963.
By 1965 the MDTA had taken a significant step away
from being a temporary program to aid adult displaced workers towards becoming a permanent remedial program to a11evi-
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ate serious inequalities in the competition for jobs.
Congress had assumed a national responsjbility for attempting to raise the incomes and increase the employability of
the disadvantaged portion of the population.

It was assumed

that providing basic education, skills training, and p1acement services would aid the disadvantaged population in
reaching these goals.

MDTA amendments in 1965, 1966, and

1967, broadening the scope of the program and increasing
expenditures, received almost unamimous bipartisan support.
The Era of Social Engineering
The MDTA was one of a series of legislative acts which
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received Administration and Congressional endorsements during the decade of the 1960's.

An unprecedented number of

programs purporting to "solve" the social and economic inequities of American society were passed under the rhetoric
of Kennedy's New Frontier and Johnson's Great Society.

Many

of the programs were aimed at the disadvantaged population.
The theoretical framework for the legislative programs was
derived primarily from empirically untested assumptions
developed in the social sciences.

"Underlying most of the

theories was the belief in 'environmentalism' - the assumption that man is almost limitlessly malleable:

through

manipulating the external conditions of living, it should in
principle be possible to secure almost any desired behavior
28
and any level of achievement."
This almost unquestioning
belief in environmental determinism and the equality of all
persons if given equal opportunities is a general theme
which runs through the social welfare legislation, including
manpower legislation, adopted during the 1960's.

The re-

formers postulated that government intervention could effectively alter individual behavior.

They were overly optimis-

tic about the U.s. policy making process and the effectiveness with which government programs can intervene in a clear
cut fashion in the structure of a highly complex society.
The promises and slogans surrounding the legislation raised
popular expectations to unrealistic levels.
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The plethora of social intervention legislation ineluded many programs expected to have an impact on the
employment rates and income levels of the disadvantaged.
Experience gained under the early years of the MDTA helped
in formulating the new legislation.

Recognition of insti-

tutional barriers to employment and a widespread reaction to
discrimination, resulted in the 1964 Civil Rights Act which
forbid discrimination in employment on the part of all
private employers with more than a minimal number of workers.

Recognition that more than prejudice stood between the

disadvantaged and satisfactory jobs was illustrated in the
29
emphasis of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
The one
billion dollar "War on Poverty" created the Job Corps and
the Neighborhood Youth Corps for providing youth with training and remedial education; the work study program to assist
college students; one hundred percent federal financing for
training programs for welfare recipients; and loans to small
businesses.

The legislation was the combination of one new

idea - the Community Action Agency (CAA) made up of local
citizens which would administer and plan the programs - and
long discussed programs designed to "help the poor help
themselves".

The manpower programs included in the bill

were aimed at either employing or training the employable
poor, particularly the youth.

The legislation was a "foot

in the door" for advocates of public service employment.
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In 1965 the consensus against unemployment, poverty,
and discrimination was at its height.
power programs found a warm reception.

Advocates for manBut, by 1966 unem~nd

ployment had reached a thirteen year low of 3.8 percent,

the continued escalation in Vietnam provided a drain on federal dollars.

Inflation was threatening, and pressure to

decrease federal spending was developing.

Traditionally,

the combination of low unemployment and inflation would have
signalled a withdrawal of interest in manpower issues.

But,

once policy cycles have developed in a particular issue
area, stopping the process is a major assignment.

By 1967

criticisms of the operations of manpower and poverty legislation were steadily increasing, but too many commitments by
too many people existed at that point for termination of
programs to occur.

A constituency existed which was created

by earlier manpower and poverty legislation and which had a
vested interest in their continuation.
Bureaus, Congressional committees, and lobbyists populate the policy-making systems.

Termination of a particular

pattern is almost never a clean break, but a gradual shifting of functions.

The initial shifting in the manpower area

was characterized by attempts on the part of involved agencies to create administrative order out of the maze of
existing programs.
Administrative Reform
By 1967 the manpower system encompassed seventeen major
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programs and thousands of separate contracts.

Each of the

programs in operation had different eligibility rules,
allocation formulas and application procedures.

The Depart-

ment of Health Education and Welfare, the Office of Economic
Opportunity, and to a minor degree the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior were all active in the manpower
field.

The confusion created by conflicts between the

administering agencies was heightened by intra-agency
competition between the three separate bureaus responsible
for manpower under the Department of Labor.

At the lower

levels of government the federal conflicts and the lack of
coordination between programs serving the same target group
contributed to almost chaotic conditions.

Local power

struggles interjected an even greater level of confusion
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into the system.

Federal administrators recognized the

need for administrative reform.
Gradually, as manpower control was consolidated at the
federal level under the DOL and HEW, several important
attempts were made to improve planning, coordination, and
administration at the local level.

Two of the attempts are

discussed in the following material.
Ghetto riots had placed a high priority on intervention in the employment problems of inner-city residents.
major attempt to meet these needs was launched with the
creation of the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) in
1967.

The program was designed to concentrate manpower

A
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funds on targeted high unemployment areas.

A central admin-

istrative unit was to coordinate the existing programs and
provide one-stop, individualized manpower services to the
ghetto unemployed.

Experience in other programs attempting

to train the hard core unemployed indicated that a straight
on-the-job setting was not enough.

The disadvantaged popu-

lation often had multiple problems, such as poor health,
child care needs, etc., which interfered with their ability
to perform on the job.

The CEP program, modeled after the

new Chicago YMCA's "Jobs Now", provided for orientation to
the world of work, counselling, medical and social services,
and individual job coaches to follow the participant from
enrollment through job placement.

Administratively, the

concept of the program was a step forward.

But, jurisdic-

tional conflict between OEO and the DOL created service
delivery problems before the program began operation.
Furthermore, CEP never gained the intended control of MDTA
Institutional funds and the NABS-Jobs program.

Expansion

from the original twenty-two areas to eighty-two areas
diluted available funds and decreased effectiveness.

CEP

was unsuccessful as a coordinating agent and became one more
local program among many.
The second attempt to bring order into the chaos of
the local manpower system was the establishment of the
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS).

CAMPS

was initially envisioned as a method to bring the state
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governments into the delivery system with the possibility of
eventually funneling manpower funds through the states to
the localities.

State committees were to create a compre-

hensive manpower plan by consolidating local CAMPS plans and
bringing unity to a disjointed system.

Unfortunately, most

governors failed to appreciate the possibilities, and the
majority of state plans were simply a collection of local
plans, which in turn were a collection of separate programs.
CAMPS lacked any direct control over funding, and thus
lacked any real power in the manpower system. CAMPS failed
to perform as anticipated, but it did create a means of
communication between groups and individuals concerned with
manpower.

It also provided preliminary manpower planning

experience at the lower levels of government.

Both the CEP

and the CAMPS programs were to provide important experience
and models for new legislation in the 1970's.
By 1969 the Administration and Congress were aware of
the need for reorganizing the manpower delivery system.
National administration of the programs did not appear to be
workable.

Under the American system policy decisions are

often made by the agencies charged under legislative acts
with administering the legislation.

The administration of

manpower policy, divided between powerful departments, provides an example how administrative policy making can
greatly impair the effectiveness of legislated policy.

The

attempts at coordinating the various programs into a unified
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whole were doomed to failure due to underlying agency conflicts.

Successful coordination demands that all involved

agencies have the same substantive interests, presumably in
this case serving the target population in the best possible
fashion.

But, it appears that the primary interest of the

bureaucracies concerned was often to maintain or increase
their own authority.

Serving the best interest of the

intended beneficiaries was secondary to their own survival
and/or growth.
Members of Congress are well aware of the problems
created when competing agencies are involved in the administration of one issue area.

But, powerful agencies such as

those involved with manpower have influential Congressional
lobbies which often prevail during the formulation of legislation.

The power of the agencies also contributes to the

difficulties encountered in reforming poorly functioning
delivery systems.
Congress is also slow to deal with administrative problems because such matters generally lack public visibility.
Officials prefer to focus on programs which have easily
identifiable benefits for their constituents and broad
political appeal.

In the manpower area, strong pressure

from the Administration was necessary before Congress acted
on the reorganization of the delivery system.

For approxi-

mately four years from 1969-1972 manpower reform was an
underlying issue in a battle between a Republican President
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and a Democrat dominated Congress over public service
employment.
Public Service Employment
The notion of the government as "the employer of last
resort" grew in popularity throughout the 1960's.

Ameri-

cans, who have always placed a positive value on work for
income received, appeared to favor public service jobs over
transfer payments.

A national Gallup poll in the late

1960's found 80 percent willing to guarantee job opportuni31
ties and an equal percentage opposed to guaranteed incomes.
Creation of limited numbers of public service jobs had been
written into a number of programs.

By 1969 the creation of

a large-scale public service job progrant had become a major
concern of such groups as the AFL-CIO, the Urban Coalition,
and the League of Cities-U.S. Conference of Mayors.

Several

commissions, such uS the Kerner Contmission, and task forces
32
had also recommended public sector job creation.
The Employment and Training Opportunities Act introduced in May, 1969 was a multibillion dollar public service
employment program.

The Nixon Administration and particu-

1ar1y Secretary of Labor Schultz, who had opposed public
sector job creation on the grounds that fiscal and monetary
policy combined with limited training-linked jobs would curb
33
cyclical unemployment,
were forced by the strength of
Senate support to commit themselves to public service jobs
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in exchange for the introduction of a series of amendments
aimed at tightening, but not eliminating, the program.

One

amendment was adopted, and the bill passed the Senate 68-6
in 1970.

In the House, where the Administration had more

support, Malcolm Lovell, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor, bargained more successfully.

In an all night

session Lovell with leading Democrats and Republicans from
the House Select Labor Subcommittee, produced a new manpower
bill, retaining a major section on public service jobs, but
also including large-scale manpower reorganization, decentralization, and decategorization which were priority aims
of the Administration.

The House passed the bill after

vigorous debate in late 1970.
The House-Senate Conference on the bill marked the
breakup of the bipartisan support which had backed manpower
legislation for nearly a decade.

The Senate position on

public service employment which prevailed in the Conference
created what could have become a permanent large scale program.

The issue of public sector job creation which divided

the Conference was fundamentally an ideological one which
had separated conservatives and liberals, Democrats and
Republicans for decades.

It was a question which had mainly

been avoided under previous manpower legislation.

Although

Republicans were willing to compromise to the extent of
supporting temporary public service jobs, massive permanent
programs were not fundamentally acceptable.

Politically
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realistic, they voted for the bill while privately urging a
presidential veto.

On December 16, 1970 President Nixon

vetoed the Conference bill which had narrowly passed the
House.

The Senate failed to override the veto.
The intensive debate over public service jobs over-

shadowed the question of manpower service delivery system
reform.

But, the hearings on the bill marked the first

overall Congresssional assessment of the manpower programs
of the 1960's, and the first major attempt at change since
the MDTA and the EOA.

The delivery of services had received

explicit attention and the appropriate functions of the federal, state and local government had been seriously considered.

The fundamental need for change was recognized in

Congress, but continued to be a low priority among the
majority.

Facing a 5.9 percent unemployment rate in 1971,

the Congressional majority considered public employment, an
issue with high public visibility and immediate benefits, as
a high priority.
The sponsors of public service employment in Congress
persisted and introduced the Emergency Employment Act of
1971.

The bill authorized the Secretary of Labor to con-

tract with lower levels of government to create public service jobs.

Shrewdly written to avoid a presidential veto

the act was to be operative for only two years.

It was also

a step towards revenue sharing in that mayors and governors
were given broad powers in selecting jobs and participants
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and in operating local programs.

For pragmatic political

reasons, it was difficult for President Nixon to veto a
transitional public service employment bill with wide public
support.

The White House supported the bill in exchange for

Congressional promises to move quickly on comprehensive
34

manpower reform, preferably manpower revenue sharing.
Manpower Revenue Sharing
The Congressional hearings in 1969 and 1970 had exposed the need for a general overhaul of manpower programs.
Host analysts agreed that the objective should be similar to
the CEP model - a centralized, easily accessible, administrative unit where a client needing manpower services could
go and receive individualized help from the initial counsel35
ling to the final job placement.
The local agency would
have access to information about the needs of the local
labor market and developed contacts for job placement.
Local manpower plans should be drawn up by a representative
decisionmaking body.

The plans should be realistic and

allow for flexible response to changing clientele and the
local labor market.
The Nixon Administration's position was that these
objectives could best be met by manpower revenue sharing.
In keeping with this goal was the desire to eliminate the
existing maze of categorical programs with their rigid funding and eligibility requirements.

Federally managed cate-

gorical programs, while in many ways commendable, were by
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their nature not sensitive to local needs.

Decentralization

of manpower planning, design, and operation responsibilities
was considered desirable by the Administration, to allow
local and state governments to decide for themselves the
types of manpower services required in their area.

The

Administration argued that State and local units, being
closer to their problems, would be able to act more quickly
and efficiently in supplying effective manpower services.
Program guidelines and goals originating in Washington, D.C.
could not possibly foresee the varied situations with which
the localities must contend.
In 1971 President Nixon had submitted the proposed
Manpower Revenue Sharing Act of 1971 to the Congress, but
Congressional resistance to revenue sharing, as well as
other considerations, prevented its passage.

During 1973,

the Administration stepped up decentralization and decategorization of manpower programs through administrative
means, and threatened Congress that manpower revenue sharing
would be implemented by executive fiat in 1974 regardless of
36

whether Congress acted on or rejected the concept.
Continuing pressure was put on Congress to pass a cornpre37
hensive reform manpower bill.
On December 28, 1973
President Nixon signed into law the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), the first legislation to
incorporate the essential principles of special revenue
sharing.
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CETA largely eliminates categorical programs authorized under previous legislation.

Instead, the Secretary of

Labor is authorized to make block grants to about 500 local
and state and general government units with populations of
100,000 or more who will act as prime sponsors for their
areas.

The prime sponsors are expected to plan and operate

manpower programs to meet local needs with little federal
direction or interference.

Specific provision for the tran-

sitional period through fiscal 1974 was included in the
legislation.
The basic features of this important new legislation
are as follows:

(1) State and local prime sponsors are to

receive 80 percent of the authorized Title I CETA funds to
provide comprehensive manpower services in their areas.

One

percent of this allocation is to be available for staffing
and serving State Manpower Services Councils which will
review state and local manpower plans, monitor their operations and make annual reports to the government.

The

remainder of the funds is to be used by the prime sponsors.
They are authorized, but not limited to, using the funds to
provide recruitment; orientation; counselling; testing; job
placement; subsidized on-the-job training; trainee allowances; supportive services; and transitional public employment programs.

Individuals may not receive training allow-

ances for more than two consecutive years, as the intent is
to provide training for permanent private employment and not
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long-term public support.

The public service employment

program must be fully integrated with the comprehensive manpower services.

A representative Planning Council to plan,

monitor, and evaluate manpower efforts in light of local
needs is to be appointed by the prime sponsor.

Of the

remaining twenty percent of Title I money, five percent is
available to encourage combinations of local government
units to serve as prime sponsors; five percent is available
for grants to provide needed vocational education services;
four percent is to help States make comprehensive plans and
to coordinate services; and the remaining funds are to be
used at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor.

(2) Title

II provides for a transitional public service employment
program in areas with 6.5 percent unemployment rates for
more than three consecutive months.

Persons unemployed for

more than thirty days are eligible.

Priority is to go to

unemployed veterans who served in Korea or Vietnam after
August 4, 1964 and to the most severely disadvantaged.

(3)

Under Title III the Secretary of Labor is authorized to
provide federal supervision of manpower programs for Indians
and migrant and seasonal farmworkers; and for special target
groups such as youth, older workers, and others with particular labor market disadvantages.

The Secretary of Labor is

also to undertake research, experimental and demonstration
programs, evaluations of all programs, the development of a
labor market information system, and a computerized job
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placement program.

(4) Title III grants the Secretary

responsibility for operation of the Job Corps.

(5) Title.v

creates a National Commission for Manpower policy to identify national manpower goals, prepare an annual report to
the President and Congress, examine the effectiveness of
manpower programs, and evaluate and make recommendations to
the Congress on the impact of the energy shortage upon
38

manpower needs.
SUMMARY
The passage of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 marked the beginning of a major new approach
to the delivery of manpower services.

In the 1960's man-

power policy had received bipartisan support at the federal
level.

Programs had multiplied as national leaders attemp-

ted to develop a manpower policy which would deal with the
emerging problems.

Concomitant with this development,

serious problems had arisen - a proliferation of separate
categorical programs; excessive duplication of delivery
systems; and overcentralization at the national level.

For

four years a general consensus existed in Congress that
reform was necessary, but it took that four years to develop
a majority consensus on the substance of the reform.

With

the passage of CETA Congress essentially turned over the
planning and operation of manpower programs from the national
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to the state and local levels of government.

Federal super-

vision and funding included in the legislation insured that
national purposes would be carried out, but the responsibilities for planning, designing, and implementing the
programs passed to the lower levels of government.
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CHAPTER III
THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT:
DECENTRALIZATION, DECATEGORIZATION AND THE DISADVANTAGED
The passage of the Comprenensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) reflected the changing perceptions
concerning social intervention strategies for government
programs.

The initial enthusiasm for large federally

controlled social programs had declined throughout the
country as both supporters and critics grew disillusioned
with the programs' high costs and questionable effectiveness.

Waste, duplication, and inefficiency in the opera-

tion of social programs created a visible target for public
complaint.

The experience of the Vietnam War had generated

a growing distrust of the federal government.

The idea of

local control of social programs gained popularity.

Presi-

dent Nixon's support for revenue sharing coincided with the
need for manpower reform and the decategorization of manpower programs.

CETA was based on practicality and Ameri-

can political ideology which enshrines the value of local
control.

Congress turned manpower over to the lower levels

of government on the assumption that local officials would
know best what their local areas required and would respond
more quickly and effectively to the needs of their citizenry.
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In December 1973 when CETA became law, the national
unemployment rate was 4.5 percent.

Titles I through IV

which authorize operating programs were intended to effect
structural unemployment.

The disadvantaged, who make up a

high percent of the unemployed during times of low unemployment, were the intended beneficiaries - although the
terms unemployed and underemployed appear often in the
actual legislation.

By 1974, when local prime sponsors had

barely begun implementation of Title I programs, the
national unemployment rate had passed seven percent and was
still climbing.

In some localities unemployment rates were
39
above eight percent.
The need for countercyclical programs appeared urgent, and the Emergency Jobs and Unemp1oyment Assistance Act of 1974 (EJUAA) was quickly passed into
law in December 1974.

It became Title VI of CETA and

authorized 2.5 billion dollars for public service jobs to
be administered by CETA prime sponsors.

Shortly afterwards

an additional 473 million was added for summer youth programs to be administered through CETA channels.

Categori-

cal programs to meet national priorities were again acceptable to the Congressional majority.
The federal addition of two well-funded categorical
programs raises several major questions about CETA.

CETA,

which accounts for only fifty-six percent of federal manpow40
er program funds,
was intended originally to act against
structural unemployment problems through decategorized,
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decentralized manpower programs.

But, Title VI and the

summer youth program are categorical programs aimed at
cyclical unemployment.

These programs, which undermine the

intent of CETA, were nevertheless passed by the federal
government to be administered through the CETA system.

If

this trend continues the CETA program may become a decentralized delivery system administering categorical programs.
As Figure II demonstrates, the "decategorized" funds available to prime sponsors for flexible use - with some shifting between Titles permitted - in fiscal year 1975 make up
only 42 percent of the CETA funds authorized, but 89 percent of the CETA funds were administered through the
decentralized delivery system.
may be illusionary.

The promised local control

If Congress continues to react to

perceived national economic problems by tacking legislation
onto CETA, the local prime sponsors will be limited in
their flexibility and tied to a rigid manpower system which
has shifted responsibilities for delivery of service, but
not definition of the problem.

Local prime sponsors may

become as limited in their capabilities for reaction to
local problems as were the federal agencies who previously
administered manpower programs.

The U.S. Department of

Labor's role, which is presently ambiguous, may become
increasingly powerful as it reasserts its responsibilities
for federal oversight of categorical programs.
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Figure 2. Amounts authorized for program activities under
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, fiscal year
1975.
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Serious consideration should be given to the effects
of combining programs aimed at structural unemployment with
programs aimed at cyclical unemployment.

Although both are

intended to benefit the unemployed, the disadvantaged
unemployed require training programs, counseling, etc. to
prepare them for employment.

The temporarily unemployed

skilled worker has quite different needs, and the inclusion
of Title VI under CETA has strained the abilities and
resources of prime sponsors attempting to effectively
administer CETA programs.

Separation of counter-cyclical

programs from structural unemployment programs should be
considered.
DECENTRALIZATION
The decentralization and decategorization of manpower
programs were expected to result in superior planning and
administration of programs while eliminating the overlap,
duplication, fragmentation and inefficiency of earlier
federal programs.

The normal Congressional process of

compromise and negotiation preceded the final decision on
the definition of prime sponsors under CETA.

The desire to

designate a prime sponsor covering an entire labor market
area was sacrificed for practical and political reasons.
Practically, there existed no units of government covering
the labor market area in the great majority of localities.
The existing units of general government - including states,
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cities, and counties - testified to their abilities and
interest in becoming prime sponsors.

The final legislation

designated general units of local governments with populations of 100,000 or more, consortia of such units, and
states as eligible prime sponsors.

Funds to induce the

formation of consortia, which may have covered a labor
market area, were limited to not more than 5 percent of the

41
amount available under Title I.

The legislation made it

possible for many manpower prime sponsors to operate in the
same labor market area.

The Act created the potential for

excessive decentralization with accompanying fragmentation,
duplication and inefficiency.
Most of the labor market areas in the U.S. include a
number of general units of local government eligible for
prime sponsorship under CETA.

Lacking strong incentives it

is unlikely that a single labor market area will be served
by a single prime sponsor operating programs aimed at the
total area.

Political rivalry, the distrust existing

between many suburban or rural governments and city units,
and the desire to control manpower funds inhibit the formation of consortia.

The fragmentation of manpower programs

by political boundaries rather than program category is
likely to result in similar inefficiency, duplication and
lack of coordination in the manpower area.
Little is presently known about the economics and
diseconomies of scale in manpower programs, but it appears
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likely that at least some functions such as planning,
developing labor market information, developing management
information systems, and evaluation could be performed more
effectively at the labor market area level.

For example,

in 1973 no system existed for defining or identifying skills
shortage occupations at the local level.

Sophisticated

methodologies and matrices were developed for national and
state forecasting, but little usable or reliable infor42
mation existed for localities.
The cost of such information is high, and it is unlikely that a single prime sponsor would attempt to develop the needed system.

Without

reliable information systems, much local planning must be
based on attempts to break out local data from national or
state

studies~

or, more frequently, to rely on "intuition"

or the "feel" of the local labor market.

With several

local prime sponsors competing for job placements in the
same market area, it is possible reliable information on
job openings may be closely guarded.
Decentralization in the Portland Metropolitan Area
In the Portland, Oregon Standard
tis tical Area (SMSA)

~etropolitan

Sta-

there are currently five different CETA

prime sponsors operating manpower programs.

~1ultnomah

and

Washington counties with a combined 1970 population of
43

332,710

excluding the City of Portland, formed a consor-

tium in May 1974.

Columbia County, lacking sufficient
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population for eligibility as a prime sponsor, was picked up
by the Oregon Balance-of-State plan. Clackamas County with
44
a population of 196,900
became its own prime sponsor.
Across the Columbia River in Washington, Clark County, with
a 1970

u.s.

census population of 128,454, also became a

prime sponsor.
The City of Portland, with a population of
45
372,500
also became a CETA prime sponsor and was the only
incorporated city government of sufficient size in the
metropolitan area to qualify as a prime sponsor.
Prior to the passage of CETA no significant DOL funded
manpower programs were operated by any of the county or city
governments.

The Portland Metropolitan Steering Committee

(PMSC), a local Community Action Agency (CAA), served as
the prime sponsor for the largest manpower program in the
area, the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP).
land Mayor's Manpower Area Planning Council

(~mpC)

The Portwas

responsible for planning in the Portland metropolitan area.
The City essentially provided the expertise in the manpower
field, although the four Oregon counties were represented
on the MAPC.

Little attention was paid to manpower deci-

sions by local elected officials prior to Spring 1974, and
officials were barely familiar with manpower categorical
46

grants.

The City's manpower director, who was responsible

for writing manpower plans and was most familiar with manpower programs, had a tendency to hold things close to his
47
chest.
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In 1973 local governments and agencies began planning
for implementation of CETA.

Negotiations to form a consor-

tium between the City and the four Oregon counties began.
During this period county officials became increasingly
interested in manpower programs and Multnomah County hired a
consultant to study current programs.

County officials

discovered that although federal manpower funds had been
budgeted for the counties, no manpower service system had
been developed for the counties.

This failure was blamed on

the City and the manpower director, in particular.

The

manpower director offended several of the counties' representatives during the negotiations.

~1u1tnomah

County, which

contains the City of Portland, decided to pullout of the
consortium and the other counties followed.

The U.S.

Department of Labor and the state manpower department did
not interfere when the consortium negotiations began to
48

break down.

The consortium which would have covered the

majority of the labor market area fell apart in April, 1974.
The primary reason for the collapse of the consortium
was the counties' fear of domination by the City of Portland.

The Mayor was a young aggressive politician, and

county politicians perhaps feared that too many of the manpower dollars would be diverted from the counties to the
City under his leadership.

Columbia, Washington and

Clackamas counties were also concerned that a city dominated consortium would pay inadequate attention to their
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geographically large rural populations.

All the counties

evidently wished to obtain autonomy for their own programs
which they felt association with the City might preclude.
The possibility of the City of Portland entering into
a consortium with any or all of the concerned counties
appears to be a dead issue.

Although all involved parties

agree that such a consortium would be theoretically ideal,
in that it would improve coordination, and eliminate present
duplication and fragmentation of manpower services, none of
the involved units were considering reopening negotiations
in 1975.
Fragmentation, duplication, inefficiency and lack of
coordination between manpower programs may have increased in
the Portland metro area under CETA.

The five prime sponsors

are all offering similar services, based on the model of
former federal programs.

All feature intake, orientation

and assessment (I,O, & A); counseling; vocational education;
institutional training; public and private on-the-job training; public employment programs; supportive services;
placement; and follow-up.

All utilize a portion of their

CETA funds for administrative costs; the development and
operation of a Management Information System (MIS); labor
market analysis; job development; planning and supervision;
and other related activities.

No working coordinating

mechanism exists between the five prime sponsors.

Officials

and bureaucrats appear to be unaware of the activities of
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their counterparts in other units of government.

Interviews

with concerned staff and officials revealed a lack of
knowledge and communication between the five prime sponsors,
and between the prime sponsors and the state manpower
office.

The prime sponsors, operating in the same labor

market area, appear to be operating independently of each
other.
Access to manpower programs in the Portland metropolitan areas has probably improved under CETA.

A citizen

residing in any part of the metro area is now eligible for
manpower programs.

Previously only residents of certain

geographical areas were eligible.

All five prime sponsors

operate central offices and field units in areas of high
unemployment.

Visibility and accessibility do appear to

have improved.
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE DISADVANTAGED
The ideal geographic unit for manpower planning and
operation has usually been recognized as an economically
integrated labor market area.

CETA has in effect broken up

planning and operation into smaller units.

Without adequate

incentives to form consortia, it is likely that other metropolitan areas are undergoing the same experience described
in the Portland metro area.

Planning and operating programs

within political boundaries tends to separate the place of
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work from the place of residence, and may limit access to
job opportunities.
The cost of possible fragmentation by political geography might be borne by the intended beneficiaries of CETA,
the disadvantaged and particularly the minorities.

Central

cities are losing their jobs to the suburbs, especially in
manufacturing.

Inadequate labor demand in areas accessible

to ghetto residents contributes to the present occupational
structure of disadvantaged workers who are concentrated in
service, laboring, and operative occupations.

"According to

the 1960 census in the fifteen largest metropolitan areas,
central cities provided nearly two-thirds of the jobs in
their metropolitan area.

By census day 1970 the central

cities had only 52% of the total metropolitan area jobs.
If, as is likely, the rates of change of the last decade
have continued, the suburbs at the present time provide the
49
majority of metropolitan area jobs".
During the same
period minorities, primarily Blacks, have been moving into
the central cities - increasing both their absolute number
and their percentage of central city population in large
SMSA's.

The White population in these areas has been
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declining.

Given these two sets of statistics and the

likelihood that many of the eligible units of local government will operate their own CETA funded manpower programs,
it appears possible that the planning and training - if
geared to jobs within political boundaries - will not

provide the optimum program for the central city disadvantaged.

They may in fact be excluded, by virtue of geo-

graphical residence, from training programs and placements
which may be most suited to their education, abilities and
aspirations.
The CETA allocation formula may also result in areas
with large number of disadvantaged persons, as opposed to
unemployed persons, receiving lower levels of funding than
they did in pre-CETA programs.

The bill as passed by the

House included only two elements in the Title I formula; the
prior year's funding level and unemployment.

The Senate

bill proposed poverty and unemployment as the criteria.

The

final compromise gave precedence to past levels of funding
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over measures of economic distress.

The formula for

distribution of Title I funds places three times as much
weight on unemployment as on low income.

Distribution of

pre-CETA funds was based to a greater extent on poverty and
52
other factors.
The effect of the CETA funding formula is
to increase funding to those areas where the ratio of adults
in low income families to the number unemployed is low.

The

formula will eventually shift funds from the cities, not
53
participating in consortia, to the counties.
Temporary
stability of programs was guaranteed by the requirement that
no prime sponsor may get more than 150% nor less than 90% of
the previous year's funding.

Over a period of several

years, the level of funding going to different units will be
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adjusted with some areas gradually settling at lower levels
than prior to CETA and other areas receiving increased
funding.

Table III illustrates the adjustment process in

Fiscal Year 1975.
In each successive year, unless total funding is
increased, the amount going to cities will continue to
decrease.

The disadvantaged minorities located in central

cities will have less access to manpower services as the
funding to their local unit of general government is reduced.

Unless Congress amends the allocation formula to

place more emphasis on low-income or poverty populations,
the hard-core unemployed will receive less attention than
they did under pre-CETA programs.

A national study of

participants in Title I programs demonstrates a basic trend
under CETA:

higher proportions of men, whites, persons of

prime working age, the better educated, the less disadvantaged, and persons who where unemployed rather than under54

employed prior to entry in programs.
Although CETA legislation requires that participants
be "economically disadvantaged, unemployed, or underemployed", the exact interpretations of these terms were,
for the most part, left to the discretion of the prime
sponsors.

~any

liberals feared that the disadvantaged, who

rarely have powerful interest groups operating on their
behalf at the state and local levels, would receive less

TABLE III
PERCENT FISCAL YEAR 1975 OF FISCAL YEAR
1974 MANPOWER FUNDS, BY TYPE OF SPONSOR
a/
!?/
Percent FY 1975 Title I Allocations- of Fy 1974 Funds
Adjusted Amount~/
Formula Amount
Range
Average
Range
Average

Type of
Sponsor

City

53-180

77

90-150

90

County

68-292

107

90-150

108

Consortium

63-143

89

90-134

97

Balance of
State

70-127

91

90-127

95

All
Sponsors

53-292

89

90-150

96

Source:

Computed from Manpower Administration data

a/
-

Excludes consortium incentives, State funds for manpower services
vocational education, and planning, funds for rural CEP's and for
Guam, Virgin Islands, Samoa, and Trust Territories.

h/
c/
-

Funds for programs corresponding with Title I.
Adjusted to provide each prime sponsor at least 90 percent hut not
more than 150 percent of prior year's fund.

SOURCE:

William Muengoff and Lester Rindler, The Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences,
1976), p. 40.
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attention than they had under the pre-CETA federal administration of manpower.

Prior to CETA the local Community

Action Agencies (CAA) were often involved in manpower programs - either as a prime sponsor or as the operating
agency.

The involvement of the CAA's benefitted the dis-

advantaged in two ways.

The CAA's worked to organize and

articulate the positions of the disadvantaged in manpower
programs.

Their organization and knowledge of bureaucratic

processes aided the disadvantaged, who often lack the necessary skills, in obtaining a fair hearing in the policy
making process.

The CAA's also had a direct influence on

the staffing of manpower programs.

It was generally a

policy in manpower programs associated with CAA's to employ
clients as staff both during and after training.

This

practice could result in a significant number of the staff
coming from the client population.

CETA legislates no

direct manpower authority or money to the CAA's and their
role is left to the discretion of the prime sponsor.

The

CAA's are likely to playa lesser part than they performed
previously.

The manpower staff is likely to be hired under

more traditional methods, and the proportion of the staff
who were or are disadvantaged clients will decrease.

The

diminished importance of CAA's in manpower programs is also
likely to quiet the political voice of the disadvantaged
groups in these programs.
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Allocations and the Disadvantaged in Portland, Oregon
The shifts in manpower funding under CETA which have
been noted nationally are present in the Portland area.
Funds going to the county governments and the state have
increased.

Table IV demonstrates the breakdown of CETA

funding.
Characteristics of the population being served by the
different prime sponsors in the Portland metropolitan area
were essentially projections at the time of the interviews
in February and March 1975.

The prime sponsors had just

begun operating their Title I programs and were attempting
to implement their new Title VI programs.

In the Portland

metropolitan area program directors do appear to be carefully following the national guidelines and are giving a
high priority to disadvantaged persons.

Although priority

is given to the disadvantaged, the client population is
likely to be different than under pre-CETA programs.

The

reason for the expected change is that the populations of
the prime sponsors of CETA are different than under earlier
programs.

The majority of the clients of the major pre-CETA

program, CEP, were Black.

Most of the Black population in

the Portland area resides in the City of Portland.

Accord-

ing to the 1970 U.S. Census there were 372 Black residents
in Clackamas County; 188 Black residents in Washington
County; and 22,155 Black residents in Multnomah County, of

TABLE IV
TOTAL CETA MONEY TO PORTLAND METROPOLITAN AREA
FEBRUARY 1975 - $35,590,008
A.

TOTAL CETA HONEY TO OREGON - $34,308,008

State of region
(administration)
$972,780

Lane County
I - $1,314,918
II - $1,292,515
VI - $1,510,722

Portland
I - $3,919,050
II - $ 981,821
VI - $1,420,039

Clackamas
County
I - $788,764
VI - $358,987
Oregon's Other
29 Counties
I - $5,058,454
II - $4,572,149
VI - $4,504,699

Mid-Wi11amette Valley
Consortium
I - $1,630,732
II - $1,623,609
VI - $1,030,024
CETA III
American Indians $521,341
(Includes $196,557 to Portland
Urban Indian center)
Oregon Rural opportunities
Center $794,500

Mu1tnomah Washington Consort.i um
I - $1,413,624
II - $ 600,000
VI - $ 689,878

...,J

I-'

TABLE IV (Continued)
B.

TOTAL CETA MONEY TO CLARK COUNTY, WASHINGTON

I - $688,000
III - $224,000 (Supplemental funds for Summer Youth Program)
VI - $370,000

SOURCE:

Willamette Week, March, 1975.

-.J
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which 98 percent resided in the City of Portland.

Conse-

quently, since clients must reside within the geographical
boundaries of the prime sponsor, the number of Blacks served
by four of the five prime sponsors is low.
Mexican-Americans is likely to increase.

The number of
But, overall the

number of minority clients served in the Portland metro area
is likely to decrease.

The county programs are likely to

have an older, better-educated, and less disadvantaged
clientele than the city program.
In the City of Portland program there also appeared to
be a slightly different philosophy emerging among CETA
administrators.

The CEP program included among its par-

ticipants many "marginal" disadvantaged persons - persons
whose background or motivation made their ultimate performance in the labor market questionable.

Several of the

persons involved in CETA mentioned that CEP "recycled" too
many participants and wasted valuable training slots on
persons who were not sufficiently motivated to obtain and
hold a job.

City Commissioner Charles Jordan, who is in

charge of CETA I and II, stated, "The situation was pathetic
before.

People who were in the program were not qualified.

Now, under the City's program, only qualified people are in
the program.

Specific instructions have been given to the

subcontractors to take only people who are really motivated,
want to be trained and are ready ... cream the best of the
disadvantaged, get them placed, and then take the ones that
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Two persons interviewed did feel

will be time consuming."

that the new CETA trainees are quite superior in education
to prior CEP trainees.

They also felt that the "creaming"

was unjustifiable, and that CETA was failing to serve the
56,57
real disadvantaged who needed training.
The marginal
costs and services required by the less disadvantaged
clients are lower.

Commissioner Jordan's position can be

justified as a rational strategy which will ultimately
benefit the disadvantaged community.

But, if the intent is

to serve the disadvantaged, the City must ensure that its
subcontractor is not just admitting the applicants easiest
to train or those who could obtain a job without CETA persons who although presently unemployed would not be
considered disadvantaged in the usual sense.

City personnel

assured the author that there would be close control, but
could not give satisfactory answers as to how the monitoring
58,59
and evaluation system would be designed or implemented.
The program at the time of the interviews was just beginning'
operation, and only an evaluation at a later time will
answer the questions raised concerning the City's clientele.
No information about the ultimate effect of different
prime sponsors competing for job placements was available at
the time of this review.

Persons interviewed expected to

use the Employment Service for placement as well as their
own individual job developers.

But, it is possible that the

elected officials of the different prime sponsors may
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attempt to influence employers in their areas to accept
trainees from their manpower programs.

Commissioner Jordan

was hopeful that the City would be able to use leverage not
available to previous manpower agency administrators to open
60

up jobs to their trainees.

The effect of the geographical

fragmentation of CETA on job placement opportunities is
unknown.
The local CAA, the PMSC, is not playing an important
part in the CETA program.

The City originally intended to

contract with the Portland CEP, which is under the PMSC, to
perform Orientation, Intake, and Assessment for CETA I and
II.

This contract was ultimately let to Portland Community

College after a public hearing packed by protesting persons
primarily connected with the PMSC.

The manpower staff hired

by the City does not appear to be following the CEP pattern
of hiring many of its own trainees in the program.

Mr. C.

Gilchrist, Director of PMSC states, "The City's CETA I
program is only hiring the CEP people with degrees or fairly
established types ••• They are an institution and are not
61
going to hire the poor as we did."
PMSC is concerned that
the essential rapport and empathy which is necessary to get
failures reinvolved in the system will be lacking in the
62
City's program.
Commissioner Jordan feels this criticism
is irrelevant.

To help people and make good

d~cisions

absolutely critical to have qualified personnel.

it is

He feels

the criticism is a symptom of the "reservation syndrome"

76

encouraged by federal programs in the 1960's.

Instead of

remaining among their "own kind", the disadvantaged must get
out of the ghetto and learn to use the whole city and its
63
institutions if they are to succeed.
There are certainly
fewer direct jobs for the disadvantaged under CETA than
under CEP.
SUMMARY
CETA was originally intended to create a decentralized
decategorized manpower delivery system in which prime sponsors could develop flexible comprehensive manpower programs
aimed at structural unemployment in their geographical area.
The Congressional tendency to add categorical programs onto
the CETA legislation has decreased the percentage of CETA
funds available for flexible prime sponsor use.

The inclu-

sion of Title VI and youth programs aimed at cyclical
unemployment strained the abilities and resources of CETA
prime sponsors.
CETA's definition of eligibility for prime sponsors
created the potential for fragmentation, duplication, and
inefficiency as many prime sponsors develop independent
manpower programs in the same labor market area.

Potential

economies of scale are lost as each prime sponsor offers
similar services.

No coordination mechanism exists between

prime sponsors, and there is apparently little communication
between units operating in the same labor market area.
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As each CETA prime sponsor operates independent manpower programs, the disadvantaged minorities concentrated in
the political unit of the city may be denied access to
suitable jobs located within
sponsor.

~he

boundaries of another prime

Program combinations offered differ by the type of

sponsor with cities concentrating on classroom training and
counties devoting more funds to work-experience programs.
The CETA allocation formula places three times as much
weight on unemployment as it does on low income.

r.1anpower

funds at the local level are gradually being shifted from
the cities to the counties and consortia.

This process will

result in a reduction in funds avilable to the prime sponsors within whose geographical boundaries many of the most
disadvantaged and minorities reside.

A basic trend appar-

ently developing under CETA is for the participants to
include higher portions of men, whites, persons of prime
working age, the better educated, and the less disadvantaged.

Shifting the geographical units receiving manpower

funds has resulted in shifting the population served by
manpower programs.

It is not possible to determine at this

time whether city prime sponsors are placing the same
emphasis on training the hard-core unemployed as existed
under the previous federal manpower programs.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III
39.

William Mirengoff and Lester Rindler, The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (Washington, D.C.:
Printing Publishing Office, National Academy of
Sciences, 1976), p. 94.

40.

Ibid., p. 21.

41.

1974 Manpower Report of the President (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office, 1974),
p. 197.

42.

Garth L. Mangum and John Walsh, A Decade of
Manpower Development and Training (Salt Lake
City: Olympus Publishing Co., 1973), p. 117.

43.

Mul tnomah Wa shington Manpower Consorti urn, ~~odif ied
Grant Application to Manpower Administration, U.S.
Department of Labor, Seattle, January 1, 1975,
p. 15.

44.

Center for Population Research and Census, Portland
State University, "Population Estimates of
Counties and Incorporated Cities of Oregon",
July 1, 1974, p. l.

45.

Ibid., p. 5.

46.

Interview with Joe White, manpower aide to City of
Portland Commissioner Charles Jordan, Portland,
Oregon, February 18, 1975.

47.

Interview with Phil ~cLarin, aide to City of Portland
Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, Portland, Oregon, February
28, 1975.

48.

Interview with Larry Macnab, Executive Secretary for
the Oregon Balance of State Plan, Salem, Oregon,
March 20, 1975.

49.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Employment,
Poverty, and Migratory Labor of the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, Job Training and Employment Legislation, 1973, Hearings on S.1559 and
S.1560, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 155.

79
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III (Continued)
50.

Kenneth McLennan and Paul Seidenstat, New Business
and Urban Employment Opportunities [Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1972), p. 20.

51.

William

52.

Ibid., p. 35.

53.

Ibid., p. 38.

54.

Ibid., p. 133.

55.

Interview with City of Portland Commissioner Charles
Jordan, Portland, Oregon, February 20, 1975.

56.

Interview with Susan Wagenblast, Counselor, Portland,
Oregon, February 10, 1975.

57.

Interview with Cleveland Gilchrist, Director, Portland Metropolitan Steering Commission, Portland,
Oregon, February 10, 1975.

58.

Interview with Commissioner Charles Jordan.

59.

Interview with Patrick Borunda, ~anpower Director
for City of Portland, Portland, Oregon, February
10, 1975.

60.

Interview with Commissioner Charles Jordan.

61.

Interview with Cleveland Gilchrist.

62.

City of Portland Public Hearing on CETA I & II,
Portland, Oregon, December 24, 1974.

63.

Interview with Commissioner Charles Jordan.

~irengoff

and Lester Rindler, p. 27.

CHAPTER IV
THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT:
PLANNING, An~INISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
CETA PLANNING
Prior to the passage of CETA, manpower planning at the
local level was primarily limited to participation in the
Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS)
by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1967.

introduced

The CAMPS program,

which was discussed in Chapter II, was intended to provide
comprehensive manpower plans for manpower programs under the
DOL at the local and state governmental levels.

The primary

benefit of the early CAMPS was to provide an opportunity for
communication between people involved in the manpower system
rather than a meaningful planning process.

In 1971 CAMPS

was restructured in an attempt to make the program more
influential.

Local recommendations were to be taken into

account by federal administrators and planning grants provided funds to state and local units to hire manpower
planning staffs.

The new structure provided for a State

Manpower Planning Council (SMPC) under the governor; an Area
T-1anpm'ler Planning Council (AMPC) under elected officials of
the largest city in each CAMPS area; and an Ancillary
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Manpower Planning Board (AMPB) for the balance of the state.
In 1973, in an administrative move intended to precede
revenue-sharing, the DOL announced that local officials
would be given more freedom in recommending how EOA and
funds were to be used in their area.
in December 1973, the CAMPS
lations carne into effect.

~DTA

When CETA became law

was discontinued as new reguBecause the local and state CAMPS

Councils lacked the power to institute their plans, the
CAMPS' manpower plans were generally a token exercise.

But,

the CAMPS program did familiarize those involved with the
manpower planning system, and it provided a channel of
communication between manpower agencies.

More importantly,

through the planning grants it provided funds which developed a core of manpower planners at the local and state
levels of government.
CETA placed an emphasis on local planning as an essential component of a decentralized manpower system.

Planning

councils are required at the state and local prime sponsor
levels to submit recommendations to the prime sponsor on
program plans, goals, policies and procedures, and to monitor and provide objective evaluation of the manpower programs.

The members of Planning Councils are to be appointed

by the prime sponsor.

To the extent practical, members are

to represent the client community, community-based organizations, the employment service, education and training

82
64

agencies, business, and labor.

Funding for Planning

Council staff is provided by the prime sponsor.

The prime

sponsor with the aid of the Planning Council was intended to
develop a comprehensive manpower plan geared to meeting
local and state needs.
The role of the advisory Planning Council will probably vary between prime sponsors due to the differing
administrative and political environments.

But, the Plan-

ning Council does have broader responsibilities than previous councils.

It is possible that an active council could

provide the prime sponsor with expertise and information
from groups with differing backgrounds which are concerned
with manpower.

Their input into the manpower plan and their

interaction with CETA administrators may provide broader
participation in manpower planning than existed previous to
CETA.
Considering the limited experience of new CETA prime
sponsors prior to 1973, the Congressional sponsors had high
expectations.

Community based organizations, the Employment

Service, Community Action Agencies and others have been
participating in manpower programs for more than a decade.
but generally the important decisions were made by the
federal government.

The proliferation of manpower programs

under CETA may lead to a critical shortage of qualified,
experienced manpower personnel.

The responsibilities for

planning, administering, operating and evaluating manpower
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programs will require skills and competencies not required
under previous federal legislation.

If the goal of planning

innovative, flexible, comprehensive manpower programs suited
to the local area is to be realized, local sponsors must
develop new methods of predicting local labor market needs;
identifying problems that exist; setting objectives; devising solutions tailored to the local labor market; garnering
resources wherever available then monitoring, evaluating and
65
modifying the emerging programs to bring them to success.
It is doubtful that many of the prime sponsors were equipped
to deal with the range of problems in 1974.

Whether they

are developing the expertise to do a competent job is yet to
be determined.
At least in the short run CETA I plans can be expected
to closely follow the models provided by previous federal
programs.

The inexperience of elected officials, staff and

the Planning Council combined with federal pressure to get
programs into operation do not contribute to a thoughtful,
meaningful planning process. Consequently, prime sponsors'
plans for CETA I are likely to be a collection of previous
programs drawn together under a new administration.

In the

first few years under CETA, the local administration and
Planning Council are likely to plan programs similar to
federal programs with which they are familiar.

Hopefully,

as experience in planning, evaluation and administration
grows, experiments and innovations will presumably be made
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to align the programs more closely to local needs.
Regardless of the planning problems encountered under
the first years of CETA, planning for manpower programs is
currently a state and local, rather than a federal responsibility.

This shift in functions is certain to have an

effect on the process of manpower planning as well as the
final outcome, the manpower plan.

Elected officials and

prime sponsors' staffs will be more involved in making
decisions which will affect their area.

The new responsi-

bilities will generate an increased interest in manpower
programs and the employment situation which in the past
received only cursory attention at the prime sponsor level.
Planning in the Portland Metropolitan Area
Planning has not been a strong point of any of the
programs operating in the Portland metropolitan area.

The

lack of firm information from the federal government concerning funding levels for the first year of operation and
short federal deadlines for grant applications under CETA
have been important factors in the low priority given to
planning by prime sponsors.

For example, the Consortium had

twenty days to formulate their initial plan which was to
66
become operational thirty days after submission.
Meaningful planning was impossible in such a short period of time.
The emphasis has been on formulating some sort of acceptable
application and getting the approved programs in operation.
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All programs appear to be so involved in reacting to various
crises, deadlines and political pressure that the problems
of initial program operation are consuming all of their
time.

The State Manpower Director summed up what appears to

be the prevailing situation in the first year of CETA
operation, "We don't have much time for meaningful ?lanning.
Now and for the past eight months we've mainly been con67
cerned with crisis intervention."
There are no new innovative designs or programs, and persons interviewed felt
that innovative programs geared to their area's needs were
not likely to be developed in the next few years.

All

programs in operation are similar to previous federal
programs, particularly the CEP program.
Although the City of Portland had been active in
manpower planning under CAMPS and had a manpower staff prior
to the passage of CETA, the City had more problems in developing and obtaining DOL approval for their CETA plan than
did other prime sponsors in the Portland area.

Other local

prime sponsors had their programs in operation by Fall 1974,
but the City of Portland did not obtain u.S. DOL final
approval until January 1975.

Even given the longer planning

time, the approved plan was perhaps overly complex and
contained numerical placement goals which were unrealistic.
For example, the original City goal was to place 3,000
persons in on-the-job training during the fiscal year.
was revised in Fall 1975 to 450 persons.

This

Lack of experience
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in manpower programs by the newly elected official in charge
of the programs and the newly hired staff led to unrealistic
planning.
Accurate, useful local labor market area employment
information did not exist in 1975.

No serious plan to

develop such an information system was under consideration
by any prime sponsor.

But, the Oregon state Employment

Service Department of Research and Statistics, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Labor, is currently attempting to develop such a system.

Until the proposed system is

operational, city and county prime sponsors are relying
primarily on information from the Employment Service, their
own job developers, and intuition.

All persons interviewed

complained that the lack of data hindered successful program
planning, operation and assessment.
The role of the advisory Planning Council appears to
differ by prime sponsor.

In the City of Portland the

~an-

power Planning Council did not approve or participate in the
plans for CETA I and II.

In October 1975, the U.S. Depart-

ment of Labor threatened to terminate funding for Portland's
CETA I and II programs.

One of the criticisms was that the

Manpower Planning Council had not participated satisfactorily in the City's programs.

The City increased the Planning

Council's role and by June 1976, the U.S. DOL felt the
68
participation was satisfactory.
In the Multnomah-Washington Consortium the Planning Council was also not active in
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planning for the first year of CETA I and II due to time
pressure.

But, the director states that the Council is not

a rubber stamp for the administration.

Instead, it is a

very hard working and vocal group and interaction between
the Planning Council and the CETA administrators is continuous.

The Council includes Chicanos, who are suspicious

of the administrators; business representatives; and persons
representing various agencies and institutions.

The direc-

tor feels the twenty-four member Council is too large and
had expected the size to decrease by attrition, but this has
not happened.

The Planning Council is active, and parti-

cipating in Consortium planning.
ADMINISTRATION UNDER CETA
Prior to CETA, administration of manpower programs was
a responsibility of federal agencies, particularly the DOL.
The subcontractors operating in local or state areas were
generally not government units.

Subcontractors were educa-

tional institutions, community based organizations, the
employment service. etc.

The Emergency Employment Act (EEA)

of 1971 was the first major piece of manpower legislation
which granted government units - including states, cities
and counties - direct control of funding and operation of
manpower programs.

Thus, prior to CETA, lower government

units had only limited experience in administering manpower
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programs, and perhaps no experience with manpower programs
aimed primarily at training the hard-core disadvantaged.
Government units proposing to become CETA prime sponsors were faced with the difficult task of assuming new
responsibilities for which the majority had only limited
experience.

Three significant decisions had to be made by

each prime sponsor in a short time period.

These were:

(1)

Should the unit form a manpower consortium with other units;
(2) Where should the manpower unit be placed in the governmentis organizational structure; and (3) Should the government unit operate any or all of the manpower programs, or
should it subcontract the operations to other agencies or
institutions?

Each decision would have a significant effect

on the eventual manpower system.
The problems involved in forming consortia were discussed in Chapter III.

Surprisingly, many prime sponsors

considered the potential benefits from forming a consortium
to outweigh the potential costs.

The number of prime spon-

sors choosing to form consortia exceeded expectations.

One

hundred thirty-five consortia were established, comprising
69
one-third of the 402 prime sponsors in fiscal 1975.
It is
impossible to determine at this time the number of consortia
which cover the majority of their labor market area.

The

motivations for the formation of consortia are considered in
the following paragraph.
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"Several factors appear to be important in the formation of consortia:
mutual trust developed in other joint
enterprises; the desire of inexperienced prime sponsors to share the
expertise of a more skilled unit; the
wish to avoid direct political accountability for manpower programs through
the use of the more anonymous consortium; and the desire to attain economies
of scale and greater opportunities for
job development in a broader labor market.
Typically, after formation of a consortium,
a form of joint powers agreement is drawn
up, assigning overall responsibilities
to a board or committee made up of delegates of each of the areas and assigning
administrative responsibilities to a
lead city or county, or to a unit reporting directly to the board. "70
The second major decision facing new prime sponsors
was the integration of their new manpower responsibilities
into the existing government organization.
able organizational alternatives are:

Three conceiv-

(1) create a separate

department for manpower with equal status with other departments in the government;

(2) place the manpower unit under

the office of the chief elected official, insuring his
attention to manpower issues; or (3) assign manpower functions to an existing department where it must compete with
other units for the attention of the department head.

The

first alternative would presumably provide the manpower unit
with the greatest visibility, accessibility to elected officials, and status.

The third alternative is considered to

minimize these factors.

Regardless of the ultimate place-

ment, CETA resulted in manpower units being institutionalized in the structure of the prime sponsor's government
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unit.
Prime sponsors could be expected to encounter difficulties in setting up administrative machinery for manpower
functions.

Experienced staff were in short supply.

Even

persons who had worked in the manpower field in the past
were not equipped to deal with the new range of responsibilities required of a prime sponsor.

DOL deadlines for

grant applications, insufficient information on funds
available, changing appropriations, and the additional
responsibilities of CETA VI and summer youth programs
complicated administrative problems.
Administration in the Portland Metropolitan Area
The breakdown in consortium negotiations which would
have resulted in a consortium covering the labor market area
was discussed in Chapter Three.

A consortium between two

counties was formed and overall responsibilities for the
consortium was assigned to an Executive Committee consisting
of the Chief Elected Official in each county or his designate and one member of the Planning Council.

The adminis-

trative unit is separate from both county governments and
reports directly to the Executive Committee.

The adminis-

trator is not responsible to other elected county officials.
The administrator feels that decisions are generally made by
his unit with the cooperation of the Planning Council, and
the Executive Committee approves plans submitted to it.
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Aside from the chief elected officials, other county politicians are not very aware of the manpower programs or the
71
Ninety-eight percent of the adminemployment situation.
istrative unit's staff has no prior experience in manpower
programs, including the director.

Hiring inexperienced

personnel was a conscious decision which was made in an
72
attempt to get "fresh" personnel.
Although the City of Portland was interested in participating in a consortium, the withdrawal of the other
potential prime sponsors from the negotiations forced the
City to become its own prime sponsor.

The inept handling of

the consortium negotiations and other factors led to the
termination of the majority of the existing manpower staff.
A newly elected official, C. Jordan, interested in the
manpower area, was assigned responsibilities for CETA.

The

grant application was delayed as the newly elected official
and his staff attempted to put together a proposal.

The

manpower unit was placed in the existing Department of Human
Resources with the manpower director reporting to the director of the Department.

A new director for manpower was

hired a month prior to the date that Portland's manpower
programs were to become operational.
prior experience in manpower programs.

The director had no
The lack of quali-

fied staff greatly hindered preparation of a realistic manpower plan as well as effective administration of the
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program after it began operation.

The City's program had

continual problems which culminated in the Regional U.S.
Department of Labor's Office threat to terminate funding
effective December 31, 1975.

The Mayor of Portland and

other Commissioners apparently did not interfere in the
administration of the foundering program.

The elected

Commissioner in charge of the manpower program was directly involved with the program.

In the fall of 1975 the

manpower director was fired and a new director, familiar
with the administration of social service programs, was
hired.

Title VI of CETA was placed by the Mayor under his

office in the Department of Personnel.

The director of

Title VI had no prior experience in manpower, but the program was planned and implemented quickly and smoothly.
separation of CETA I and II from CETA VI freed the

The

manpowe~

unit under Commissioner Jordan to concentrate on the problems encountered in administering CETA I and II programs.
THE DELIVERY SYSTEM
The third major decision facing new prime sponsors
concerned the operation of manpower programs.

For many

prime sponsors setting up the necessary administrative
machinery for planning, fiscal accounting, reporting,
contracting, supervising and monitoring subcontractors, and
assessing results strained existing capabilities.

Operating

programs in which they had little or no prior experience
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would add an additional burden.

Nevertheless, many prime

sponsors seriously considered the extent to which the prime
sponsor should operate programs directly.

The factors

favoring the subcontracting of program operation were:
- Subcontracting for program operation provided
a clear demarcation between the prime sponsor's
planning and administrative functions and program
operation.
- Federal funding is always subject to change
and/or delays.

Subcontracting for services

offered a flexible alternative to dealing with
the attendant insecurities.
- Subcontracts could be let to other agencies if
the existing contract performance was unsatisfactory to the prime sponsor.

Subcontractors

were responsible for performance.
In many areas existing agencies had prior
experience operating manpower programs and
available facilities to continue programs under
CETA.
Factors favoring prime sponsor operation of all or part
of the programs were:
- In areas where no manpower programs had previously
operated, such as rural or county areas, the prime
sponsor was faced with a lack of alternative
operators.

The prime sponsor was forced to
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operate the programs or contract to agencies
with no previous experience.
- Past performance by existing agencies may have
been considered unsatisfactory to the prime
sponsor.
- To maintain control over program operations,
the prime sponsor may have desired to shift some
functions to the prime sponsor while contracting
for other activities.
- Political considerations, such as a prime sponsorts desire to weaken a community action agency,
could have resulted in the prime sponsor choosing
to operate the programs.
Under CETA, the proportion of programs being operated by the
73
prime sponsor has risen to 33 percent.
CETA granted authority to each prime sponsor to
establish comprehensive manpower systems.

Although the

prime sponsor was expected to provide a range of services
from orientation to followup, the legislation designated no
presumptive deliverers of services.

Prime sponsors were to

give consideration to programs of demonstrated effectiveness
and the use of existing services, but they were not required
to use such programs or services.

Agencies which had played

important roles in manpower training and placement prior to
CETA were forced to compete for contracts which could be
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granted by only one prime sponsor in any geographical area.
The comprehensive manpower system model stresses the
integration of various manpower services under the direction
of the prime sponsor.

A manpower center would offer a

combination of services under one roof.

Functional opera-

tions, such as classroom training, could be contracted out
to agencies in different locations, but all activities would
be coordinated.

This model assumes the elimination of

overlapping activities performed by different agencies
within the prime sponsor's geographical area.

Prior to CETA

duplication and overlapping of functions between programs
was a common occurrence.

To achieve the goal of a compre-

hensive delivery system, the prime sponsor must choose to
fund certain existing agencies while eliminating others.
These decisions have and will continue to result in traumatic changes in existing programs and agencies.

Those most

affected by the decisions are likely to be community action
agencies, community-based organizations, public vocational
institutions, and the employment services - all of which
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were active in pre-CETA manpower programs.

Making radical

changes affecting existing agencies, which may have a vocal
local constituency, results in repercussions to agencies and
local elected officials.

Although prime sponsors can

generally be expected to move towards the development of
comprehensive manpower delivery systems, the transition will
occur over several years.
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The Delivery System in the Portland Metropolitan Area
Prime sponsors in the Portland area have chosen different methods to deliver manpower services.

In Spring

1974, the Multnomah-Washington Consortium made a careful
study of available programs and the past operation of manpower programs in the City of Portland.

The Director

concluded that the programs had not been effective.

The

consortium decided to operate its own programs in order to
find out how a manpower system worked.

The Director felt

that no one in Multnomah or Washington Counties knew any
more than the consortium staff about running manpower
programs.

In early 1975 the consortium had subcontracts

totalling about $50,000.

The remainder of the programs were

operated by the prime sponsor directly.

The Director is

critical of subcontracting, because, in his opinion, it is
too hard to terminate a contract once it has been let, even
if performance is very unsatisfactory.

Once a contract has

been let, political pressure to continue the contract is
intense.

Consequently, the Director prefers to run his own
75
programs and maintain control.
The City of Portland chose to subcontract most of the
operation of their manpower programs.

Aside from fiscal

accounting and the payment of client allowances, the City
contracts for all aspects of program operation.

The city
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commissioner in charge of manpower does not believe that the
City should set up new bureaucracies to operate manpower
programs when agencies with the necessary expertise already
exist in the area.

The existing agencies, financed gener-

ally by public funds, should be used rather than setting up
duplicating city programs.

Commissioner Jordan feels that

the CETA money can be used most effectively by using the
leverage supplied "by the funds to make existing institutions
more responsive.

Organizations such as the Employment

Service will continue to function regardless of CETA contracts.

If CETA funds can be used to bring about institu-

tional change, the long term benefits to the disadvantaged
will be greater than if the City sets up its own service.
Jordan sees the City's performance based contracts and the
threat of contract termination as the levers which will
provoke the envisioned changes in existing institutions.
City representatives optimistically stated in early 1975,
that contracts to subcontractors would definitely be terminated if performance was unsatisfactory.

The following

paragraphs describe the initial operation of CETA contracts.
Table V demonstrates the breakdown of CETA f.unds in
the City of Portland.

The local community action agency,

PMSC, was initially to obtain the Intake, Orientation, and
Assessment (I, 0 & A) contract.

This contract was eventu-

ally let to the Portland Community College which had no
previous experience in I, 0 & A.

The Director of the PMSC
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TABLE V
CITY OF PORTLAND'S CETA MONEY
CETA II
Manpower Staff

Youth ~anpower
Human Resources Bureau

$918,821

$821,423

CETA VI
Bureau of Personnel

Older Workers System
Human Resources Bureau

$1,420,039

$33,028

ADMINISTRATION
Human Resources Bureau
Manpower Staff
$201,082
SUBCONTRACTS:
Intake, Orientation &
Assessment - Portland
Community College

Pre-vocational &
Vocational Training POIC

$231,552

$282,754
Job Development and
Placement - Oregon
State Employment Division
$ 75,398

Hanagement Information System Systems Improvements Associates
$ 90,423

Allowances (for enrollees) Systems Improvements Associates
$491,647
SOURCE:

Willamette Week, March, 1975
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feels this was done because of political pressure.

The

approval of the contract by the majority of the City Council
was necessary.

The PMSC director feels that several of the

council members, who have had past conflicts with PMSC, communicated privately to the Commissioner in charge of man76
power, that they would not approve a contract with PMSC.
These allegations were denied by the commissioners during
77
the public hearing.
When the contract was lost the CEP
program under PMSC was terminated.

The local community

action agency is no longer involved in the manpower delivery
system.
A contract authorizing a local community-based organization, the Portland Opportunities Industrialization Center
(POIC), to provide pre-vocational and on-the-job training
services was let by the City without controversy in December
1974.

The performance based contract placed responsibility

for implementing their portion of the manpower plan on the
POIC.

As the program failed to meet expected goals in the

first half of 1975, the City's manpower director considered
terminating the POIC.

Political pressure to continue the

contract was intense, and the POIC contract was maintained.
City contracts were also let to a private corporation
to develop and implement a management information system and
to develop the formats to provide the information for printouts on allowance payments.

A contract was let with the
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Employment Service to provide job development, job placement
and follow-up.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Underlying much of the argument favoring decentralization under CETA was the quest for accountability in
decision making in manpower programs.

Putting manpower

decision making in the hands of local and state elected
officials was expected to provide accountability.

Local

elected officials were presumed to be close to the people to
be served by CETA, and the people could express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with manpower decisions through
the ballot box.

Local officials were also presumed to he

more knowledgeable about the needs of the local labor market
than were Washington bureaucrats.

The interaction between

elected officials and representatives of business and labor
were expected to result in manpower systems geared to local
needs.

Representatives of various groups on the Planning

Council would allow for broad participation in manpower
planning.
Local elected officials are certainly more responsive
to the electorate than were federal bureaucrats.

But, their

responsiveness is often influenced by the political strength
of the interested parties.

Because manpower programs

generally have low visibility and receive little attention
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by the average voter, the political pressures brought to
bear on manpower decision makers are likely to come from
groups directly involved in the manpower system - the
clients, operating agencies, business and labor.

The

responsiveness of the elected official will depend on his
priorities and the level of obligation existing between the
official and what he considers the constituency responsible
for his election.

For example, a Black mayor elected in

large part by disadvantaged voters, may be very responsive
to the potential and existing client population of a manpower program where another mayor might be much more responsive to labor interests.

Unless a scandal from mis-

appropriation of funds, etc. centered media interest on
manpower programs, it is unlikely that the elected official
would need to consider the electorate as a whole in making
manpower decisions.

But, the tendency to broaden client

groups under CETA, which was discussed in Chapter III, is
one possible indicator that elected officials are making
changes in response to their perceptions of the desires of
the electorate.
The disadvantaged client population of manpower programs will in most cases be small, politically ineffective,
and politically inactive.

The exclusion of community action

agencies from a mandated role in manpower programs will, in
all probability, decrease their past role of organizing and
articulating the positions of the disadvantaged population.
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Although client representatives were to be included on the
Planning Council, such positions are often token appointments.

Lacking managerial, political and bureaucratic

skills, disadvantaged persons are often ineffective in such
positions.

Unless the client disadvantaged population has

an effective lobby at the prime sponsor level they are not
likely to be influential in manpower decision making.
If there is increased accountability under the CETA
legislation, it will be accountability to groups directly
concerned with manpower and the provision of manpower
services, rather than accountability to individual voters.
Political activity surrounding CETA appears to approximate
the model of "group theorist" David Truman in The Governmental Process.

There appears to be little individual

participation or interest in local manpower programs except
by individuals representing the groups with which they are
affiliated.

Agencies which have been active in manpower

programs in the past desire to continue their operations and
are likely to use whatever political influence they have to
maintain their position.

The legislation, which stipulates

that "to the extent practical" the Planning Council will
have representative of community-based organizations, the
employment service and agencies involved in training, gives
the involved agencies a potentially effective voice in
manpower decision making.

Regardless of their past or

present performance, many of these agencies have managed to
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maintain their position.

As the prime sponsors become more

experienced and assume increasing responsibility for comprehensive manpower programs, the power of these agencies
and institutions may decline.

But, as long as manpower

funds are channeled through lower government units, interest
group activity can be expected to continue to influence the
decision making process.
In the Portland metropolitan area CETA I and II programs have low visibility.

The Multnomah-Washington Man-

power Consortium which operates separately from either
county government and reports to an almost unknown Executive
Committee, has received very little attention from the
media.

The problems of the City of Portland's manpower

programs and statements from Commissioner C. Jordan have
received press coverage in times of crisis.

There has been

no continuing coverage of any of the prime sponsor's programs by the media.

Little information concerning the

functioning of manpower programs or the decisions made by
elected officials is easily available.

The bureaucracies

concerned appeared with one or two exceptions to be generally suspicious, defensive and secretive.

Perhaps the

level of disorganization and the inexperienced staff members
contributed to the inability to answer questions or locate
supposedly public documents.

Regardless of the reasons, it

is difficult to discover what is actually occurring in the
programs.

The average citizen is unlikely to even make the
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attempt.

It is improbable that his vote will be influenced

by a thoughtful assessment of the local CETA program.
The proportionately large amount of CETA funds channeled into the Portland area has attracted interest group
attention.

The competition for subcontracts and the poli-

tical pressure brought to bear when termination of contracts
is threatened has been at times intense.

When the city

commissioner eliminated the PMSC as a subcontractor, all the
city commissioners were lobbied, law suits were threatened,
the public hearing was packed and the commissioner's political integrity was questioned.

An agency which considered

itself slighted by the Oregon Balance-of-State administration threatened to march on the state capitol.

Similar

incidents were cited by representatives of all prime sponsors interviewed.
Unfortunately, the active involvement of at least a
few of these agencies does not necessarily result in better
manpower programs.

The agencies' inclusion or exclusion

from different programs appears to be more a question of
politics than performance.

All CETA administrators inter-

viewed expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of at
least one of their agencies under contract.

Several of the

agencies were criticized for their reputed unresponsiveness
to disadvantaged clientele.

The principal hope of the

administrators is that the threat of "yanking the contract"
will alter the agencies' performance.

Yet, in several
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instances, the political pressure of the involved agencies
has prevented the termination of contracts.
CETA has resulted in elected officials of local prime
sponsors becoming much more actively involved in the manpower area.

There are differences in the degree to which

elected officials exercise administrative control of the
programs, but elected officials do appear to be maintaining
close contact with manpower administrators.

In a period of

high unemployment, CETA has been a visible, concrete attempt
to deal with the problem.

CETA VI, in particular, provided

local elected officials with jobs during a period when they
were critically needed.

New channels of communication have

opened between local units and affected groups.

Elected

officials are generally more responsive to local interests
than were federal agencies.

SUMMARY
Major changes have taken place under CETA in the areas
of manpower planning, administration and decision making
accountability.

At the prime sponsor level elected offi-

cials and administrative staff, who had only limited prior
experience in manpower planning, are becoming increasingly
involved.

Planning is being integrated into manpower

administrative units in local and state governments.

Al-

though meaningful planning was limited in the first year due
to federal deadlines and the necessity of· concentrating on
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program operation, planning systems have been developed and
may function more effectively in the future.

The role of

the advisory Planning Council appears to vary between
different prime sponsors.

Councils are not the decision

making body but their interaction with decision makers can
affect final decisions.
Manpower administrative units have become institutionalized in prime sponsor government units.

The impor-

tance of the unit varies between prime sponsors as does the
degree of elected officials' involvement.

The lack of

qualified staff and the inexperience of many elected officials in the manpower area have generated problems in
planning and administration.

The changes involved in

developing a comprehensive manpower system have altered the
manpower delivery system.

Traumatic changes affecting

agencies and others involved in the delivery of manpower
services have marred the transitional period.
appear to be developing under CETA:

Two trends

(1) larger than expec-

ted numbers of prime sponsors are choosing to form consortia; and (2) many of the CETA prime sponsors are choosing to
operate all or portions of their manpower programs.
Accountability has improved as elected officials in
prime sponsor areas become more involved in manpower decision making.

Broad citizen participation in the manpower

area has not developed.

The average employed citizen is
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unlikely to be more aware of the functioning of CETA programs than he was of the earlier federal programs.

Those

directly involved in manpower programs are developing new
channels of communication to decision makers.

Interest

group activity has been intense as involved agencies with
constituencies at the prime sponsor level use their political resources in an attempt to influence decisions.

There

is little evidence that local elected officials either "know
best what their local area needs are" or are able to develop
innovative programs geared to the local labor market.

Prime

sponsors have tended to continue operating programs closely
modeled after federal programs, particularly CEP.

Political

pressures appear to make termination of subcontracts difficult.

Unless elected officals and administrators are able

to resist such pressures, prime sponsor programs may become
inflexible.
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CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF THE PORTLAND
CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM
~1anpower

programs for the disadvantaged in the United

States have been based on the theory that the programs, if
successful, will result in the participants being better
78
able to compete successfully in the labor market.
The
ultimate objective is to improve the employment and earning
experience of the disadvantaged target population.

Although

the evaluation of manpower programs is a new and growing
field, little is known about the impact of the programs on
the participants after they leave the programs.

The nati-

onal studies which have been done to date do indicate that
the post-training experience of participants in manpower
programs is substantially more favorable than that of con79
trol groups without training.
Many more studies, particularly of a longitudinal nature, need to be done before
firm conclusions can be made concerning the impact of manpower programs on participants.
Over fourteen billion dollars was obligated by the

u.s.

Department of Labor (DOL) for work and training pro80
grams between fiscal years 1963 and fiscal year 1974.

Like all public programs manpower programs are financed by
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tax money from private citizens and businesses.

The money

spent on these activities could be used in other enterprises.
This dissertation is based on the premise that impact
evaluations which seek to assess the extent to which long81
term objectives are being met,
need to be done to determine whether manpower programs were and are effective.

Such

assessments are necessary to provide a basis for good decision-making.

The past practice of creating and continuing

to fund programs on the basis of scarce knowledge about
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their impact is both inefficient and costly to society.
Deliberation on program continuation should include an
assessment of program effectiveness.
This portion of the dissertation will not be concerned
with administrative monitoring, or "process evaluation",
but will concentrate on the impact, or "outcome evaluation",
which is primarily focused on the capacity of the program to
83
cause changes in those who are exposed to it.
The only
"outcomes" chosen to measure the impact will be tangible
change in the income of participants of the manpower program
and of the control group.

This measure of manpower effec-

tiveness was chosen because as Scanlon, et aI, concluded,
"Given the present state of knowledge, the most appropriate
framework for effectiveness measurement at present is not
the national economy ... but the success of the applicant in
84
the labor market."
Other possible changes attributable

III

to the program, such as decreased crime, improved selfimage, increased social and job satisfaction, and decreased
governmental dependency, are considered outside the range of
this study.

This research will not attempt to investigate

the questions of job displacement, or the impact of the
program on local institutions and the local labor market.
The assumption is made that an effective program has at
least the following impacts on the local labor market:

(1)

Increased labor market participation and a larger labor
market supply;

(2) Improved skills among those in the labor

market; and (3) Reduction in labor market frictions due to
the participants' increased familiarity with its institu85
If income redistribution is included as an allowtions.
able goal for manpower programs, then the question of job
displacement becomes less important in evaluating programs.
A program which succeeds in reshuffling employment and
decreasing the dispersion in the distribution of earned
incomes would be considered a success.
THE PORTLAND CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM AND CETA
The general background information concerning the
creation of the Concentrated Employment Program at the
national level is contained in Chapter II.

The Portland

Concentrated Employment Program (PCEP) began operation in
September 1968 and was terminated in January 1975 when the
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City of Portland under CETA Title I contracted wi'th the
Portland Community College for manpower services.
acted as a subcontractor to the DOL.

The PCEP

The local prime spon-

sor of the program was the Portland Metropolitan Steering
Committee (PMSC), a local community action agency.

Con-

tracts were let by the DOL to the PCEP generally on a yearly
basis.

Federal funds were allocated to the program under

the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964, Title I, Part B,
and the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of
1967, Title II.

Table VI shows the budgets for the years

1968 through 1975.

The major purposes of the programs were

to assist the economically disadvantaged persons within the
defined target geographic area in finding employment and
attaining higher incomes.

The PCEP also attempted to pro-

vide substantial employment expansion and employment training for residents of the target area.
Briefly the PCEP operated in the following manner.
Outreach staff in the community identified and referred
potential enrollees to the PCEP.

All applicants were

required to meet the definition of disadvantaged as promulgated by the DOL.

Once screening, selection, and en-

rollment were completed, the client was tested and counselled by an Employment Development Team.

The client worked

with the team to draft an Employability Development Plan
(EDP) suited to the client's individual needs and the services offered by PCEP.

The client was then enrolled in a

TABLE VI
PORTLAND CONCENTRATED EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM
BUDGETS AND ENROLLMENTS: 1968-1974
Total
Funds

MDTAInside

MDTAOutside

Planned
Enrollment

$780,300

$200,700

None

800*

$1,000,019

$505,000

$379,614

$243,386

600

$1843

Sl,474,000

$880,000

$290,000

$304,000

800

16-48

$2075

$1,681,000

$880,000

$436,847

$364,153

810

1-6-70 12-2-70

0681

$1290

$1,161,503

$337,503

$308,573

$515,427

900

9-68
1-5-70

1681-41**

$1221**

$

$880,000**

$115,756**

$1531

$7,213,278

Contract
Number

Cost per
Enrollee

1-16-74 1-10-75

46-48

$1226*

$

981,000

3-1-73 1-15-74

36-48

$1667

11-5-71 2-28-73

26-48

12-3-70 11-4-71

Date

Total

915,756**

EOA

$4,262,803

$1,731,490 $1,426,966

750**

4,660

Cost per Enrollee and Planned Enrollment figures are estimates, not actual figures.
EOA funds are allocated through the Economic Opportunity Act.
t-'
t-'

w

TABLE VI (Continued)
MDTA-Inside funds were controlled by PCEP and funded "institutional training" programs
which have higher costs per enrollee than on-the-job training and work experience
prog.r-ams.
MDTA-Outside funds were controlled by the Employment Service and "ocation Education.

*

Estimate by Region X, Department of Labor - CEP figure was 1050, but Regional
officials stated that this was an unrealistic figure.

**

DOL could not furnish information on this contract.
by PCEP Director.

Source:

Figures are estimates given

Department of Employment and Training, Region X, U.S. Department
of Labor, 1975

f-'
I-'
~
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program of varying length which oriented him or her to the
world of work and specific job requirements.

This first

stage was referred to as Intake, Orientation, and Assessment
(I, 0, & A).

The second stage consisted of remedial educa-

tion if necessary and training - general, job-specific, or
on-the-job training.

These services were generally provided

by other agencies subcontracting with PCEP.

Throughout the

client's enrollment in the program counselling and various
supportive services, such as medical services, day-care,
etc., were available.

Upon completion of training the

client was hopefully placed in a suitable job.

The particu-

lar combination of services utilized depended upon the type
of disadvantage confronting the client, and the kind of
employment desired.

A client was contacted at intervals of

thirty, sixty, and ninety days after job placement.

No form

of follow-up continued after ninety days, and very little is
known about participants' incomes after this period.

Evalu-

ations of the internal administration of the PCEP and
audits have been performed, but no long-term impact evaluation of the PCEP has been made up to the present time.
The City of Portland's CETA I program is closely
modeled after CEP.

Although contracts are administered by

the City and the subcontracting agencies are different in
some cases, the basic form of the City's manpower programs
is similar to that of the PCEP.

The City is also serving

the same geographical area although clients may also come

116
from other areas in the city.

The present programs consist

of a comparable set of components directed more or less at
similar target groups and designed around a particular set
of assumptions relating the causes and effects of the
groups' perceived problems in the labor market.

For exam-

pIe, the PCEP orientation connected with institutional
training assumed that the primary problems facing the client
were insufficient knowledge of the labor market and a lack
of basic skills.

Consequently, the primary services offered

were intake to identify persons with low skills, counselling
to determine vocational interests, orientation to the work
world and its requirements, a classroom training service to
impart necessary job skills, a stipend to provide financial
support during training, and a placement service to match
86

clients to available jobs.

The basic package of services

offered under CETA I in the City of Portland is based on the
same model.

The similarity of the programs increases the

importance of an evaluation of the impact of the peEP on its
participants.

Given that the purpose of both programs is

primarily to increase the income of participants, the impact
evaluation of the peEP will provide insight into the validity of the model on which both programs are based.

The

information on the peEP may provide the present CETA decision makers with new facts which may assist them in making
future manpower decisions.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
The research is a retrospective study relying on the
use of existing records at the PCEP.
In September 1973 the author was given full access to
all the files of past enrollees in the PCEP, and the files
of those persons who had been admitted to the PCEP but had
failed to participate.

From these files the author extrac-

ted the information shown in Table VII on every individual
whose file was closed between 1968 and 1972. Only complete
87
Individuals who comand available files were included.
pleted the program as well as dropouts who received part,
but not all, of the intended program were included in the
88
Other research has found that exposure
treatment group.
to the program, regardless of completion, does result in
89
changes which must be included in the evaluation.
The Control Group
A basic problem in measuring the impact of manpower
programs is to obtain valid evidence on the magnitude of
'each outcome variable which would have emerged had the program not existed.

Studies lacking control groups leave

unanswered the vital question of whether training is the
relevant variable which explains post-training gains or
losses.

The ideal solution is to randomly select a control

group by dividing like interested applicants in half - providing one group with the services of the manpower program
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and excluding the other group, the control group, from the
manpower services provided by the program.

This ideal was

not a feasible alternative for this retrospective study.
Another alternative is to compare the pre-training and the
post-training earnings experience of participants.

The

author recorded the self-reported income for the 52 weeks
preceding program application for all involved individuals.
This information was not utilized in evaluating the impact
of the program.

The author concluded that the self-reported

income was unreliable.

PCEP intake personnel indicated that

applicants were aware of the low income eligibility requirement and that generally the income reported was not checked.
Consequently, applicants were possibly motivated to underreport their income to qualify for the program.

Further-

more, groups with high unemployment levels can be expected
to have high unemployment levels later, but they will usually have greater than average increases in employment and
earnings.

This is particularly true for youths and re-

entrants to the labor force.

Such income gains are not
90
necessarily attributable to training.
The control group

used in this research is a group of persons who are statistically equivalent to the enrollees in the peEP in all
respects as far as demographic variables, their application
to the program, and their eligibility for the program; but,
who for some unknown reason, did not enter the program.
other research has concluded that, "until new results
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emerge, qualified and interested nonenrollees seem to be
more appropriate control groups than does the general target
91
population."
They, like the program participants, showed
an interest in the program and were able to meet the pro92
gram's entrance requirements.
Qualified nonentrants may
be slightly less qualified or conversely, slightly more
qualified than the entrants.

Other research and the PCEP

personnel have indicated that reasons for non-entrance are
varied and may be due to timing, fear of the program, finding a job on their own, moving, etc.

All eligible indivi-

duals who had applied but failed to participate in the PCEP
and whose files contained the essential information were
93
included in the control group.
Income Data
The long-range followup of persons who participated in
the manpower training programs has proved to be both diffi94

cult and costly in previous attempts by other researchers.
Cost estimates on national surveys of personal interviews
with exenrollees after six to twelve months ranged in 1972
from fifty to one hundred and fifty dollars per person.
95
Response rates are frequently unsatisfactory.
The disadvantaged population which is the focus of the manpower
programs evidences certain characteristics that make locating, meeting, and interviewing exenrollees very difficult.
The peEP attempted in 1973 to survey exenrollees in one
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component of the program.
ten percent.

The response rate was less than

Other means of obtaining follow-up data are

necessary if evaluation of program impact is to be effected.
The united states Social Security Administration (SSA)
has recognized that their data, if suitably used so as to
provide confidentiality, is a useful source of income data
for evaluating the impact of manpower programs.

This re-

search uses SSA data to obtain follow-up information on the
incomes of the control group and the exenrollees in the
PCEP.

The earnings reported to the SSA are not total earn-

ings, but taxable earnings up to a maximum of $9000 in 1972
96
and $10,800 in 1973.
This maximum does not appear to be a
serious limitation considering the expected earnings for
97
most participants in manpower programs.
The SSA records
cover ninety percent of paid employment under nationally
uniform laws and procedures.

All local units of government

in the Portland area and the local community action agency
are covered by the SSA.

The response rate is reportedly
98
over 98 percent with accurate Social Security numbers.
The records collected by the SSA are confidential.
The SSA provided the author, on a reimbursable basis, the
earnings information for coded cells containing five or more
individuals.

The author provided the SSA with punch cards

with the following data elements on PCEP exenrollees and the
control group:
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Social Security number
Last name
Five digit numeric code - classifying individuals by
Treatment or Control Group, Sex, Race, Age, and
Education
The SSA matched the punch cards to its master file, and for
every match, wrote out the five digit code field and the
taxable earning for the years 1972 and 1973.

The SSA sorted

the resultant file according to the five digit code and
aggregated the incomes of 3330 individuals in cells of five
individuals or more. Cells with less than five individuals
99
were deleted.
The SSA then provided the following information for 1972 and 1973 on each coded cell:

minimum and

maximum income; frequence distributions on total earnings by
year, mean earnings by year, standard deviations on the
mean, and median earnings including and excluding zero
earners.

The information was provided on computer tape,

which unfortunately was not usable, and an accompanying
printout.
Problems in using Social Security Administration Data
Several problems are involved in the use of SSA data.
For each year there is only one earnings amount reported.
No information concerning the period of employment covered
is retained.

Consequently, it is impossible to compute

hourly wage rates or to determine whether the reported
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earnings are for a one-month or a twelve-months period.
coverage under the SSA has not been universal.

The

Federal

employees, who might be manpower participants, are not
included.

Employees of nonprofit organizations and govern100
Wages paid for yard work,
ment units may not be covered.
domestic services and other "odd jobs" often may not be
reported.

Earnings reported included military wages without

a label.
There is a built-in time lag before wage data reported
by employers can be obtained from the SSA summary earnings
records.

SSA records are not 99 percent complete for non-

farm wage and salary data until October of the following
calendar year.

Preparing special research data is not the

primary purpose of the SSA.
be given a low priority.

Retrieval of research data may

The information for this research

was submitted in October 1974.

The most recent SSA summary

earnings records at that time were for 1973 earnings.

The

complete SSA compilation of the earnings data was received
by the author during the summer of 1975.

Thus, complete

earnings data was not available until one and a half years
after the last year being examined.
The most serious limitation to research encountered in
the use of SSA data is imposed by the necessity of maintaining confidentiality of individual records.

Income in for-

mation is only reported in cells of five or more individuals.

This

require~ent

seriously limits the number of
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independent variables that may be included in a cell code
unless the sample size is very large.

The five variables

included in this research were considered important in
influencing income levels.

Many independent variables, such

as criminal record, head of household, handicaps, etc.,
could not be included.

Furthermore, the reporting of group

earnings severely limits the ability of the analyst to
manipulate the data.
-

Although the cells can be aggregated

i.e., the total earnings of the group aged 0 - 20 years

could be added to the total earnings of the group aged 21 25 years - the group earnings cannot be disaggregated since
individual incomes are not reported.

These limitations

inherent in the use of SSA data should be kept in mind when
reviewing the findings of this research.
The Dependent and Independent Variables
Manpower program impact evaluations involve the
measuring of relationships between program goals, the dependent variable, and a chosen group of independent variables.
The evaluation attempts to discover which independent variables are important and the nature of the relationship.

It

is assumed that the dependent variable is a function of more
than one independent variable.

The dependent variables

were limited in number in order to obtain SSA data, are
treatment, age, sex, race, and years of formal education.
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My hypotheses concerning these variables are as
follows:
1.

Participation in the peEP will have a significant

positive impact on incomes.

Other research has found

individuals do benefit from participation in manpower pro101
The income levels of participants will be siggrams.
nificantly higher than those of the control group.
2.

The age of persons included in the study will

influence income.

Factors associated with age - such as

increased labor market experience, maturity, family responsibilities, etc. - should result in adults being more stable
workers and attaining higher income than youths.

Labor

market discrimination against hiring older workers, and
particularly disadvantaged older workers, will result in
lower incomes for persons forty-five and over.
3.

Sex of persons included in the study will have an

influence on income.

This hypothesis is based on the

assumption that women generally have a weaker labor force
attachment than men, and that sex discrimination in the

u.s.

has resulted in lower incomes for the female labor force
than the male labor force.

In 1969 the earnings of full-

time women workers was 60.5% of full-time men's earnings
102
nationally.
Female incomes will be lower than male
incomes.
4.

The Race of persons included in the study will have

an influence on income.

Discrimination in hiring and
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promotion on the basis of race has been well documented in
103
Substantial economic disadvantage remains for
the U.S.
104
nonwhites, even at high levels of aggregate demand.
The
mean and median incomes of nonwhites are lower than those of
whites, and the ratio of nonwhite to white earnings is
declining in all major geographical areas of the U.S. except
105
the South.
Nonwhites will have lower incomes than
whites.
5.

Years of education attained by persons in this

study will have a distinct influence on income.
is often used as a screening device by employers.

Education
Increased

years of education generally improves opportunities for
employment in higher income jobs.
correlated with income in the U.S.

Education is positively
Persons with twelve

years of education and over should have higher incomes than
those with less education.
6.

Interactions between the five independent vari-

abIes will influence income.
Table VII provides an explanation of the code submitted to the SSA and the approximate number of persons in
each coded cell.
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TABLE VII
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
PCEP PARTICIPANTS AND CONTROL GROUP 1968-1972
5 Digit Code -

!

I

-

Treatment

II

-

Sex

III

-

Race

II III IV V

l. Participant of PCEP
2. Control Group

.

L.
Male
2. Female

l. Black
2. White
3. ~1exican Amer ican
4 . American Indian
5. Other

IV - Age

.i..

2.
3.
4.
5.
V - Completed
Years of
Education

Example:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

o - 20 years of age
21 - 25 years of age
26 - 44 years of age
45 years of age and over
Blank
1 - 9 years completed
10 - 11 years completed
12 years and over completed
Blank
Blank

11212 - Treated, Male, White, 0-20 years, 10-11
years of education completed
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TABLE VII (Continued)
FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - PCEP PARTICIPANTS
Code

Number of Persons

Code

Male, Black

Number of Persons
~ale,

White

11111

14

11211

23

11112

107

11212

57

11113

72

11213

45

11121

11

11221

15

11122

72

11222

36

11123

99

11223

51

11131

43

11231

32

11132

64

11232

27

11133

106

11233

57

11141

28

11241

14

11142

13

11242

17

11143

11

11243

16

Total

640
Male, Other

11355

25

11455

27

11555

9

Total

61

390
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TABLE VII (Continued)
FREQURNCY BY CODED CELL - PCEP PARTICIPANTS
Number of Persons

Code

Female, Black

Number of Persons

Code

Female, White

12111

16

12211

9

12112

71

12212

45

12113

93

12213

58

12121

8

12221

17

12122

58

12222

22

12123

98

12223

34

12131

30

12231

13

12132

63

12232

21

12133

106

12233

38

12141

14

12241

9

12142

8

12242

5

12143

15

12243

16

Total

580

Female, Other
12355

7

12455

13

12555

6

Total

26

288
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TABLE VII

(Continued)

FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - CONTROL GROUP
Number of Persons

Code

Code

Male, Black

Number of Persons
Male, White

21111

7

21211

17

21112

50

21212

30

21113

45

21213

38

21121

7

21221

8

21122 .

34

21222

22

21123

54

21223

40

21131

23

21231

16

21132

35

21232

16

21133

59

21233

32

21141

23

21241

12

21142

6

21242

11

21143

9

21243

7

Total

352
Male, Other

21355

11

21455

10

21555

8

Total

29

249
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TABLE VII (Continued)
FREQUENCY BY CODED CELL - CONTROL GROUP
Number of Persons

Code

Number of Persons

Code

Female, White

Female, Black
22111

12

22211

8

22112

47

22212

30

22113

56

22213

30

22121

11

22221

7

22122

23

22222

11

22131

14

22223

25

22132

34

22231

7

22133

54

22232

16

22141

7

22233

31

22142

5

22241

6

22143

5

22242

12

22243

9

Total

324

Female, Other
22455

13

Total

13

GRAND TOTAL

3144

192
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After considering the small number of persons in the

~exi

can-American, American Indian, and Other cells, and the
increased complexity introduced by a five-level variable
versus a two-level variable, these cells were eliminated
from the study.

A two-level variable for race - Black and

White - was used in the final analysis.

A number of the

frequencies in the coded cells are low, particularly in the
control group.

All available records at peEP were utilized

in compiling the control group.
were considered:

Three possible alternatives

(1) Increasing the number of persons in the

cell by the process of estimation;

(2) Aggregating the

cells - increasing the frequencies in the involved cells by
eliminating one of the levels of one of the variables; and
(3) analyzing the data as reported and noting the possible
unreliability introduced by the small cell size.

The first

alternative was rejected because of the complexity of the
task and the questionable validity of the estimated result.
The second alternative was also rejected because of the loss
of information and the apparent importance of the different
levels of the variables as defined.

For instance, the cells

representing persons 45 years of age and over have low
frequencies.

The mean earnings of coded cells 12241 and

12231 are respectively $961 and $2286.

Persons over 45

years of age in every category earned appreciably less
income than did those in other categories.

The aggregation

of the categories did not appear to benefit the research.
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Instead, the low cell sizes in certain categories are noted,
and less reliance should be placed on the conclusions derived from these cells.
The original research design included a second code
including the variables year treated, type of training
received, length of training, and years of education.

The

earnings information for the second code was reported by the
SSA.

The author intended to compare earnings in 1972 and

1973 as well as median earnings and mean earnings in the
different years reported.

Unfortunately, the computer tape

prepared by the SSA could not be utilized.

After investing

a considerable amount of time in an unsuccessful attempt to
retrieve data from the SSA tape, the decision was made to
discard the tape.

This decision meant that all data to be

utilized in the analysis had to be keypunched onto computer
cards from the over four-hundred page computer printout
provided by the SSA.

Constraints on time and funds limited

the amount of information which could be keypunched.
The decision was made to perform the analysis on the first
code which contained both the participants and the control
group and included larger cell frequencies.

Mean earnings

which reflect more accurately the possible total lifetime
stream of earnings over time, was chosen as the earnings
measure.

The study is limited to earnings in the year 1973.
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ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The statistical technique chosen for analysis of the
data was the analysis of variance.

~1ultiple

regression

analysis was rejected due to the large number of dummy
variables which would have to be included in the equation.
The general purpose of Analysis of Variance is to determine
which factors of an experiment have noteworthy effects on
the scores, and to provide quantitative information about
the relative importance of different factors and their
levels.

The Analysis of Variance is utilized in this

research to determine whether the factors previously described as the independent variables have noteworthy effects
on the incomes of the persons in this study.

The primary

interest is focused on the effects of participation in the
PCEP on income.

The different levels of the five factors

and their effects on income levels are also of interest in
that they aid in determining which particular categories of
persons benefit or do not benefit from participation in the
PCEP or similar programs.
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is based on the assumptions that there are equal scores per condition, the distribution of the scores within a condition conforms to the
normal distribution, and the assumption of homogeneity of
106
variance. Actually, it has been demonstrated by Norton
that the F-test, which is the test of significance used in
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ANOVA, is fairly robust with respect to heterogeneity of
variance of normal distributions, and also with respect to
simultaneous failures of both normality and heterogeneity of
variance.

The Analysis of Variance computer program for

this research was performed using the original data reported
by the SSA as well as two standard score transformations.
There was no significant difference in the results of the
analysis.
The Biomed program, Analysis of Variance for Factorial
Design, was utilized in the analysis of the data.

The

research design is described as a 2 X 2 X 2 X 4 X 3 factoral
experiment.

All five factors are considered fixed factors.

The Analysis of Variance for Factorial Design program provided the following output:
(1) Analysis-of-variance table and the grand mean.
(2) A breakdown of the sums of squares into orthogonal
polynomial components for four main effects and all of their
first order interactions.
(3) Main effects and first order interactions for the
factors specified in (2).
(4) Cell and marginal means.
To obtain a denominator to be utilized in the FTest for Significance, the fifth level interactions were
pooled with the computed residual term.

Tukey's Test for

Nonadditivity was performed and supported the hypothesis
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that the components for the fifth IE-vel interaction are
homogeneous.

There was no reason to reject the hypothesis

of additivity, and therefore the pooling of the fifth level
interactions provides an estimate of experimental error.
F-Tests for Interaction
The F-Test for Interaction was performed prior to the
F-Test for Main Effects since the existence of interaction
between two or more factors affects the influence of the
main effects.

For example, two factors such as participa-

tion in the peEP and race of the individual may interact to
produce an effect which is different than the main effect of
treatment or race measured individually.
The interactions found to be significant using the FTest for interaction for the fixed effects model are shown
in Table VIII.
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TABLE VIII
F-TESTS FOR INTERACTION FOR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL

df ,df
1

Sources

4.20

7.64

2.95

4.57

F

2

1, 29

95

df ,28
1
F
99

TR, MS

F

99.9
13.5

error
3, 29

SA, MS

7.19

error
TRA, MS
error
INTERACTIONS SIGNIFICANT AT

F

Treatment, Race

p~.05

=

5.71

=

3.47

(1,29)
Treatment, Race, Age F
(3,29)
INTERACTIONS SIGNIFICANT AT

p~.OOl

Sex, Age

=

F

8.69

(1,29)

Although the F-Test for interaction indicated that four of
the five factors had significant interaction with one or
more other factors, the F-Test for Main Effects was performed for all five factors.

All Main Effects were found to

be significant at the .10 level or higher.

Education, the

factor which had no significant interaction with other factors, is significant at the .001 level.
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TABLE IX
F-TESTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS FOR FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
df
1,28
df ,df
1
2

Sources

1,29

2,29
3,29

F

F

90

95

99

Treatment
Sex MS
error
Race

2.89

4.20

7.64

Education
MS
error
Age, MS
error

2.50

3.34

5.45

8.93

2.29

2.95

4.57

7.19

Main Effects Significant at p<.10
Treatment

=

F

3.49

(1,29)
Main Effects Significant at p<.OI
Race

=

F

11. 86

(1,29)
Main Effects Significant at p<:.OOI
Sex

F
(1,29)

Age

F
(3,29)

Education

F

F'

F
(2.29)

=

35.47

=

14.08

=

12.49

99.9
13.5
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In spite of the significant interactions between
Treatment and Race; Treatment, Race, and Age, and Sex and
Age, all main effects except Treatment are significant at
the .01 level or better.

Because of the significant inter-

actions, care must be taken in interpreting the main effects
due to Treatment, Race, Sex, and Age.

The manner in which

the different levels of the factors with significant interactions are related is most readily shown by the profiles of
the simple effects for the factors at different levels.
These profiles are drawn in Figures 3-8.

Data for these

profiles are obtained from the ANOVA summary tables.
Figures 3-5 represent the profiles of the means at different
levels of the factors Treatment, Race, and Age.

The nota-

tions for the levels follows the code given in Table VII.
For example T

stands for participation in the peEP, R
1

stands for Blacks, etc.

1

Generally, if two profiles have the

same shape (i.e., are parallel) all simple interactions are
zero.

The profiles of a three-factor interaction, such as

shown in Figures 3-5 imply that the third level interaction
is equal to zero when (1) the profiles of the two-factor
means are parallel within each level of the third factor or
when (2) the pattern of profiles for the two-factor means is
geometrically similar to the pattern for the combined
levels.

A three-factor interaction may be nonzero while the

two-factor interaction is zero.

The TA profiles for the

combined levels of Race, for example are nearly parallel and
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do not cross.

Thus, the interaction between Treatment and

Age may be equal to zero.
significant.

In fact the interaction was not

Figure 4 represents the three level inter-

action with the profiles on the far right representing
Treatment and Race for Combined Ages.
parallel and cross each other.

The profiles are not

This implies that the two-

factor interaction for Treatment and Race is not equal to
zero.

The interaction was significant.

The interaction

between Race and Age was also not significant at the .05
level.

The interaction between Treatment and Race is

presented in Figure 6.

The profiles are not parallel and

the two-factor interaction was significant at the .05 level.
The interaction between Sex and Age is presented in Figure
7.

The profiles are not parallel and cross each other.

The

interaction was significant at the .001 level.
In addition to providing information on interactions,
the profiles in Figures 3-7 indicate the possible differences between the different levels of one factor and its
effects on the different levels of another factor.

For

instance Figure 6 represents the profiles of the two factors, Treatment and Race.

The profiles appear to indicate

that Treatment has a beneficial income effect on Whites and
a possibly small negative effect on Blacks.

Ex~~ination

of

the profiles in other figures provides further information
and indications of possible relationships which require
additional testing.
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It may appear that the main use of analysis of variance in this research is to generate a number of F statistics on the data.

However, the author considers the gener-

ation of F tests as only a small part of the advantages
gained from the use of ANOVA.

The important feature of

AN OVA for this study is that it permits the separation of
all the potential information in the data into distinct and
nonoverlapping portions, each reflecting only certain aspects of the experiment.

The mechanics of the analysis of

variance allow for the arrangement and the summarization of
the data in nonredundant ways in order to make decisions as
to whether effects exist and to estimate how large or important these effects may be.

The analysis of variance allows

the researcher to "pull apart" the factors that contribute
to variation and to examine the particular, meaningful,
aspects of the data.

The large number of F tests which were

performed greatly increased the probability that at least
one of the tests showed spurious significance at the .05
level.

The presence of the same mean square for error in

the denominator of the test creates some statistical dependency among the various F tests, and consequently increases
the probability of spurious results.

For this reason the

results of the F tests need to be considered in conjunction
with the pattern and interpretability of the results in
order to form a more reasonable basis for evaluation of the
107
data.
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A Posteriori Tests
Four variables, not including Treatment, were included
among the independent variables due to their proven association with income in the united States.

The research was de-

signed with the intention of testing the five independent
variables, with their twenty-nine different levels, to see
which turned out to be significant in affecting the income
levels of persons included in this study.

Such tests are

called a posteriori or post hoc contrasts.

It is recognized

that such a large number of a posteriori tests capitalize on
the chance differences that happen to be large for this
particular study due to sampling variability.

To lessen the

possibility of Type I errors the significance level accepted
for contrast testing is set at .01, rather than the .05
level accepted for main and interaction effects.

The test

chosen for the contrasts is the Least Significant Difference
Test.
Sex and Age
Sex and Age demonstrated a significant interaction of
.001.

The profiles representing the interaction were not

parallel and crossed between Age

and Age.
3

The Least

4

Significant Difference Test demonstrated at the .01 level
that males matched to females of the same age bracket at all
ages except 45 years and over earned significantly higher
incomes than did females.

Females 21-25 and 26-44 years
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earned significantly more than males 45 and over.

Males

ages 0-20, 21-25 and 26-44 years earned significantly higher
incomes than females in any age category.

There is no

significant difference between the incomes of females age 45
and over and males ages 45 and over.

There is no signifi-

cant difference between males age 21-25 and males age 26-44
years.

Males ages 21-25 years do earn significantly more

than males aged 0-20 years.

Males 0-20 years of age, 21-25,

and 26-44 years of age, all earn significantly more than
males aged 45 and over.

Females a;es 26-44 years earn

significantly more than do females ages 0-20 and 21-25
years.

Thus, it would appear that males aged 0-44 years

earn significantly more than females of that age group.

Up

until age 44 both groups appear to have increased earnings
with age, or at least to have no significant decrease in
income as age increases.

Apparently, discrimination by sex

in the labor force, and perhaps within the training programs
of the peEP, resulted in significant differences between
male and female earnings in all age groups between 0-44
years.

Sex, rather than age up to age 45, appears to be the

most important factor influencing incomes in the interaction
between Sex and Age.
Treatment and Race
The interaction between Treatment and Race was significant at the .05 level.

The profiles between Treatment
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and Race were not parallel.

The Least Significant Differ-

ence test demonstrated that at the .01 level of significance
there existed no significant difference between Blacks who
participated in peEP and Blacks in the control group.

There

was a significant difference between Whites who participated
in peEP and Whites in the control group.

But, there was

also a significant difference between the Black and the
White control group with the Black group earning significantly more than the White group.

There was no significant

difference between the Whites participating in peEP and the
Blacks who did not participate.

This suggests that the

Blacks who chose not to enter the program for unknown
reasons may have been superior in terms of labor force participation potential, than the Whites who chose not to enter
the program.

The Blacks who participated in the peEP were

earning significantly better incomes than the Whites in the
control group.

The difference between the White and Black

participants was not significant.

Two different explana-

tions for the differences between incomes by race are
considered.

The finding that Black participants as a whole

and within different levels of different factors appear to
earn significantly more than White participants suggests
that there is a difference between White applicants and
Whites in the larger labor force.

The labor market dis-

crimination against Blacks may result in Blacks with superior labor market potential requiring the services of a
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manpower program to gain entrance to employment opportunities.

Whites, who experience little or no entrance barriers

to employment, can be expected to obtain jobs more readily
without manpower program assistance.

The White applicants

and participants in manpower programs may lack crucial job
skills or sufficient motivation to obtain and hold a job.
The White participant and control groups may be comparable
and the White groups may in fact be more disadvantaged than
the Black groups.

Treatment may significantly benefit the

White group more than the Black group.

Alternatively, for

unknown reasons, the particular White group who applied and
did not participate in the peEP may have a different labor
market potential than the White group who participated in
the peEP.

Although the Black control group does appear to

be equal to the Black participant group, the White groups
may not be comparable.

If this is the case, the study is

biased in favor of the White participants.

The interaction

between Treatment and Race appears to be a function of a
difference in incomes between races in the control group
rather than an influence of the peEP.
Treatment, Age, and Race
The interaction between Treatment, Race and Age was
significant at the .05 level.

The findings suggest that the

introduction of the age factor does influence the interaction between treatment and race.

Although the two factor
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interaction demonstrated no significant difference in income
between Black and White participants as a whole, there do
exist significant differences between both the participant
groups and the non-participant groups and the control groups
at different age levels.
Within the first age level, 0-20 years, the only significant difference was between treated Blacks and untreated
Whites.

Blacks participating in the peEP did not earn sig-

nificantly more than Blacks in the control group.

There was

no significant difference between White participants and
Black participants, the White control group, or the Black
control group.
Black participants in the second age level, 21-25
years, earned the highest income received by Blacks in any
group in the study.

There exists a significant difference

between Blacks participating in the peEP age 21-25 and all
other groups with the exceptions of White participants age
26-44, and untreated Blacks ages 26-44 years.

Blacks enter-

ing the peEP between ages 21-25 years did significantly better than similar Blacks of the same age who did not enter
the program.
Between the ages of 26-44 years the highest incomes
were earned by Whites participating in the peEP and Blacks
in the control group.

There exists no significant differ-

ence between the incomes of these two groups, or between
their incomes and the incomes of Blacks ages 21-25.

There
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is a significant difference between White and Black participants ages 26-44, and the Black control group aged 26-44
earned significantly more than the Black participants of the
same ages.

Although the Black participants ages 26-44

years did earn significantly less than the Black control
group, the White participant group of the same age, and
treated Blacks ages 21-25 years, they did earn significantly
more than White participants and control groups ages 0-20
and ages 21-25, and the Black control group ages 0-20
years.

The White control group ages 26-44 did significantly

worse than every other group in the study except the White
control group 45 years and over.
with the exception of the Black control group, persons
aged 45 years and over earned significantly less than every
other group except the White control group aged 26-44
years.

The Black control group ages 45 and over earned

significantly more than one group, the White control group
of the same age.

Both the Black eTId the White control

groups aged 45 and over contained small cell frequencies and
are not considered representative of a larger population.
The participant groups did contain larger cell frequencies,
and their income levels, which were significantly lower than
those of other groups in the study, do suggest that participation in manpower programs is not beneficial for persons
45 years and over.
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The profiles in Figure 4 representing Treatment and
Age for combined races suggests that with race not considered, those participating in the peEP continue to have
increased earnings as age increases up to age 44 years.
There exists a significant difference between participants
ages 26-44 and the control group of the same age.

This

difference for combined races is apparently due to the inexplicably low earnings of the White control groups of this
age.

The participant group age 26-44 also earned signifi-

cantly more than did the untreated groups of all ages and
the treated group ages 0-20 years.
Education
The F-test for interaction demonstrated no significant
interaction between education and any of the other four
independent variables.
in F

=

level.

The F-test for main effects resulted

12.49 for education which is significant at the .001
Education has a significant effect on the incomes of

persons involved in the study.

At the .01 level the tests

for simple effects found no significant difference between
persons with 1-9 years of education and persons with 10-11
years of education.

There exists a significant difference

between persons with 12 years of education and over and
persons with 1-9 years of education.

A significant dif-

ference was also found between persons with 12 years of
education and over and persons with 10-11 years of education.

The large difference in earnings between persons with
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a high school

educ~tion

and persons with less than a high

school education on application to the PCEP is present in
all groups and within all levels except for those 45 years
of age and over.

This finding suggests that regardless of

treatment, age (with the exception of those 45 years and
over), sex, and race - persons with a high school education
prior to application for the PCEP will earn significantly
more than persons without a high school degree.

The possi-

ble significance of this finding will be explored in Chapter
VI.
Although no significant interaction was demonstrated
between education and the other independent variables, significant differences do exist between the different levels
of the four factors and education.
The following findings are not considered statistically although the LSD results are reported.

They are in-

cluded to present more information on possible relationships
between the groups in the study.
Treatment and Education
Both participants and nonparticipants with a high
school education or better earned significantly more than
did all other groups.

There was no significant difference

between participants with a high school education and nonparticipants with a high school education.

Participants

with 1-9 years of education did earn significantly more than
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did the control group with a similar education.

There was

no significant difference between the participants and the
nonparticipants with 10-11 years of education.

Participants

with 10-11 years of education did earn significantly more
than nonparticipants with 1-9 years of education.
findings suggest that

pa~ticipation

These

in the peEP, not con-

sidering other factors, is of more significant benefit to
persons with 1-9 years of education.
Race and Education
Blacks with a high school education did significantly
better than all other groups including Whites with a high
school education.

Whites with a high school education did

not earn significantly more than Blacks with 1-9 years of
education, Blacks with 10 and 11 years of education, and
Whites with 10-11 years of education.

Whites with a high

school education earned significantly more than only one
group, Whites with 1-9 years of education.
The differences notes above between Whites and Blacks
with different educational levels were influenced by the
poor performance of the White control group.
the factor Treatment alters the findings.

Inclusion of

Black partici-

pants and nonparticipants who had completed high school
continued to demonstrate significantly higher income levels
than did any other group.

There was no significant differ-

ence between the participant and nonparticipant Black groups
with 12 years of education.

Treated Whites with 12 years of
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education earned significantly more than all other groups
with the exception of treated Whites with 10-11 years education, and treated and untreated Blacks with 12 years education.

Treated Whites with 1-9 years of education and

10-11 years of education earned significantly more than the
White control groups with the same education, but not more
than the Black control groups with similar educational
levels.
Sex, Education and Treatment
Treated males at all educational levels earned significantly more than did treated females with similar educations.

Treated males with 12 years of education earned

significantly more than all treated groups.

Treated females

with 12 years of education did not earn significantly more
than treated males with 1-9, and 10-11 years of education.
Treated females with 12 years of education did earn significantly more than treated females with 1-9, and 10-11
years of education.

Hale participants with 1-9 years of

education earned significantly more than similar nonparticipants.

Within this group treated White males earned

significantly more than treated male Blacks and untreated
Whites.

If treated Black males and treated White males are

compared only to the untreated Black control group with
1-9 years education, there is no significant difference in
incomes between the groups.

Untreated Black males with
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10-11 years of education earned significantly more than
treated Black males and untreated White males with similar
educations.

Treated White males with 10-11 years of edu-

cation earned significantly more than similar treated
Blacks.

There was no significant difference between the

treated Whites of this group and the untreated Blacks.

With

combined races there was no significant difference between
treated and untreated males with 10-11 years of education.
Treated Black males with 12 years of education earned significantly more than treated and untreated White males with
similar education.

There was no significant difference

between treated and untreated Black males with 12 years of
education, but untreated Black males of this group earned
significantly more than similar treated White males.

There

was no significant difference between the treated and the
untreated group with combined races for males with 12 years
of education.

Untreated males earned significantly more

than untreated females at every level of education.

Un-

treated Black females earned significantly more than untreated White females at every level of education.

Treated

Black females with 1-9 years of education earned significantly more than treated and untreated White females with
1-9 and 10-11 years of education.

Treated Black females

with 1-9 years of education did not earn significantly more
than untreated Black females of similar education.

Treated

White females did earn significantly more than untreated
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White females with 1-9 years of education.

Treated White

and Black females did not earn significantly more than untreated Black females with 10-11 years of education, but
both treated groups earned more than the similar untreated
White females.

With combined races treated females with

10-11 years of education earned more than untreated females
with similar education.

Untreated White females with 12

years of education earned significantly less than treated
White females, and treated and untreated Black females with
12 years of education.

Treated and untreated Black females

with 12 years of education earned significantly more than
treated White females with similar education, but there was
no significant difference between the treated and untreated
Black females with 12 years of education.

With combined

races there is no significant difference in income between
treated and untreated females with 12 years of education.
untreated Black females, treated Black females, and treated
White females with 12 years of education earned significantly more than females in every other female group.
Age and Education
All age and education groups except those 45 years and
over earned significantly more than did the group aged
0-20 years with 1-9 years of education.

With the fore-

mentioned exception, there was no significant difference in
earnings between persons aged 0-44 years with 1-9 years of
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education and 10-11 years of education.

High school gradu-

ates aged 0-44 earned significantly more than all other
education groups.

There was no significant difference be-

tween the incomes of high school graduates at different age
levels.

All persons ages 45 and over did significantly

worse than all other age and education groups with the
exception of persons 0-20 with 1-9 years of education.
ANALYSIS WITH ZERO EARNERS AND THOSE
45 YEARS AND OVER EXCLUDED
The analysis presented in the previous pages included
all persons including persons reported as having no earnings
during the year 1973.

The author considers that all persons

included in the study regardless of their present earning
levels should be included in the analysis.

But, because of

the nonuniversa1ity of the Social Security data and the
possibility according to Social Security sources, that at
least 10 percent of the persons reported as having zero
earnings may in fact have been working in jobs not covered
by Social Security, a brief analysis of persons in the study
reported as earning more than zero dollars is included.

The

groups ages 45 years and over were excluded due to the small
cell size which remained after zero earners were dropped.
The Analysis of Variance with zero earners and those
45 years and over excluded resulted in different findings.
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The F-test for interactions showed no interactions significant at the .05 level between the variables treatment, race,
sex, age, and education.
presented in Table X.

The F-test for Main Effects is

The two Main Effects found to be

significant were education and sex.

Treatment, race, and

age were not significant at the .05 level.

Thus, the main

variables affecting the incomes of the persons involved in
this portion of the study are sex and education.

Sex

appears to have the greatest effect on earnings, and examination of the incomes by group demonstrates a large difference in earnings between males and females.
A study performed by the Olympus Research Corporation
108
on the Total Impact of Manpower Programs
found that both
pre- and post-wage rates were higher for males than females.
However, because of their lower starting points the females
tended to experience greater wage and income increases if
109
employed.
The study which utilized interviews to obtain
their findings was also able to determine whether participants chose to seek employment following training.

Olympus

Research found that in the WIN programs, which included
70-85 percent females, relatively few of its welfare mothers
110
chose to seek employment following enrollment.
The
research design of this study made it impossible to detect
persons actively seeking employment from those who chose to
not enter the labor market following training or application
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TABLE X
ZERO EARNERS AND PERSONS 45 AND OVER EXCLUDED:
F-TESTS FOR MAIN EFFECTS FOR
FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
df , df

1
1,20

Sources

F

2
Sex, HS

F

F

95

99

4.35

8.10

3.49

5.85

Error
2,20

Education, f\~S
Error

Main Effects Significant at p< 05
Education F(2,20)

=

4.00

Main Effects Significant at p<.OOl
Sex

F(1,20)

=

15.5

99.9
14.8
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to the program.

But, the low mean earnings for females and

the high percentage of female zero earners relative to
males, suggests that a higher percentage of females than
males in this study may have chosen not to seek employment.
The Olympus study also found that clerical training resulted
in below average wage rates, but considerable employment
stability.

The director of the peEP program indicated that

many of the women participants in the peEP program receiving
skill training were enrolled in clerical courses.

This may

also have influenced female participant income levels.
The mean earnings by sex, race, and treatment indicate
that Black male nonparticipants earned $343 dollars more in
1973 than did Black male participants.

When age and educa-

tion are included Black male participants ages 0-20 years
with 10-11 and 12 years of education earned slightly more
than did similar nonparticipants.

Black male participants

aged 26-44 years with 12 years of education or more earned
$1.91 more dollars in 1973 than did similar nonparticipants.
At other age and education levels Black male nonparticipants earned more than Black male participants in the peEP.
White male participants earned $521 more in 1973 than did
White males in the control group.

When age and education

are included, the only White male nonparticipant groups
with large cell sizes to earn more than the participant
White males were White males 0-20 years of age with 10-11
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TABLE XI
MEAN EARNINGS BY CODE GROUP 1973:
ZERO EARNERS AND PERSONS 45
YEARS AND OVER
EXCLUDED
Code Group
Participants

f\1ean
Earnings

11111

$2262*

21111

$3015*

$ 753

11112

$2598

21112

$2560

$

11113

$3686

21113

$3531

$ 155

11121

$4004

21121

$5208*

$1204

11122

$3295

21122

$4027

$ 732

11123

$4183

21123

$4415

$ 232

11131

$3219

21131

$3359

$ 140

11132

$3674

21132

$4317

$ 643

11133

$4371

21133

$4180

$ 191

11211

$2985

21211

$1043

$1942

11212

$2848

21212

$3505

$ 657

11213

$3278

21213

$3248

$

11221

$2793

21221

$3326*

$ 533

11222

$3861

21222

$3192

$ 669

11233

$3066

21223

$2706

$ 360

11231

$3139

21231

$2045

$1094

11232

$4709

21232

$2280

$2429

11233

$4529

21233

$4291

$ 288

*

Code Group
Control Group

Mean
Earnings

Indicates cell frequency less than 10
Underlined difference indicates control
group earned more than participant

Difference

38

30
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TABLE XI (Continued)
Code Group
Participants

Mean
Earnings

Code Group
Control Group

Mean
Earnings

Difference

FEMALES
12111

$2892

22111

$1848*

$1044

12112

$1824

22112

$1471

$ 353

12113

$3191

22113

$3539

$ 348

12121

$3199*

22121

$ 477*

$2722

12122

$2295

22122

$2050

$ 245

12123

$3579

22123

$3719

$ 140

12131

$2164

22131

$3865

$1701

12132

$2240

22132

$2483

$ 243

12133

$3040

22133

$3466

$ 426

12211

$1357*

22211

$ 773*

$ 584

12212

$2170

22212

$2483

$ 313

12213

$2576

22213

$2191

$ 385

12221

$2037

22221

$1867*

$ 170

12222

$1902

22222

$2804*

$ 902

12223

$1919

22223

$2943

$1024

12231

$2972

22231

$1014*

$1958

12232

$3333

22232

$1062*

$2271

12233

$3839

22233

$3421

$ 418

The grand mean for the total group is $2999.
Mean Earnings by Sex, Race, and Treatment:
Black Male Participants - $3431
White Male Participants - $3507
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TABLE XI (Continued)
Total Male Participants

-

$3459

Black Female Participants - $2932
White Female Participants -

$2606

Total Female Participants - $2836
Black Male Nonparticipants

-

$3774

White Male Nonparticipants

-

$2986

Total Male Nonparticipants - $3438
Black Female Nonparticipants - $2943
White Female Nonparticipants - $2361
Total Female Nonparticipants
Total Males

- $3451

Total Females - $2807

-

$2752
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and 12 years of education,

(those with 12 years of education

earned only $30 more than the participant group).

All other

White male participant groups by age and education earned
more than did White male nonparticipants, and often the difference is fairly large.

It must be noted that although

White male participants earned a total of 76 dollars more
than Black male participants, the Black male nonparticipant
group earned $788 more than the White ma18 nonparticipant
group.

With combined races male participants earned only

21 dollars more than male nonparticipants.

Black male par-

ticipants ages 0-20 with 12 years of education or more
earned more than did similar White participants and nonparticipants.

The incomes of Black males ages 21-25 years with

12 years of education or better exceed the incomes of similar White male participants and nonparticipants.
The mean earnings of Black female nonparticipants was
almost equal to the earnings of Black female participants.
with the factors age and education included, the earnings
of Black female participants ages 0-20 and 21-25 years of
age with 10-11 years of education exceed similar nonparticipants by $353 and $245 respectively.

In Other Black

female groups with sufficient cell size, nonparticipant
incomes exceeded those of participants.

Female white par-

ticipant earnings exceeded the earnings of similar nonparticipants by $245.

Reliable conclusions concerning the

effects of age and educational factors are difficult to
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formulate due to the small cell sizes.

It does appear that

female White participants with 12 years of education or
better and between the ages of 0-20 and 26-44 earned more
than similar nonparticipants.

Female White nonpartici-

pants with 12 years of education or more ages 21-25 earned
more than similar participants, but the cell sizes limit
the reliability of the difference.

Black female nonparti-

cipants earned $582 more than did White female nonparticipants.

Black female participants earned $326 more than

White female participants.

With combined races female par-

ticipants in the peEP earned $84 more than did females in
the control group.

With the exceptions of females aged

26-44 at all educational levels, Black female participants
earned more than White female participants in similar age
and education groups.
Median Earnings 1973
Examination of the median earnings by code group confirms the pattern revealed in the analysis of mean earnings.
The Black male participant group did slightly worse in comparison with the Black male nonparticipant group using
median earnings.

The only Black male participant group to

earn more than the nonparticipant group was the group aged
0-20 years with 10-11 years of education.

The Black male

participant groups ages 0-20 and 26-44 years with 12 years
of education which had demonstrated small advantages over
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the control group using mean earnings, earned less than the
control group using median earnings.

The differences be-

tween the amount earned by participating Black males and the
control group were greater using median earnings.

Among

White males the findings were reversed in three groups.
White male participants ages 0-20 with 10-11 years of education earned slightly more than the similar control group
using median earnings.

The White male participants ages

0-20 and 21-25 years with 12 years of education earned
slightly less than the control groups.

Black female and

white females demonstrated similar relationships with their
control groups using median and mean earnings.

Using median

earnings the large difference between male and female earnings remained.

White male participants continued to earn

slightly more than Black male participants.

The Black

participant group both male and female continued to earn
more than the White male and female control groups.

The

relationships between participating White groups and nonparticipating Black groups was identical using median
earnings, i.e., the same Black control groups earned more
than the same White participant groups.
FAMILY HEADS AND WELFARE RECIPIENTS IN THE PCEP
The Olympus study found that the most single important
variable in statistically explaining the level of posttraining wage rates was the number of dependents.

Wage
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rates rose consistently as dependents increased up to three
III

or four, and then turned down with five or more.

The

responsibility to provide income for persons other than
yourself may increase motivation to obtain and retain emp1oyment.

Unfortunately, the number of dependents was not

recorded for persons involved in this study.

Information

was obtained on persons participating in the peEP who
reported themselves as "head of family" upon enrollment in
the program.

Persons currently receiving welfare payments

at the time of enrollment were also noted.
was not available on the control group.

This information

Persons who re-

ported themselves as "Head of Family" and "Welfare Recipient" cannot be matched with their eventual 1973 incomes on
an individual basis, but the percentage of each code group
in these categories was computed.
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TABLE XII
PCEP PARTICIPANTS REPORTED AS "HEAD OF FAMILY"
AND "WELFARE RECIPIENTS" BY
PERCENT OF CODE GROUP
Code Group

Percent Head
of Family

Percent
Welfare Recipients

Male, Black
11111
11112
11113
11121
11122
11123
11131
11132
11133
11141
11142
11143

7%
29%
14%
36%
26%
38%
49%
45%
49%
14%
7%
7%

0%
9%
7%
18%
8%
7%
12%
19%
10%
11%
8%
0

Male, White
11211
11212
11213
11221
11222
11223
11231
11232
11233
11241
11242
11243

30%
19%
13%
33%
47%
31%
47%
56%
51%
29%
35%
25%

22%
16%
2%
13%
8%
6%
22%
15%
14%
29%
18%
6%

Female, Black
12111
12112
12113
12121
12122
12123
12131
12132
12133
12141
12142
12143

66%
58%
51%
50%
76%
63%
53%
67%
79%
64%
38%
53%

33%
64%
42%
50%
67%
52%
57%
57%
58%
21%
38%
40%
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TABLE XII (Continued)
Code Group

Percent Head
of Family

Percent
Welfare Recipients

Female, White
12211
12212
12213
12221
12222
12223
12231
12232
12233
12241
12242
12243

33%
2%
19%
41%
36%
41%
54%
76%
75%
56%
60%
73%

22%
9%
11%
18%
18%
29%
46%
71%
57%
33%
20%
45%

Total Male, Black

36%

10%

Total Hale, White

35%

13%

Total Female, Black

65%

54%

Total Female, White

39%

28%

Total Males

36%

11%

Total Females

56%

46%
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The presence or absence of a positive

relation~hip

between Head of Family and income is difficult to assess
without further statistical analysis.

There is no method to

determine the number of dependents in each category.
Furthermore, within each sex and race category, with the
exception of Female Blacks, the groups with the highest
percentages of "Heads of Family" are generally the older
partjcipants of prime labor force age.

However, persons who

are "Heads of Families" may earn higher wage,::;.

The White

male group aged 21-25 years with 10-11 years of education
reported 47% "Head of Family".

The mean earnings not in-

cluding zero earners of this group were $1068 greater than
the similar group with 1-9 years of education and 33% "Head
of Family"; and $795 greater than the similar group with 12
years of education and 31% "Head of Family".

The White

female groups with 50% or higher "Head of Family" had higher
incomes than any other white female groups.

There is a

possibility that family responsibilities do have a positive
association with income.

Future studies should include the

number of dependents as an independent variable.
TRAINING VARIABLES FOR PCEP PARTICIPANTS
AND MEAN EARNINGS
The participants in the Portland Concentrated Employment Program included in this study were enrolled in the
program at different times over a four-year period, received

173
differing services and training, for varying lengths of
time.

A second code including these variables on partici-

pants only was submitted to the Social Security Administration.

Earnings for persons in the second code groups were

reported by the SSA in the same manner as earnings under the
first code.

It is impossible to determine the sex and age

of persons included in the second code groups.

Due to time

and money constraints, only a brief analysis of the findings
of the second code group are reported.

Earnings were repor-

ted on 1680 persons who had participated in the PCEP and who
were included in the first code groups.

An explanation of

the code is given in Table XIII.
The participants in the PCEP involved in this study
were enrolled in the program during the period from November
1968 through December 1972.
training during this period.

All persons had completed
The SSA earnings are mean

earnings for the calendar year 1973.

Consequently, the

period intervening between completion of the PCEP and the
period in which earnings were reported varies from one to
four years.

Table XIV presents earnings information by year

of completion for participants.
The highest mean earnings are reported for participants who completed the program in the year prior to 1973
and who have the least labor force experience since training.

This suggests the possibility that benefits from

training may be highest during the year or two following
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TABLE XIII
SECOND CODE:
PCEP PARTICIPANTS ONLY
Four Independent Variables -

!

II III IV

I. Year PCEP Completed - 7. 1968 and 1969
8. 1970
9. 1971
o. 1972
II. Length of Stay in peEP - 6.
o - 5 weeks
6 - 25 weeks
7.
8. 26 - 49 weeks
9. 50 weeks and over
III. Years of Education Completed - 6.
1 - 9 years
7. 10 - 11 years
8. 12 years and over
IV. Type of Services:
6. Public Employment - Operation Mainstream, STEP
Neighborhood Youth Corps,
Work Experience
7. On-the-Job-Training and NABS JOBS
8. Basic Education
9. Orientation Only
o. Institutional/Skills Training - VOC 1, 2, & 3;
CEP VOC, MDTA CEP, MDTA OSES
1. New Careers
2. Hold Only and Placement
Example:

0681 - Completed 1972, 0 - 5 weeks length of stay,
1 - 9 years of education, New Careers
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TABLE XIV
1973 MEAN EARNINGS BY YEAR TRAINING
WAS COMPLETED IN PCEP

Year Completed

Frequency

Mean Earnings

1968 and 1969

368

$2199

1970

307

$2001

1971

495

$2418

1972

368

$2487
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the training period or that the training programs offered by
the PCEP had improved markedly with experience.

However,

other important variables appear to vary by the year training was completed and may be responsible for the differing
mean earnings by year.
Education, which was an important explanatory variable
influencing income under the first code, appears to explain
part of the variation between mean earnings by training
year.

Fifty-seven percent of participants who completed

training in the year 1970, the year with the lowest mean
earnings, had less than a high school education, as compared
to forty-seven percent in 1972, the year with the highest
mean earnings.

The percentage of participants completing

the program each year with a high school education upon
entrance to the program appears to be directly related to
the mean earnings by year.

Education appears to explain a

portion of the variation in mean earnings by corrlp1etion
year.

Conversely, mean earnings by years of education

completed appear to vary by year that PCEP was completed.
These variations may be due to varying percentages of males
and females or differing ages between those participants
finishing the programs in different years.

Other variables

included in the study which may affect the variation in
income are length of stay in the program and type of services received.
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TABLE '{V
EDUCATION OF PARTICIPANTS BY YEAR PCEP COMPLETED:
BY PERCENT
Education Upon Enrollment

Year Completed

1968 and 1969
1970
1971
1972

1-9 Yrs.

10-11 Yrs.

18%
14%
12%
7%

33%
43%
36%
40%

12 Yrs.
and Over
48%
43%
52%
53%

Total
100%
100%
100%
100%

TABLE XVI
MEAN EARNINGS 1973 BY YEARS OF EDUCATION
COMPLETED AND YEAR PCEP COMPLETED
Year Completed

1968/1969
1970
1971
1972

Years of Education Completed
1-9 Yrs
Mean

10-11 Yrs.

$1421
$1900
$2023
$1523

$1979
$1679
$1953
$2072

~ean

12 Yrs
and Over
14ean
$2975
$2354
$2725
$2926
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Types of Service
Participants enrolled in the PCEP received many different combinations of services and training.

The partici-

pants involved in the study may have received orientation,
basic education, institutional skill training, placement, or
any combination of these services.

Persons may have been

enrolled in publicly funded work experience programs such as
the Neighborhood Youth Corps, Operation Mainstream, STEP, or
CEP Work Experience.

A small percentage of persons were

enrolled in private on-the-job training programs, NABS JOBS,
and New Careers.

In this study participants were included

under the category of training in which they spent the
longest period of time.

All participants except those in

the "Hold Only" category participated in orientation.
Persons who received basic education and more than four
weeks of other training were classified under the latter
category.
The New Careers program enrolled primarily minority
people of above average education who were to be given
access to entry-level white-collar jobs and advanced education for those presumed to have the ability and ambition to
progress from there.

Eighty percent of the participants in

the PCEP enrolled in New Careers had a high school degree or
better on entrance.

The twenty percent who had 10-11 years

of education received basic education prior to their transfer to the New Careers program.
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TABLE XVII
MEAN EARNINGS BY TYPE OF TRAINING:
BY PERCENT
Type of Training

Number of
Persons

% of
Total

Mean Earnings
1973

Institutional/
Skills Training

213

13%

$2127

New Careers

103

6%

$3724

TABLE XVIII
MEAN EARNINGS BY TYPE OF SERVICE:
BY PERCENT
Hold Only and Placement

74

4%

$3410

Public Employment

401

24%

$2115

OJT and NABS JOBS

73

4%

$2788

Basic Education

252

15%

$1611

Orientation

564

34%

$2287

1680

100%

$2284

TOTAL
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Persons included in the "Hold Only and Placement"
category were considered by the peEP to be "job ready" upon
entrance.

Placement was the only peEP service obtained by

these participants.

Eighty percent of the persons in this

category had a high school education.
The NABS JOBS program and the On-the-Job-Training
programs involved training provided by private employers
,~ith

continued employment after completion of a satisfactory

training period.

Sixty-six percent of the persons in these

programs had a high school degree on entry.

Forty-four

percent had 10-11 years of education.
During the first two years of operation, the peEP
appears to have relied more heavily on orientation, basic
education, and the public employment programs.

Participants

completing during 1971 and 1972 are more evenly distributed
among the different services.
Length of Stay in the peEP
The period in which a participant was enrolied in the
peEP varied from one ''leek to over one year.

Length of stay

in the program does not appear to vary directly with income,
or education.

Length oi time in the program did not dictate

the training content.
In every year participants who spent 6-25 weeks in the
program had the lowest mean earnings.

The highest total

mean earnings were received by persons with 0-5 weeks in the
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TABLE XIX
TYPE OF TRAINING BY YEAR COMPLETED:
BY PERCENT
Year Completed

Type of Training
1968/69

1970

1971

1972

Institutional/Skills
Training

9%

13%

11%

20%

New Careers

0%

7%

5%

15%

Hold Only

0%

5%

5%

9%

15%

23%

39%

17%

0%

0%

8%

9%

Basic Education

12%

19%

16%

15%

Orientation

64%

33%

16%

15%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Public Employment
OJT/NABS JOBS

TABLE XX
LENGTH OF STAY AND MEAN EARNINGS 1973
BY YEAR COMPLETED
Year Completed

oFrequency

5 Weeks
Mean
Earning

6 Frequency

25 Weeks
Mean
Earning

26 - 50 Weeks
Frequency

Mean
Earning

Length of Stay
50 Weeks
and Over
~1ean
Frequency
Earning

1968 and 1969

288

$2306

193

$1993

29

$2509

0

0

1970

123

$2415

106

$1612

42

$1247

36

$2609

1971

121

$2473

205

$1909

117

$2490

52

$3574

1972

90

$2914

155

$1917

77

$2283

46

$3899

622

$2449

659

$1888

265

$2235

134

$3426

Total

f-J

co

N

TABLE XXI
PERCENT OF PARTICIPANTS IN "LENGTH OF STAY" CATEGORY
BY YEAR COMPLETED
Year Completed

o-

5 Weeks

6 - 25 Weeks

25 - 50 Weeks

50 I'leeks
and Over

Total

1968 and 1969

56%

38%

6%

0%

100%

1970

40%

35%

14%

12%

100%

1971

25%

41%

24%

10%

100%

1972

24%

42%

21%

13%

100%

f-'

co

w

184
program and 50 weeks and over.

Those with zero to five

weeks were enrolled in "Orientation" and the "Hold Only and
Placement", with the exception of eight percent who were
enrolled in public employment programs.

Forty-seven percent

of those with 0-5 weeks in the program had less than a high
school education.

Of those persons in the 50 week and over

period, sixty percent were enrolled in New Careers, 17
percent were enrolled in institutional skills training, 15
percent were enrolled in public employment programs, and the
remaining eight percent were evenly divided between OJT/NABS
JOBS and Basic Education.
a high school education.

Thirty-four percent had less than
There does appear to be a positive

relationship between length of stay in the program and Basic
Education.

Two percent of those enrolled in Basic Education

had a high school degree.

Of the ninety-eight percent with

less than a high school education, those with 26 to 50
weeks, anu 50 weeks and over received mean incomes of
approximately $1000 greater than those enrolled in Basic
Education for 0-5 weeks and 6-25 weeks.

This figure may

reflect differing degrees of motivation during training the less motivated having shorter training periods - which
carried over into employment opportunities.
Conclusions
Mean earnings for 1973 vary by the year in which the
participant completed the program.

Percentage of partici-

pants with a high school degree appears to vary directly
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with increase in mean earnings by year the PCEP was completed.

Differences in years of education completed among

participants completing the program each year appears to
have a direct influence on mean earnings.

Conversely, mean

earnings by years of education completed differ according to
the year the PCEP was completed.

These differences may be

affected by the variables sex, age, type of training, length
of stay in the program, or other factors not included in the
study.

Participants receiving the highest mean earnings by

type of services received were enrolled in the New Careers
program or received only placement services from the PCEP.
Previous training, education, and work experience contributed to the high earnings of the "Hold Only" group, but the
placement services available at the PCEP facilitated their
reentry into the labor force.

Eighty percent of those

enrolled in New Careers had a high school diploma upon entry
to the program.

Persons enrolled in the program were pre-

sumably selected for their abilities and ambition which may
have contributed to their eventual higher earnings.

Al-

though their earnings were high in relation to other PCEP
participants, they are low compared to the average incomes
of the

u.s.

labor force with similar levels of education.

NABS JOBS and On-the-Job-Training programs, which included
only four percent of the PCEP participants, resulted in the
third highest mean income.

Seventy-one percent of the par-

ticipants were enrolled in three different types of services
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and received mean incomes between $2100 and $2300.

Of those

enrolled in institutional skills training, 41 percent had
less than a high school education and received a mean earning of $2007.

Fifty-nine percent had a high school degree

and received a mean income of $2210.

Of those involved in

only Orientation, 34 percent had 1-11 years of education and
received a mean income of $2738.

Those with a high school

degree enrolled in Orientation received a mean income of
$2053.

Of those involved in Public Employment programs, 45%

had less than a high school degree.

There was little dif-

ference in mean earnings between those with a high school
degree and those without one.

Thus, there appears to be

little direct relationship between type of training for the
majority of participants and education and their influence
on income.

Differences in sex, age, motivation or other

variables not included in the second code may explain the
differences in mean income by training.

Persons enrolled in

Basic Education who received no other substantial training
were the most disadvantaged in terms of education levels of
the participants and received the lowest mean income.
Mean incomes for persons enrolled in the program from
6-25 weeks were the lowest of any category by length of stay
in the program.

Although 47 percent of those with 0-5 weeks

in the program had less than a high school education, their
total mean earnings were higher than the total mean earnings
of those with similar education.

Quick placement in a job
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may have resulted in higher eventual earnings than training
programs offered by the peEP.

Training periods of over 50

weeks appear to result in higher earnings, although 66
percent of those enrolled for this period had 12 years of
education and over and might be expected to earn higher
incomes.

The longer training period may provide specific,

marketable job skills which the intermediate length programs
do not provide.

Persons remaining in the program for a long

length of time may also have greater motivation and persistence than those in the program for shorter periods of time.
STJMHARY
Analysis of variance on the 1973 mean earnings of participant groups in the peEP and control groups of persons
who were admitted to the peEP but for unknown reasons failed
to enroll in the program resulted in the following findings:
Of the five independent variables - Treatment (Participation or nonparticipation in the peEP), sex, race, age,
and education - there were significant interactions between
Treatment, Race, and Age; Treatment and Race; and Sex and
Age.
The interaction between treatment, race and age
appears to result from the differing performances of the
Blacks and Whites by age and treatment.

Black participants

and the White control group earned their highest incomes in
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the age group of 21-25 years.

White participants and the

Black control group had generally rising incomes as age
increased up to 45 years.

The peEP was not as effective in

serving mature Blacks as was predicted.

All groups ages 45

years and over earned low incomes relative to other groups
in the study.
The interaction between treatment and race is apparently the result of the differing performances of the Black
and White control groups.

The Black control group in most

cases earned more than the Black participants, White participants and the White control group.

The Black partici-

pants earned slightly more than the White participants.

The

White participant group appears to have benefitted more from
participation in the peEP in comparison with their control
group, than did Black participants.
significantly more than Blacks.
most

c~se5

Whites failed to earn

Enrollment in the peEP in

aid not raise the incomes of participants signi-

ficantly higher than the incomes of the control group.
Sex and age demonstrated a significant interaction
which is primarily due to the poor performance of males ages
45 years and over.

In all other age groups males had sig-

nificantly higher earnings than did females.

Hale earnings

were highest between the ages of 21-25 years.

Female earn-

ings reached their peak between the ages of 26-44 years.
Sex appears to be a stronger variable than age.

The find-

ings confirm the hypotheses that males earn more than
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females, and that persons 45 years and over have less labor
market success than younger persons.

The hypothesis that

income increases with age was confirmed, although males
demonstrated a nonsignificant decrease in income between the
age groups 21-25 years and 26-44 years.
As hypothesized, education is an important variable
affecting incomes.

The groups with a high school degree and

under 45 years of age earned significantly more than those
without a high school degree.

The education group bene-

fitting most from participation in the peEP included persons
with 1-9 years of education.

Persons with 10-11 years of

education, particularly Blacks, benefitted least from participation in the PCEP.

This finding implies that the most

severely educationally disadvantaged persons receive sufficient education or training to enable them to obtain
better employment than similar persons who did not participate in the PCEP.

But, the peEP was markedly unsuccessful

in raising the educational capabilities of persons with lOII years of education, particularly Blacks, sufficiently to
narrow the earnings difference attributable to possession of
a high school degree.
Persons who are heads of families may have better
labor force potential than persons who do not have family
responsibilities.
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The greatest benefits from participation in the peEP
are secured by persons enrolled in the program from zero to
five weeks and over fifty weeks.

Persons enrolled from six

to 25 weeks received the lowest total mean earnings.
The majority of participants were enrolled in three
components of the program - orientation, public employment,
and institutional skills training.

The mean earnings of

persons enrolled in these programs were similar.

Quick

placement may have been more beneficial than longer training
for many persons in these components.
Persons enrolled primarily in basic education were the
most educationally disadvantaged.

This group earned the

lowest mean incomes by type of service received.

Longer

enrollment periods in basic education are apparently more
beneficial than shorter periods.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V
78.

Congress and the agencies administering manpower
programs placed a high priority on education and
training and a low priority on correcting the
acknowledged problem of labor market discrimination which may prevent the disadvantaged clientele
for reasons of race, sex, age, education, etc.
from obtaining jobs which bestow above poverty
level incomes, employment stability, and other
benefits to the employee. As Peter B. Doeringer
and Michael J. Piore point out in Internal Labor
Markets and Manpower Analysis, employment discrimination is a complex process.
"The rules which result in employment
discrimination are not designed to effectuate
discrimination alone, but are part of the
total fabric of labor pricing and allocation.
The rules represent the desire of the incumbent labor force to protect employment benefits such as job security and advancement
opportunities, and the employers interest
in minimizing the fixed costs of recruitment,
hiring and training.
For example, where two
racial popUlations differ significantly in
terms of the proportion of persons possessing certain desired characteristics, the
most efficient hiring policy may be simply
to reject all members of one racial population.
Screening by race is less expensive than developing a new process to select
qualified workers from the second race. The
existing labor force for reasons of selfinterest would be likely to resist attempts
to a policy intending to give priority in
hiring and promoting members of the other
race since this would threaten their own
positions.
Hence, it is not generally
possible to change the distribution of
jobs between the races without imposing
costs on the incumbent employees and the
employer. Discrimination is most often
effected by entry, allocation, and wage
instruments of labor market adjustment
process. To eliminate discrimination
with the least possible costs the intricacies of the rules resulting in discrimination and their effects should be
thoroughly studied."
(Paraphrased by
the author).
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Manpower programs for the disadvantaged have been
operated in the

u.s.

for approximately fifteen years.

The

programs - introduced under the authority of the Manpower
Development and Training Act, the Economic opportunity Act,
the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act and the
Comprehensive Training and Employment Act - were all concerned with the employment and earnings of certain groups.
The crucial impact measure, therefore, is that on the lives
of the enrollees.

Has their participation in a manpower

program led to higher incomes and stable employment?

Did

the benefits of the program justify the costs to both the
individual participants and the society?
The evaluation of the impact of the PCEP on the
incomes of participants does not result in brief, conclusive
answers to the major questions.

In reviewing the findings

of this research, the constraints imposed by the research
design and the data on which the findings are based must be
kept in mind.

The primary limitations of the study are

reviewed in the following paragraphs.
The control group was selected from applicants to the
PCEP who did not participate in the PCEP.

The reasons for
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the nonparticipation of the control group are unknown.

It

is possible that the individuals in the control group were
characterized by superior or inferior labor market potential
when compared to the participants.

The participant and the

control groups may not in fact be comparable.

If this is

the case, and there is no method to determine whether the
two groups are completely comparable, then the conclusions
based upon comparisons between the participant and the
control groups are unfounded.

However, based upon analysis

of the results, the author endorses the assumption that the
groups are comparable.

The original hypothesis assumed

that, due to labor market discrimination, Whites in the
study would earn more than Blacks.

This hypothesis was not

confirmed by the research findings.

Instead, both the Black

participant and control groups earned more in 1973 than did
the White participant and control groups.

The difference in

earnings indicates that the labor force potential of Black
applicants to the peEP was superior to that of Whites
applying to the program.

The peEP served a high unemploy-

ment, racially mixed geographic area with a high incidence
of poverty among the population.

Whites living within this

geographic area and applying to the peEP are apparently
characterized by a lower ability preparedness than Black
applicants.

This hypothesized initial difference in the

population by race is consistent with the income findings.
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Mean incomes differed between races but were fairly consistent within each racial group.

Given the size of the

groups, the similarities in demographic characteristics, the
similarities in earnings distributions, the corresponding
percentages of zero earners, and comparable mean earnings the author concludes that the Black control group is comparable to the Black participant group.
The smaller number of Whites involved in the study and
a higher percentages of zero earners among nonparticipant
White females, leaves in question the possibility that the
White control group, particularly the female control group,
may not be comparable to the White participant group.

Their

failure to participate in the peEP may be indicative of a
weak attachment to the labor force.

If this is true, then

the study is biased in favor of the White participant group.
The conclusions reached in this chapter are based on the
assumption of comparability between the participant and the
control groups.
For reasons of confidentiality, the Social Security
Administration's earnings data is reported only on groups of
five individuals or more.
provided.

No information on employment is

Small groups reduce the reliability of the in-

comes reported.

Mean earnings reported by group may obscure

information which would have emerged from analysis of individual incomes.

The reporting of group earning severely

limited the ability of the analyst to manipulate the data.
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The utilization of aggregate data from secondary
sources imposes constraints on the ability of the author to
formulate reliable conclusions.

Due to limitations on time

and funds, the research did not utilize primary sources
which may have provided a valuable check on the incomes
reported by the SSA as well as more in-depth information
concerning the reasons for the apparent success or failure
of the program to effect expected changes.
These conceivable shortcomings of the research should
be considered when reviewing the findings in the following
sections.
THE IMPACT OF THE PORTLAND CONCENTRATED
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM ON THE INCOMES OF PARTICIPANTS
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this
study in both the participant and the control groups earned
incomes below the official poverty level of $4,540 in 1973
for a nonfarm family of four.

Although their incomes were

generally higher than their self-reported pre-enrollment
incomes, the participants continued to earn considerably
less than the average member of the civilian labor force.
Participation in a manpower program did not raise the mean
earnings of participant groups above the poverty level.
The group means for the eight sex/race groups are as
follows:
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Nonparticipants

Participants
Black
White
Black
White

Male
Male
Female Female -

$2,618
$2,539
$2,129
$1,738

Black
White
Black
White

Male
Male
Female Female -

$2,796
$2,287
$2,044
$1,331

Although there are individual exceptions, the mean earnings
of the participant and the control groups remain below the
poverty level.
The 1970 mean income in Portland, Oregon for all families was $11,803.

Of persons in the experienced civilian

labor force, the median earnings for males and females 16
112
years and over were respectively $8,257 and $3,796.
The
mean income for all Black families was $8,142.

The median

earnings for Black males and females in the experienced
113
civilian labor force were respectively $5,806 and $3,427.
Thus, although the earnings of Whites in this study are
proportionately lower than those of Blacks to the general
population, the earnings of both groups continue to be
substantially below that of the experienced workers in the
labor force in the Portland metropolitan area.
Benefits and Costs of Participation
A difference of means test was used to identify which
groups gained significant benefits from participation in the
PCEP or from presumed labor market experience in the absence
of participation.

The groups which experienced significant

benefit are identified by an asterisk.

Other groups in
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which the difference in mean earnings approached significance are unmarked.

The eight participant groups which

earned more than the similar nonparticipant group and are
considered to have benefitted from participation in the PCEP
are:

*
*
*

White males ages 0-20 years with 1-9 years of
education
Black females ages 26-44 years with over 12 years
of education
White females ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years
of education
Black males ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of
education
Black females ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of
education
White males ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of
education
White females ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of
education
White females ages 26-44 years with 12 years of
education

Considering income alone, approximately thirteen percent of
the persons participating in the PCEP gained significant
benefits from their enrollment in the program.
In three cases the control group earned more than the
participant group:

*
*

Black male ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of
education
Black female ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of
education
White male ages 0-20 years with 10-11 years of
education

These findings indicate that of the participant population,
six percent may have benefitted more from continued labor
mark~t

participation than they did from enrollment in the
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peEP.

Participation in the peEP may have cost these groups

in time and income foregone during and after their participation.
The impact of the peEP was measured against a single
criterion - income.

Nonmonetary benefits experienced by

participants were not considered in this study.

The per-

formance of the peEP in affecting income appears to be
disappointing.

Why did the peEP fail to have a significant

effect on the earnings of so many of its participants?
Although mean earnings differences were not significant by
small groups, there did appear to be certain categories of
participants which benefitted more from participation and
others in which participation in the peEP failed to have the
expected effects on income.

These categories are examined

in the following sections.
Persons 45 Years and Older
Regardless of race, sex, age or education the population age 45 years and over applying to the peEP apparently
is characterized by a poor potential for employment.

The

higher percentage of zero earners in all groups over 45
years of age indicates that a large portion of this group
either failed to seek or were unable to obtain employment.
Two possible factors may contribute to the low earnings of
these groups:

(1) the population 45 years and over applying

and/or entering the peEP was characterized by individuals
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lacking motivation towards employment or evidencing severe
problems, such as poor health, which necessitated their
withdrawal from the labor market; or (2) the lack of marketable skills combined with age presented insurmountable
obstacles to employment for disadvantaged persons.

Both

factors are likely to have affected the earnings of this
group.
Unless more exhaustive selection procedures can eliminate the applicants in this group with poor motivation,
health, etc., or new jobs are developed which are suitable
to the older disadvantaged worker, this group does not
appear to be a good investment for limited manpower dollars.
The group aged 45 years and over are not included in
the following analysis.
Sex
Sex had a significant effect on income.

As hypothe-

sized in the original research design, males of both races
earned significantly more than females of both races.

This

finding was apparently influenced by several factors:

(1)

Labor market discrimination resll.l t.s in women entering lower
paid employment regardless of education.

(2) Institution-

alized discrimination within the peEP channeled women participants into traditional female occupations, such as
clerical work, which are generally lower income jobs.
Female participants themselves often did not consider

(3)
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traditionally male occupations when setting their employment
goals.

(4) White females in the younger age groups had

higher percentages of zero earners than did other sex and
race groups.

This figure, in all probability, is a result

of younger White females not seeking employment in 1973.
The smaller percentages of White female heads of families
may indicate that these groups contained many second earners
'vho voluntarily withdrew from the labor market to assume
family responsibilities.

Female Black groups, reporting a

higher number of heads of families, had approximately the
same percentages of zero earners as male groups.
Although females received consistently lower earnings
than did males, participation in the PCEP appears to have
had a more beneficial effect on their earnings than did
participation for males, particularly Black males.
finding

su~gests

This

that females, prior to training, may lack

skills or access to employment opportunities, even poorly
paid employment.

The PCEP services apparently decreased the

barriers to employment encountered by female participants.
The equivalent number of zero earners between male and
female groups with high percentages of family heads, suggests that regardless of the differential in wages, women,
who are heads of families, utilize their training and continue to participate in the labor market.

Training in

occupations with higher income potential might further
reduce the number of women withdrawing from the labor force.
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To improve the effectiveness of manpower programs for
females and to attain the maximum benefit for training
dollars expended, program operators should consider using
the number of dependents, or a similar indicator of the
strength of labor force attachment, as a screening device
for admission into a manpower program.

Scarce manpower

dollars are most effectively utilized in training persons
who will apply their training in employment situations.
Persons who are initially rejected by the program could
reapply when they are seriously interested in pursuing
employment opportunities.

Attention should also be paid to

the type of training and placements which are provided to
female participants.

Efforts should be made to eliminate

discrimination within the program and to reduce discriminatory practices in the labor market.

The program operators

should examine their counseling services and eliminate
guidance practices which channel males and females into
different occupations on the basis of sex.

Participants who

set narrow, traditionally defined goals for employment
should be encouraged to consider other alternatives.
Training and placement services should also eliminate discriminatory practices.

Training for both sexes should be of

sufficient quality to be acceptable to an employer.

The

program job developers may find it necessary to attempt to
influence employers to accept qualified females for nontraditional jobs, just as they must attempt to provide the same
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service for qualified minority applicants for traditionally
White jobs.

But, at least in initial placements, the

manpower program should attempt to screen out persons with
a weak attachment to the labor force and to place persons
who will be satisfactory workers.

Otherwise, employers may

be disillusioned with their initial experience and discontinue the contact with the manpower program"

In brief,

the manpower program operators should attempt to provide
services for females with a strong labor force attachment,
and to place females in jobs which provide above-poverty
income, employment stability and income security.
Education
Education had a significant effect on income.

Except

for White male participants, all groups with a high school
education upon application to the program earned significantly more than groups with less than a high school degree.
Although participants with 1-9 years of education earned
significantly more than nonparticipants with similar education, they earned significantly less than any group with a
high school degree.

The lack of significant interaction

between treatment and education and the similar slope of the
income curves for the participant and nonparticipant groups
by education indicates that the educational services provided by the peEP, particularly for those persons with 10-11
years of education, failed to have the intended effect on
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the income levels of participants.

The goal of Graduate

Equivalency Degree training and other educational services
was to overcome employment barriers by providing dropouts
with equivalent educational training.

~he

large difference

in earnings between the dropouts and the high school graduates suggests that the peEP was unable to eliminate the
employment obstacle imposed by failure to complete a normal
high school education.

There are several possible explana-

tions for the wage differentials attributable to a high
school degree:

(1) The peEP educational training services

may not be equivalent to training received in the average
high school.

(2) peEP educational services may not be

continued for a long enough period to have an effect on
income.

(3) Employers may continue to rely on a high school

degree, received through the normal educational process, as
a screening device for higher income employment; or (4)
Persons who dropped out of high school may lack characteristics possessed by high school graduates which lead to more
satisfactory job performance and superior employment stability.

The latter explanation would prove the least amenable

to correction by the manpower program.

The first three

explanations imply that the wage differential may be eliminated by upgrading the quality of educational services
offered by the manpower program, placing increased emphasis
on longer training, and/or influencing employers to accept
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qualified dropouts for jobs requiring a high school degree
on the assumption that educational training has raised the
participants to the level of high school graduates.

Modi-

fication of educational services may be worthwhile.

The

earnings differentials indicate that there is a significant
payoff in future earnings for high school graduates.
Hanpower programs should continue to admit and train
persons with 1-9 years of education.

This educational group

received the most significant benefit from participation.
Functional literacy levels were evidently raised sufficiently to affect the eventual earnings of this educational
group.

Persons with a high school degree are also bene-

ficiaries of the PCEP.

Placement services and such programs

as New Careers and NABS-JOBS appear to be the most useful
services provided for high school graduates.
Black males with a high school degree did better in
comparison with the control group than Black males with
lower levels of education.

A high school degree had more

effect on the earnings levels of Blacks than it did on
Whites.

This finding suggests that at least part of the

earnings differential may be due to racial discrimination.
Employers may use a high school degree requirement as an
excuse for not employing Blacks, while relaxing the requirement for Whites.

If the income differential is a

function of racial discrimination, then manpower programs
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must deal with the issue of racial discrimination as well as
educational discrimination when attempting to influence
employers to hire high school dropouts.
Race
Race had a significant effect on the income of persons
in the study, but not the effect hypothesized in the research design.

Blacks in both the participant and the

control groups and of both sexes earned more than Whites.
There was no significant difference between the White
participant group and the White control group.

It is

possible that this difference in White earnings is due to
the poor performance of the control group which may not be
comparable to the participant group.
Blacks who benefitted most from their participation in
the peEP were between the ages of 21-25 years.

Black fe-

males benefitted more from participation than did Black
males.

Black males with a high school degree benefitted

more from the peEP than did Black male high school dropouts.
Blacks benefitted less from participation in the peEP
than did Whites.

Black males received the lowest incomes in

comparison with their control group.

For example, although

Black males in the control group with 10-11 years of education received mean incomes several hundred dollars higher
than similar nonparticipants with 1-9 years of education,
the Black male participants in these educational groups
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earned similar incomes.

The finding that Black males in

many cases earned less than their control groups suggests
that the peEP was ineffective in reducing the barriers to
employment experienced by this group.

The peEP may have

eliminated the expected earnings differential between races
by placing persons in jobs where racial discrimination is
minimal due to low wages or unsatisfactory working conditions.

At best the peEP failed to place many Black parti-

cipants in jobs whose incomes were as high as those achieved
by the control groups.
Whites apparently benefit more from participation in
the peEP than do Blacks, particularly when comparing the
success of high school dropouts.

Whites who benefitted most

from the peEP were between the ages of 26-44 years.

Al-

though Whites benefit more from the peEP than do Blacks,
their mean income levels when compared to the average White
labor force are proportionately less than that of the Black
participants to the Black labor force.

This suggests that

although Whites benefit from the manpower program, the peEP
was either dealing with a White population of substantially
lower potential than the normal population, or the jobs for
which the peEP trained and had access were of a much lower
quality than many alternative occupations pursued by the
average White labor force participant.
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MODIFICATIONS TO IMPROVE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF MANPOWER PROGRAMS

RECO~1ENDED

Although impact evaluations which do not include
program monitoring provide information on what happened,
they furnish little knowledge about why the outcome occurred.

The findings of this study indicate that the benefits

to participants in the PCEP were not as substantial as
expected.

No definitive answers concerning the reasons for

the failure of the program to effect the expected changes
can be formulated from the existing data.

Nevertheless, the

findings indicate that serious modifications in manpower
program operations may be necessary if participants are to
gain substantial benefits.
The most serious implication to emerge from this
research is that the PCEP failed to train and place participants in jobs which provided above-poverty level incomes.

The income findings suggest that generally the PCEP

trained and placed persons in jobs which offered no greater
employment stability or higher incomes than jobs which the
participants may have attained without participation in a
manpower program.

Unfortunately, it appears that the pres-

sures to move-clients through the system and to keep average
enrollee costs down by quick training and placements, resulted in few long term benefits for the participants.
The goal of manpower'programs including the PCEP is to
obtain not just an immediate job but above-poverty level
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income, employment

stabi~ity

fying working career.

and income security - a satis-

To provide target groups with jobs

already available to them or to perpetuate their poverty in
lowly paid dead-end jobs is no gain.

Without adequate job

development and placement services, the attempt to serve as
many persons as possible with scarce public manpower funds
results in few benefits to participants.
Institutional Barriers to Employment
A manpower program offering skills training, basic
education and other services is ineffective if it fails to
develop job opportunities for participants which are better
than those available to the potential client without the
manpower program.
enforcement,

If job restructuring, anti-discrimination

su~sidized

employment or training and other

functions are necessary to provide access to satisfying
employment for the disadvantaged, then these functions
should receive high priority in manpower funding decisions.
Ignoring the importance of these functions and placing an
emphasis on the quantity but not the quality of placements
is of little ultimate benefit to the participants or the
society.
The findings of this research suggest that manpower
programs which focus on effecting only individual change may
not be sufficient to cause changes in the eventual incomes
of the disadvantaged.

Programs such as the peEP which
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expend most of their effort on changing the participant by
increasing his job skills, education, motivation, etc. may
not be sufficient to affect incomes.

Perhaps a higher

priority needs to be assigned to functions intended to
reduce the institutional obstacles to employment such as
racial or educational discrimination.

Although services

such as basic education and skills training will continue to
be necessary if the disadvantaged are to obtain satisfying
employment, the existence of institutional obstacles apparently need to be recognized and given a high priority if the
so-called "primary labor market" is to be opened to the
disadvantaged participants of manpower programs.
The Director of the PCEP and the administrators of the
CETA I programs for the City of Portland and the WashingtonMultnomah Consortium, indicated that intense examination of
the local labor market and its operation, job development,
job restructuring, anti-discrimination enforcement and
superior job placements received a low priority in their
programs.

Persons interviewed recognized the importance and

need for these services, but due to time and funding limitations, considered it impossible to devote adequate attention to them.

The demands imposed by operating programs

along established lines, meeting imposed quotas and coping
with emerging crises leave little time for other considerations.
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Unfortunately, it is possible that the goal of the
programs may be 0verlooked as administrators and others
concentrate on developing and operating smoothly running
programs.

Without impact evaluations or long term followup

the decision makers have little information on which to
judge the effectiveness of their programs.

Easily meas-

urable and obtainable indicators of program performance,
such as the number of persons completing the program, are
used to gauge the success of program operations.

The abi-

lity of program operators to meet administrative quotas are
often the only measured indicators of effectiveness.

Con-

sequently, the administrators and operators of manpower
programs may place a high priority on indicators which
measure the effectiveness of program operation but not
program impact.
The administrators of the PCEP operated the program
under federal government supervision and guidelines.
Flexibility in program design and funding allocations were
limited.

Manpower planning was not a responsibility of the

PCEP personnel.

The PCEP met federal requirements.

There

was no indication that the Portland CEP failed to perform
satisfactorily in comparison with other federal manpower
programs.

Under federal programs functions such as job

development, restructuring and anti-discrimination enforcement did not receive equal emphasis with manpower services
intended to cause individual change.
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Recommendations for CETA Decision

~akers

CETA, which places the functions of planning, administering and program operations in the hands of the prime
sponsor, allows the prime sponsor to set new priorities and
develop new policies.

The first step might be a careful

examination of the local labor market and the theories of
low income labor markets.

Programs such as the peEP appear

to be based on the queue theory of low income labor markets.
"The queue theory asserts that workers are ranked according
to the relationship between their potential productivity and
their wage rate •.• The most preferred workers are selected
from the queue first, leaving the least preferred to find
work in the least desirable jobs on the fringes of the
114
economy or to remain unemployed."
The disadvantaged are
among the least desired workers.

Manpower programs empha-

sizing skill training and education assume that raising the
productivity of the disadvantaged should move them forward
in the queue and provide access to primary employment.
CETA prime sponsors should devote careful study to the
local labor market to determine whether the continuous model
of the labor market as postulated by the queue theory is the
most suitable to their area.

If labor market mechanisms are

working to expand the importance of primary employment and
encouraging labor market mobility then this theory is
appropriate as the basis for local policy.

If the pro-

portion or importance of secondary employment is large and
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increasing and barriers to mobility into the primary market
are growing then policies which are based on the dual labor
115
market theory may be more appropriate.
Briefly, the dual
labor market theory postulates that the labor market is
divided into a primary market-characterized by high wages
employment stability, promotion opportunities, and due
process in administration of work rulas - and a secondary
market-characterized by low wages, high turnover, little
116
opportunity for advancement, and arbitrary supervision.
Disadvantaged workers are confined to the secondary market
by residence, poor skills and work histories, and discrimi117
nation.
If the local CETA prime sponsor adopts the dual labor
market theory as the best explanation of the local low
income labor market, the most appropriate manpower policies
may differ from policies based on the queue theory.

Poli-

cies based on the queue theory assume that expansion of
aggregate demand and employment coupled with training to
increase productivity may solve the employment problems of
the disadvantaged.

Policies developed from the dual labor

market theory assume that expansion of the primary market
has little effect on many of the disadvantaged.

Instead,

direct efforts must be made to facilitate the movements of
workers out of secondary employment by altering worker
characteristics and to convert secondary jobs into primary
jobs.

CETA sponsors should have an understanding of the
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above theories and a careful assessment of the characteristics and operation of the local labor market.

Policies and

priorities should be developed which are the most likely to
yield positive results in their local labor markets.
If the queue theory of low income labor markets is
adopted as most applicable to the local CETA labor market,
then an effective CETA program may place a high priority on
skills training to increase the productivity of the disadvantaged.

Furthermore, manpower planners should carefully

assess the local labor market to determine the occupations
in which the programs' clientele have the best chances of
obtaining satisfactory employment.

Employers on the Plan-

ning Council might be requested to obtain data from their
peers in the business community on how employees are trained,
the length and content of the training and access points to
employment.

Training funds should not be utilized to train

persons for jobs which are available without training.
Before training courses are developed, the planner should
obtain in-depth information about usual training methods.
Working with employers, the planners and operators should
develop training courses that provide equivalent training to
that received by other applicants.
CETA prime sponsors should attempt to utilize whatever
channels are available to local employers to obtain direct
access to jobs which will provide satisfactory employment
for manpower program participants.

Job developers should
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meet with prospective employers and influence them to accept
a reasonable match between job requirements and worker
capabilities rather than pursuing unnecessary qualifications.

If possible, programs which couple initial classroom

training with on-the-job training should be developed.
Internal labor markets of large local employers sh ,u1d be
carefully studied and strategies developed which remedy
customary discrimination practices at entry points, in
promotion, and in wage rates.
Regardless of the theory of the low income labor
market adopted by the CETA sponsor, CETA decision makers
might utilize manpower funds more effectively than did the
PCEP by paying more serious attention to assessment of
manpower program clientele.

Accepting persons into the

program on a first-come, first-served basis or with little
consideration of services and jobs available results in a
clientele with many diverse needs, interests and aptitudes.
Accepting persons who have a weak attachment to the labor
force or with such severe barriers to employment as to make
them unemployable is not the most effective use of manpower
funds.

The findings of this research suggest that persons

ages 45 years and over may not be good prospective candidates
for manpower programs.

Females who are not heads of fami-

lies may have a weak attuchment to the labor force.

An

orderly, consistent system for making assessments of clients
should be developed which considers physical and mental
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barriers to employment as well as the capabilities of the
manpower program.

The extent and severities of employment

barriers serve as the ultimate cost of the necessary interventions and the prospects of success.

The amount of

manpower funds available set limits on what can realistically be .done and manpower decision makers should recognize
program limitations.

Rather than process the maximum number

of clients with little long term benefit to the participant,
CETA sponsors should develop a strategy which considers
available services and jobs as well as the target population
applying to the program.
If the dual labor market theory is adopted as the
basis for policy, the assessment of individual clients and
the development of skill and behavioral traits appropriate
to primary employment may receive high priority.

Preference

may be given to adult applicants with stable low wage work
experience and young people who are entering the transitional period between unstable adolescence and the more
mature stable patterns of adulthood required in primary
employment.

These two groups may be the easiest to place in
118
primary employment.
CETA sponsors may also focus on
converting secondary employment into primary employment stabilizing jobs, building career ladders, increasing wage
rates, etc.

Unfortunately, the tools necessary to force

this type of change are generally outside the control of a
local prime sponsor.

But, local prime sponsors could begin
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an active lobby at the state and federal level to encourage
this process through application of minimum wage legislation, labor legislation, social security, and unemployment
119
compensation.
CETA sponsors should develop intervention strategies
which most effectively improve the basic employability of
individual clients, remove the institutional or systemic
obstacles to employment for the disadvantaged, and create
new public or private jobs for specific target groups.

To

concentrate only on individual employability may not have
the expected impact on income.
Finally, the findings of this study demonstrate the
potential value of impact evaluations.

CETA prime sponsors

should consider designing impact evaluations which would
provide them with information on the effectiveness of their
programs.

Evaluations which include program monitoring

would enable prime sponsors to determine what the impact of
their programs are as well as probable explanations concerning why these impacts are occurring.

Impact evaluations

would enable the prime sponsor to reject unworkable projects
and modify others to improve their effectiveness.
SUMMARY
Participation in the PCEP was of significant monetary
benefit to thirteen percent of the participants included", ."in
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this study in comparison to a control group.

The groups

which received benefit were:
White males ages 0-20 years with 1-9 years of
education
Black females ages 26-44 years with over 12 years
of education
White females ages 26-44 with 10-11 years of
education
Black males ages 21-25 with 1-9 years of education
Black females ages 21-25 years with 1-9 years of
education
White males ages 26-44 years with 10-11 years of
education
White females ages 26-44 years with 1-9 years of
education
White females ages 26-44 years with 12 years of
education
Participation in the peEP nlay have cost six percent of the
participants.

The groups in which the control group earned

significantly more than the participant groups were:
Black males ages 26-44 Years with 10-11 years of
education
Black females ages 26-44 years with 1-0 years of
education
White males ages 0-20 years with 10-11 years of
education
Over seventy percent of the persons included in this study
earned incomes below the official poverty level of $4,540 in
1973 for a nonfarm family of four.

Participation did not

raise the mean earnings of participant groups above the
poverty level.

The findings of this study suggest that the

PCEP may have failed to train and place participants in jobs
which provided above-poverty level incomes.

The PCEP appar-

ently trained and placed persons in jobs which offered no
greater employment stability or higher incomes than jobs

•
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which participants may have attained without the manpower
program.
Manpower decision makers should attempt to obtain
access to satisfactory jobs for participants.

High priority

should be given to the functions of job development, job
restructuring, anti-discrimination enforcement and job
placement.

An orderly, consistent system for making client

assessments should be developed which considers physical and
mental barriers to employment as well as the capabilities of
the manpower program.
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